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Cover
A Landsat-7 image (taken on 27 July
2000) of the Lena Delta on the Russian
Arctic coast, where the Lena River emp-
ties into the Laptev Sea. The Lena,
which flows northward some 2,800 miles
through Siberia, is one of the largest
rivers in the world; the delta is a pro-
tected wilderness area, the largest in Rus-
sia. Russia is the subject of a “cluster” of
articles in this issue, including a striking
proposal for disposing of Russia’s re-
maining tactical nuclear weapons, and
two historical studies—of a particularly
dangerous incident involving the U.S.
Sixth Fleet during the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, and of Stalin’s puzzling program
for a battleship navy.
For a full-color version of this duotone
treatment, visit the “Images in the Re-
view” page of the Naval War College
Press website. Image courtesy of the U.S.
Geological Survey; further data available
from the USGS, EROS Data Center,
Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
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Following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy
in 1971, Rear Admiral Route completed a series of com-
mand and leadership assignments both within the
Navy and in the joint service arena. His primary areas
of expertise include surface warfare, politico-military
affairs, and resource management.
Rear Admiral Route has commanded the Navy Warfare
Development Command; Cruiser Destroyer Group 2
and the George Washington (CVN 73) Battle Group;
USS Lake Erie (CG 70); and USS Dewey (DDG 45).
Ashore in Washington, D.C., Rear Admiral Route
served as Director, Navy Programming Division (N80),
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and in his first
flag assignment as Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Division (N52), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Other Pentagon assignments have included Executive
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Man-
power and Reserve Affairs) for three Assistant Secre-
taries in two administrations, Long Range Planner and
Surface Ship Readiness analyst in CNO’s Program
Resource Appraisal Division (now N81), and Naval
Warfare Analyst in the Joint Analysis Directorate (now
part of J-8), Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
He holds a bachelor of science degree in systems engi-
neering from the U.S. Naval Academy, and a master of
science degree in operations research from the Naval
Postgraduate School. Selected to a Navy Federal Execu-
tive Fellowship, he completed a year-long assignment as
a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in
New York City and subsequently became a council
member in June 1998. Rear Admiral Route is also a
graduate of the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course
and of the Joint Force Air Component Commander
Course at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama.
Rear Admiral Route assumed duties as the fiftieth Pres-
ident of the Naval War College on 9 July 2003 while si-
multaneously maintaining his former position as
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
until 24 September 2003.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Study the past if you would define the future.
CONFUCIUS
It is change, continuing change, inevitable change that
is the dominant factor in society today. No sensible
decision can be made any longer without taking into account
not only the world as it is, but the world as it will be.
ISAAC ASIMOV
WE EXPECT A LOT FROM OUR FACULTY at the Naval War College. They
teach, conduct research, advise on issues of national security, and
contribute to their respective bodies of knowledge in their fields.
Some come to the College from a more traditional academic back-
ground; others bring with them the invaluable experience they have gained in
combat or in their service in the fleet, with the regional combatant command-
ers, or in the policy and resource planning environment of Washington, D.C. We
are very fortunate that a number of our superb faculty bring all of these capabili-
ties to bear in Newport, because of the diversity of their backgrounds.
We demand that our faculty know and appreciate the lessons of history, but
we also expect that they can translate these lessons into the context of future
events. History for history’s sake is of no value to us. What is of value is the abil-
ity of our faculty to use whatever is necessary to educate officers to solve com-
plex problems, manage change, and execute their decisions. This demands an
extraordinary degree of mental flexibility and intellectual agility on the part of
our faculty, whether they come from the world of practitioners or from the more
traditional academic environment. The readers of this issue of the Review will be
asked to exercise a similar degree of mental agility.
Within these pages you will find articles on the Soviet Navy of the 1970s and
on Stalin’s navy of earlier decades. These pieces are timely, in light of the “Cold
War at Sea” conference that the College will co-host in May 2004. Sponsored
jointly by the Naval War College, Brown University, and the USS Saratoga Foun-
dation, the conference will bring together Cold War adversaries who once oper-
ated in close proximity to each other on, above, and beneath the seas. The focal
point of this unique event will be an intensive three-day conference that will
commemorate the proud service of sailors from the former Soviet Union and
the United States. This series of meetings, to be held at both the Naval War
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College and at Brown University’s Watson Institute in Providence, is expected to
bring new understanding of the strategic and operational challenges faced by
both navies during this extraordinary period in naval history. Sergei Khrushchev,
son of the former Soviet premiere, has been a driving force behind the confer-
ence. Sergei is now a faculty member at Brown University and an adjunct faculty
member at the Naval War College.
In addition to having value as a significant historical study, the portions of
the conference that look at the early Cold War period may yield new perspectives
on the challenges that the U.S. Navy faces in the current international security
environment. For Naval War College students, the conference represents a
unique opportunity to grapple with such classic concepts as crisis stability and
escalation—concepts that are largely unfamiliar to today’s officers but that
could once again command our attention.
Also within this issue you will find an in-depth look at current and future op-
erations of the U.S. Coast Guard, in a very informative article by Admiral Tom
Collins, USCG, its current Commandant. These are dynamic times for the Coast
Guard, which will soon embark on the largest capital-acquisition program in the
service’s history—the Deepwater Project, wherein virtually all cutters, aircraft,
and command and control systems will be replaced. Mutual cooperation among
the Coast Guard, the Navy, and all of the Defense Department has never been
greater, as evidenced by Coast Guard support for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
and by Admiral Collins’s participation in the International Seapower Sympo-
sium held here in Newport last October. Admiral Collins is a proponent of a
broadened definition of maritime security cooperation that will require new
thinking, new partnerships, and new constructs to ensure the safety and free-
dom of the seas for all.
Finally, enclosed with this issue you will find a recently produced digital video
disk (DVD) that portrays the nature of the Naval War College experience. I encour-
age you to view the disk and then share it with others who may be interested in
knowing more about this great institution and the important work that is done here.
We ask you to look to the past, with our focus on the former Soviet Navy; to
the present, with our DVD tour of the campus; and to the future, with our part-
ners in the U.S. Coast Guard. I hope you enjoy this issue.
R. A. ROUTE
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Admiral Collins assumed the duties of Commandant of
the U.S. Coast Guard on 30 May 2002. Prior to becom-
ing Commandant, he served as the Coast Guard’s Vice
Commandant, spearheading servicewide initiatives as
the Coast Guard Acquisition Executive. From 1998 to
2000 he served as Commander, Pacific Area and Elev-
enth Coast Guard District. His other flag assignments
include service as Commander, Fourteenth Coast Guard
District in Honolulu, Hawaii, and Chief, Office of Ac-
quisition at Coast Guard Headquarters.
Admiral Collins began his Coast Guard career as a deck
watch officer and first lieutenant aboard the cutter Vigi-
lant (WMEC 617). Following that assignment, he com-
manded the cutter Cape Morgan (WPB 95313). His
shore operational assignments include Deputy Com-
mander, Group St. Petersburg, Florida, and Commander
of Coast Guard Group and Captain of the Port, Long
Island Sound, in New Haven, Connecticut. Prior to his
promotion to flag rank in 1994 he served as the Chief,
Programs Division at Coast Guard Headquarters, and
then the Coast Guard’s Deputy Chief of Staff.
Admiral Collins graduated from the Coast Guard Acad-
emy in 1968 and later served as a faculty member within
the Humanities Department. He earned a master of arts
degree in liberal studies from Wesleyan University and a
master of business administration from the University of
New Haven.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2004, Vol. LVII, No. 2
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CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
The U.S. Coast Guard Today
Admiral Thomas H. Collins, U.S. Coast Guard
The men and women of our Coast Guard are showing once again that
you are “always ready.” You’re always ready to serve with courage and
excellence. You are always ready to place your country’s safety above
your own. You shield your fellow Americans from the danger of this
world, and America is grateful.
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, 31 MARCH 2003
The first anniversary of the U.S. Coast Guard’s realignment under the Depart-ment of Homeland Security in March 2003 provides an appropriate oppor-
tunity to reflect on the extraordinary events that have transpired since that
transition and to consider their implications for tomorrow’s Coast Guard.
We are all well aware that the terrorist events of the last two years have sub-
stantially changed the national security environment in which our armed forces
serve our nation. In fact, these factors of change are elements of a new range of
transitional and nonstate cultural threats (drugs, illegal migrants, piracy, illegal
fishing, and organized crime, along with terrorism) that have been gathering
momentum over the last decade or so. The breadth of security threats directed at
our nation has grown not only more expansive but more complex—driving the
need for the armed services to make a “transformational” examination of the ca-
pabilities and capacity (force structure) needed to address them. We in the U.S.
Coast Guard, although aligned organizationally outside the Department of De-
fense, are no less impacted by these winds of change, especially in terms of mis-
sion relevance and our emphasis on the need for a transformational approach to
our capabilities and capacity so that we may deal effectively with evolving na-
tional security requirements.
The Coast Guard’s roles as a military service, as a federal law-enforcement
agency, as a regulatory authority of maritime transportation systems, and as a
member of the new Department of Homeland Security place it squarely at the
center of national initiatives to reduce security risks to our nation. Coast Guard
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operations over the past year reflect these dynamics and were as challenging as
any in its 213-year history. These realities suggest that 2003 was a watershed for
today’s Coast Guard. I use the term advisedly, because the past year represents a
true dividing line between our past and our future with respect to our continued
role as a maritime, military, and multimission service.
Confronting new demands of homeland security and the global war on ter-
rorism, the Coast Guard supported Operation LIBERTY SHIELD to defend the na-
tion’s ports, waterways, coastlines, and critical infrastructure. Deployed Coast
Guard forces executed Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM as
American and coalition forces liberated the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. At
the same time, we successfully met unabated and unrelenting demands in our
multiple mission areas of search and rescue (SAR), marine safety, environmen-
tal protection, drug and illegal migrant interdiction, fisheries enforcement, aids
to navigation, and domestic and polar icebreaking.
On 1 March 2003 the Coast Guard moved smoothly from the Department of
Transportation into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as part
of the largest reorganization of the federal government in more than fifty years.
We used the largest budget increases in Coast Guard history to raise operational
readiness rates in our aging inventory of cutters and aircraft. We continued to
build tomorrow’s readiness by executing the two largest acquisition programs in
Coast Guard history, Rescue 21 and the Integrated Deepwater System. We led the
international effort to adopt a new comprehensive maritime-security code and
issued expansive domestic security regulations for ports and vessels in response
to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.
The dual threads of change and continuity are woven into the fabric of the
Coast Guard’s performance of today’s missions and its anticipation of tomor-
row’s. On the one hand, the changes that the Coast Guard is experiencing today
are of epic proportions by any measure. The Coast Guard must lead that
change—to seize its opportunities by transforming itself so as to be ready to ad-
dress tomorrow’s challenges. At the same time, we in the Coast Guard must im-
plement transformation initiatives within a framework that allows us to hold
fast to the core characteristics and values—honor, respect, and devotion to
duty—that have defined the very essence and success of our service to the nation
throughout our history and will continue to do so in the future.
Our steady strategic focus on people, readiness, and stewardship will sustain
the Coast Guard through today’s challenges, transform it to meet evolving de-
mands and the uncharted future that stretches ahead, and preserve its enduring
character.
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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MULTIMISSION FLEXIBILITY
During the protracted legislative discussions and debate leading to the passage
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, there was discussion of the Coast Guard’s
ability to sustain performance in all of its traditional missions after it was re-
aligned under the Department of Homeland Security. Fortunately, a critical in-
fusion of significantly increased funding, resources, and people over the past
two years has enabled the service to make tremendous progress improving
readiness and restoring its performance in non–homeland security mission
areas. The past year’s operational highlights tell the story.
In our national-defense mission during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, we pro-
vided port security for all Defense Department “outload” operations, activated
68 percent of our reserve force to meet increased operating and personnel
tempo at the peak of mobilization, and deployed approximately 1,250 personnel
to support combatant commanders. During the final weeks of 2002, two
high-endurance cutters, eight patrol boats, a buoy tender, four port-security
teams, strike team personnel, and two maintenance-support units made prepa-
rations for short-notice deployment to the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea.
On station early in 2003, these units participated capably in maritime intercep-
tion operations and coastal security patrols with U.S. Navy and coalition forces;
provided port-security resources in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq; conducted
search-and-rescue missions; helped open Iraq’s main shipping channel to com-
mercial traffic and humanitarian support; and maintained security for Iraqi oil
terminals in the North Arabian Gulf.
The multimission capabilities, flexibility, and initiative of the crew of the
buoy tender USCGC Walnut (WLB 205)—performing the first out-of-
hemisphere deployment by a buoy tender in support of Department of Defense
operations—are instructive. The U.S. Fifth Fleet originally wanted Walnut on
station in the event Iraq resorted to environmental warfare and released a mas-
sive amount of oil into its coastal waters (the cutter can skim 420 gallons of oil
per minute with its modern oil-recovery gear). Immediately after arriving in
Bahrain in February, prior to combat operations, however, Walnut was pressed
into service conducting maritime interception of commercial shipping entering
and leaving Iraq, in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 986.
When the coalition went to war, Walnut applied its multimission capabilities
in other ways, transporting Navy equipment on its large buoy deck and search-
ing for the crew of two Royal Navy helicopters that collided during the opening
days of hostilities. Walnut also made a critical contribution to coalition objec-
tives by resetting navigational markers and buoys in Iraq’s forty-one-mile
Khawr Abd Allah, making this strategic waterway safe for navigation. This im-
portant communication link leads from the Persian Gulf to Umm Qasr, Iraq’s
C O L L I N S 1 1
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only deep-draft port. Using new buoys “liberated” from an Iraqi warehouse in
Umm Qasr, Walnut replaced thirty-five decrepit, nonfunctioning buoys and
then worked with a British hydrographic team and the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency to inform all mariners of the improvements to the aids to navi-
gation marking the channel—enabling the opening of the port for humanitar-
ian and commercial shipping at a critical stage in the coalition’s campaign.
Other Coast Guard units also made important contributions during combat
operations in Iraq. Vice Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy, then com-
mander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command, awarded
Bronze Stars to the commanding officers of the patrol boats Adak, Aquidneck,
Baranof, and Wrangell.* I was proud to stand by Secretary of Homeland Security
Tom Ridge when he presented these combat decorations at Coast Guard Head-
quarters in Washington, D.C., last August. I was struck by a phrase in Admiral
Keating’s award citations. He described the boat crews as having been the “first
line of defense” for coalition naval forces during the amphibious assault of Iraq’s
Al Faw Peninsula and for naval mine-clearing forces operating in mine-danger
areas within Iraqi territorial waters. During this ceremony Secretary Ridge also
presented a Coast Guard Unit Commendation to the Coast Guard Patrol Forces,
Southwest Asia, for its collective work supporting U.S. combatant commanders
during IRAQI FREEDOM.
Our success in these historic events was due to five key factors. The first was
the hard work, integrity, professionalism, and adaptability of our people; the
second, the military character of our service; the third, the multimission capa-
bility embedded in our cutters, in our aircraft, in our boats, in our systems, and
in our people. The fourth was our close partnership with the Navy and our in-
vestment throughout the year in joint training opportunities and inter-
operability; and the fifth, our transfer to the Department of Homeland Security,
which strengthens both our relationships with other agencies within our de-
partment and our partnerships with the Department of Defense, as well as with
other federal, state, and local agencies.
A MULTIMISSION PORTFOLIO
From U.S. military operations overseas to vital homeland security missions in
the United States, to a host of significant operations in its full multimission
portfolio, the Coast Guard in 2003 proved repeatedly that it is semper paratus—
always ready to do whatever it takes to support the nation and the American
people. It is worth reviewing some of the past year’s operational highlights.
Working closely with its interagency and international law-enforcement
partners, for example, the Coast Guard had by the end of the fiscal year seized its
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
*All Island-class 110-foot patrol boats, respectively WPB 1333, 1309, 1318, and 1332.
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second-highest annual total of illegal drugs—136,865 pounds of cocaine and
more than fourteen thousand pounds of marijuana. Coast Guard units stopped
more than six thousand undocumented migrants from entering the United
States illegally. This law-enforcement presence to preserve maritime security in
the 3.4-million-square-mile American exclusive economic zone also led to the
documentation of more than a hundred significant violations of fisheries regu-
lations (and the seizure of more than forty illegal catches) and of more than 140
violations of laws protecting marine mammals and endangered species.
International partnerships forged with law-enforcement agencies from na-
tions of the North Pacific region and the establishment of Coast Guard Mari-
time Intelligence Fusion Centers contributed directly to the past year’s seizure of
four People’s Republic of China trawlers engaged in illegal high-seas driftnet
fishing, identification of eighteen additional suspect vessels from other nations,
and ongoing investigations of other cases.
This level of success in law-enforcement missions is due in part to innovative
tactics, techniques, and procedures. Previously limited to counterdrug opera-
tions, armed Coast Guard helicopters now patrol port and harbor approaches
to counter more complex terrorist threats. New equipment also is being fielded
to enable units to stop vessels that refuse to comply with boarding-and-
search orders.
As part of their mission to protect natural resources, Coast Guard men and
women worked hard in 2003, through a concerted program of prevention, educa-
tion, and enforcement, to eliminate pollution discharged into the nation’s water-
ways from any source. More than 3,800 pollution incidents were reported and
investigated by the Coast Guard during the year. Incidents calling for a response
took many forms—a ninety-eight-thousand-gallon spill in Cape Cod’s Buz-
zards Bay, an explosion on an oil drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico, a spill
from an oil pipeline under a lake in Louisiana, the release of hazardous materials
from a merchant vessel in a major port in the Pacific Northwest, and a fishing
vessel sinking in port and releasing fuel oil, to cite but a few examples.
The winter of 2003 was one of the coldest in decades in the northern United
States. Coast Guard cutters from Maine to New York were employed to break ice
along navigable rivers and waterways. Strong winds and bitterly cold tempera-
tures on the Great Lakes created the worst ice season that region had experi-
enced in more than twenty years, yet Coast Guard icebreaking cutters kept
merchant vessels and barges on the nation’s inland waterways moving.
A hemisphere away, in Antarctica, the icebreakers USCGC Polar Sea (WAGB
11) and USCGC Healy (WAGB 20) completed the most difficult resupply of
McMurdo Station during the forty years of Operation DEEP FREEZE. They
smashed through fifty miles of ice more than thirteen feet thick to enable
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American scientists to continue their studies of the earth’s climate. Healy again
headed out to sea soon after returning from Antarctica—this time on a
four-month Arctic mission that included a circumnavigation of the North
American continent by way of the Northwest Passage. In mid-November, Polar
Sea left Seattle, Washington, for a return mission to Antarctica with the ice-
breaker Polar Star (WAGB 10) to escort resupply vessels participating in DEEP
FREEZE 2004.
In home waters, Coast Guard units conducted more than 41,500 SAR cases as
the year drew to a close, saving more than six thousand lives and assisting in safe-
guarding property. When several large tropical storms and hurricanes (includ-
ing, in September, Hurricane Isabel) lashed the East Coast and inflicted
extensive damage, Coast Guard personnel were at their stations, ready to re-
spond—which they did, with traditional resolve.
As the lead federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard also worked
closely with DHS directorates and other federal, state, and local agencies to im-
prove its presence and responsiveness in the nation’s ports, waterways, and
coastal regions as part of its homeland security mission.
In March, incident to the onset of combat operations in Iraq, Secretary Ridge
announced LIBERTY SHIELD, a comprehensive national plan to increase the
safety of U.S. citizens and security of infrastructure while maintaining the free
flow of commerce and people across the nation’s borders. To enhance security
along maritime borders and protect naval shipping and deployments en route to
Iraq, the Coast Guard increased the number of patrols by its aircraft, cutters, and
small boats. We also increased the number of escort vessels for commercial ferries
and cruise ships; every high-interest vessel arriving at or departing from U.S. ports
had an armed Coast Guard sea marshal on board to observe the crew and ensure
that the ship made port safely. New security zones were established and enforced
in and around critical infrastructure sites in many of the nation’s major ports.
The Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and the maritime
industry also implemented the far-reaching provisions of the Maritime Trans-
portation Security Act (MTSA) during 2003. Designed to protect the nation’s
ports and waterways from a terrorist attack, the law requires, among its many
measures, area maritime security committees and security plans for facilities
and vessels that may respond to a transportation security incident. The act sig-
nificantly strengthens and standardizes the security measures of the nation’s do-
mestic port security team of federal, state, local, and private authorities.
In October, as part of its implementation plan for MTSA, the Coast Guard
published new maritime security requirements mandating significant changes
in security practices within all segments of the maritime industry—including
cruise ships, container ships, and offshore oil platforms. The industry is now
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required to complete security assessments, develop security plans and submit
them to the Coast Guard for approval, increase security measures as a threat
arises, and install automatic identification systems aboard large ships.
“ONE TEAM, ONE FIGHT”
The scope and diversity of Coast Guard operations during 2003 illustrate the
fundamental strength of its long history of partnerships with other government
agencies and the private sector to carry out its maritime safety, security, mobil-
ity, and environmental protection missions. The Coast Guard’s move from the
Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security was a
change of historic proportions, but it is entirely consistent with our history—we
have been a leader in providing for the maritime security needs of our nation
since 1790.
The Coast Guard’s multimission assets, its military role as an armed force
(codified in law under Title 14 U.S. Code Section 1), its law-enforcement au-
thority, and its collaborative response capabilities bridge federal, state, local, and
private sectors. As both a military and law-enforcement agency, it also straddles
the seam separating the federal government’s homeland-security and homeland-
defense mission areas—an important consideration, given the possibility that
the transition from a homeland security incident to a full-fledged homeland de-
fense crisis could occur in a matter of minutes. As Secretary Ridge told cadets at
the U.S. Coast Guard Academy last November, “If we didn’t have a Coast Guard
working with the Department of Defense and as an integral part of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, we’d have to invent one.”
Our past year’s realignment in DHS was accomplished smoothly and effi-
ciently thanks in large measure to the leadership of Secretary Ridge and the hard
work and professionalism of the twenty-two agencies involved, including Coast
Guard men and women. The secretary’s rallying cry—“One Team, One Fight”—
reminds us all that we are engaged in a common battle against the forces of inter-
national terrorism and other threats to national security. “Over the years, the
Coast Guard has always provided a shield of protection against those who would
seek to do America harm,” Secretary Ridge said during his visit to Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington, D.C., last August to observe the service’s 213th
birthday. “That shield is more important now than ever before, and while the
mission remains the same and the Coast Guard remains the same, no longer
must you shoulder the burden alone.”
Working in close cooperation with all agencies in the Department of Home-
land Security in 2003, the Coast Guard began forceful implementation of its new
Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security to support the president’s broader
strategy for protecting the U.S. homeland. Our maritime strategy’s
C O L L I N S 1 5
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layered-defense approach provides Coast Guard operating forces with a
time-proven means to enhance security in U.S. ports and waterways while facili-
tating the smooth flow of commerce. The collective result of our efforts is aimed
at reducing maritime security risks.
The strategy is based on the Coast Guard’s statutory authorities, operational
capabilities and capacity, and both internal and external partnerships. Four “pil-
lars” (see figure 1) constitute the strategy’s main elements: enhancing maritime
domain awareness; building and administering an effective maritime security
regime domestically and internationally; increasing military and civil opera-
tional presence in ports, coastal areas, and beyond; and improving response pos-
ture in the event a security incident does occur.
The Coast Guard’s
strategy will bolster the na-
tion’s maritime security by
reducing risks. Key to its
success will be our ability
to prevent future attacks
through preemption or de-
terrence as the result of im-
proved maritime domain
awareness—the ability to
collect comprehensive
knowledge of vulnerabili-
ties, threats, and targets of
interest on the water. Mar-
itime domain awareness
will be increased through
more aggressive and effec-
tive means of gathering, using, and sharing information and intelligence. It means
providing a level of knowledge that is increasingly comprehensive and specific as
the activities and potential threats move closer to the United States.
In 2002, the Coast Guard became a formal member of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program. Since that time, it has expanded cooperative efforts with
the U.S. Navy at the National Maritime Intelligence Center. Our ability to share
information that is gathered by all agencies and to derive tactical applications at
the Coast Guard’s operational level is steadily improving. New Coast Guard
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers were established on the East and West
Coasts in 2003. Field Intelligence Support Teams now serve in major ports
throughout the country. Joint Harbor Operations Centers (manned by Coast
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Guard and Navy personnel, and harbor police) began operations early in 2004 in
Norfolk, Virginia, and San Diego, California.
Fortunately, consistent with our strategy’s goals of increasing operational
presence and improving response posture, the Coast Guard’s capabilities and
capacity are now on the upswing following a prolonged period when the de-
mands for its services simply exceeded the supply of modern platforms and sys-
tems in the fleet.* We are now increasing our operational presence in ports,
domestic waterways, and coastal zones to deter and prevent terrorist incidents,
to be sure, but also to improve our overall responsiveness to any incident calling
for the Coast Guard’s services.
The key to our current and future readiness is obtaining the right capabilities
and the right capacity as we grow, modernize, and realign our force. In recent
years the Coast Guard’s budget has increased by more than $1.6 billion—a 30
percent increase between 2002 and 2004. This budget growth is allowing us to
improve our current readiness, balance better our full range of missions, mod-
ernize our aging fleet, build our homeland security capability, and sustain our
non–homeland security missions.
Near-term improvements to Coast Guard operational capabilities in 2003 in-
clude ongoing execution of the contract for our Rescue 21 maritime distress net-
work for coastal waters, seven hundred new maritime security boats (under a
$145 million contract, the Coast Guard’s largest single acquisition of identical
response craft), twelve new hundred-person maritime safety and security teams,
and additional sea marshals. Three Juniper-class 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders
were delivered to the fleet in 2003, and two more were launched. In addition,
contracts were awarded to Bollinger Shipyard for two eighty-seven-foot coastal
patrol boats, and negotiations were set in motion for an additional nine to be
awarded in fiscal year 2004, for a total of sixty-five boats in the class. We also ac-
cepted six C-130J Hercules maritime patrol aircraft in 2003.
Well trained and properly equipped people constitute an all-essential ele-
ment in our response to today’s growing operational tempo. We are poised to
add thousands of new billets to our enlisted and officer force structure, which is
to grow to an expected authorized end strength of 45,500 personnel during fiscal
year 2004. Recruit training at Cape May, New Jersey, is operating at maximum
levels to meet this expected growth. Our Coast Guard Reserve component began
an incremental growth to nine thousand in 2003, and I expect it will grow to ten
thousand during the years ahead. A robust and well trained force of selected re-
servists is an integral part of our ability to provide critical infrastructure protec-
tion, coastal and port security, and defense readiness. Our Coast Guard
C O L L I N S 1 7
*For an assessment of Coast Guard capabilities in that period (and for background on the National
Fleet, discussed below), see Colin S. Gray, “The Coast Guard and Navy: It’s Time for a ‘National
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Auxiliary proved again to be an invaluable resource in today’s high-paced opera-
tions, and we will continue to rely on the talent and experience of its dedicated
volunteers during the years ahead.
Increased capacity will allow the Coast Guard to become as much a “pres-
ence” organization as a response organization. In keeping with a central premise
underlying our strategy for maritime homeland security, we cannot afford sim-
ply to respond to emergencies—we must prevent them. Ongoing modernization
and recapitalization programs are critical in this regard, because they will de-
liver the platforms and systems needed to close the capability gaps found in
today’s Coast Guard.
In particular, the long-range Integrated Deepwater System will recapitalize
our entire inventory of aging cutters and aircraft, as well as systems at sea and
ashore for C4ISR*—all supported with an integrated logistics system. When the
transformational Deepwater program is fully implemented (figure 2), the total
system will consist of three classes of new cutters and their associated small boats,
a new fixed-wing manned aircraft fleet, a combination of new and upgraded heli-
copters, and both cutter-based and land-based unmanned aerial vehicles.
Deepwater will pro-
vide the means to extend
our layered maritime de-
fenses from ports and
coastlines many hun-
dreds of miles to sea to
increase maritime do-
main awareness. It is a
flexible program, able to
meet emerging require-
ments for maritime secu-
rity and other missions.
When Deepwater is com-
plete, our cutters and
aircraft will no longer
operate as independent
platforms with only lim-
ited awareness of what
surrounds them in the
maritime domain. Instead, they will have the benefit of information from a
wide array of mission-capable platforms and sensors—enabling them to share
a common operating picture as part of a network-centric force operating in
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
FIGURE 2
THE IDS “SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS”
U.S. Coast Guard/Rich Doyle
*Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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tandem with other cutters, boats, and both manned aircraft and unmanned
aerial vehicles.*
The Deepwater program, backed strongly by the Department of Homeland
Security as the Coast Guard’s top acquisition priority, enjoys broad bipartisan
support in Congress. We must move forward to execute the program aggres-
sively so that its modern, more capable platforms and systems are delivered with
an appropriate urgency.
AN EXPANDED CONCEPT OF JOINTNESS
The Deepwater program will allow the Coast Guard to enhance its operational
excellence in the future. However, as discussed at the 2003 International
Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, maritime security must be a
concerted effort that encompasses more than just protecting a nation’s national
interests against hostile nations (an enormously challenging task in its own
right). It also includes protection against terrorist attacks and threats to national
sovereignty, as well as the areas of natural resources, the environment, economic
prosperity, and social welfare. The world’s oceans are global thoroughfares. A
cooperative international approach involving partnerships of nations, navies,
coast guards, law-enforcement agencies, and commercial shipping interests is
essential—with all parties acting collaboratively to confront broadly defined
threats to their common and interdependent maritime security.
Applying this strategy of “maritime power” in an integrated way among the
world’s navies and coast guards is a powerful notion. We have within our grasp
the opportunity to leverage new technologies and attain new capabilities that
will enable coordinated, systematic, and fused intelligence that will, in turn, pro-
vide detailed, in-depth knowledge of the maritime domain. Improved unity of
effort and coordination, clear lines of authority and command, more effective
risk-based investment decisions, and opportunities for greater synergy have all
flowed from the Coast Guard’s realignment within the Department of Home-
land Security.
The benefits of operating with other federal agencies sharing a common DHS
mission perspective are multiplying daily. The DHS Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, for example, receives information on cargo and shipping
entering U.S. ports. We collect information on ships and shipping by our work
with the Navy in the Joint Intelligence Coordination Center. Our National Vessel
Movement Center catalogues and assesses this information. Coast Guard cap-
tains of ports, responsible for safety and security issues in all major American
ports, chair port-security committees comprising federal, state, and local offi-
cials as well as representatives from the maritime industry. Quickly sharing and
C O L L I N S 1 9
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exploiting relevant, time-critical information at the working level on a daily ba-
sis will yield important short and long-range dividends. Similar opportunities
exist—and must be taken advantage of—overseas, through our partnership
with the International Maritime Organization.
Maritime power in the twenty-first century is about awareness—gathering
and synthesizing large amounts of information and specific data from many dis-
parate sources to gain knowledge of the entire maritime domain. Maritime do-
main awareness and the knowledge it imparts will allow maritime forces to
respond with measured and appropriate force to any threat. Building a net-
work of alliances, people, and systems—at home and abroad with our friends
and allies—to increase maritime domain awareness will be a critical product of
collaborative partnerships. This has never been more important than it is now in
our collective national imperative to defend our nation and win the war against
terrorism.
A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
In addition to the critical strategic relationships that we are forging within the
Department of Homeland Security, our battle-tested special relationship with
the U.S. Navy warrants emphasis. The two services have always enjoyed close re-
lations, but we are today working together more effectively than at any time
since World War II. This partnership is yielding important dividends in the
global war on terrorism at home and overseas. In today’s post-9/11 world, we
must forge even closer bonds.
It is worth recalling that one of the first telephone calls that Admiral Vern
Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, made on 9/11 was to my predecessor as Com-
mandant, Admiral James M. Loy. Admiral Clark, recognizing the Coast Guard’s
leading role in providing enhanced levels of maritime homeland security in the
wake of the terrorist attacks, asked how the Navy could assist the Coast Guard in
carrying out this responsibility. Consistent with this vision of partnership, thir-
teen Cyclone-class coastal patrol ships were quickly transferred by the Navy for
Coast Guard use in Operation NOBLE EAGLE.
Early in my own tour as commandant, Admiral Clark and I signed a revision
to the “National Fleet” policy agreement that guides our mutually supportive
policies, programs, and operations. This policy guarantees that the U.S. Coast
Guard will be steaming in close formation with the U.S. Navy during its transit
through the sea of change. Our National Fleet agreement commits us to shared
purpose and common effort focused on tailored operational integration of our
multimission platforms, infrastructure, and personnel. Full cooperation and in-
tegration of our nonredundant and complementary capabilities will be achieved
to ensure the highest level of maritime capabilities and readiness for the nation’s
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investment. Processes are in place to synchronize research and development,
planning, fiscal stewardship, procurement, development of doctrine, training,
and execution of operations for the National Fleet.
The Coast Guard’s contribution to the National Fleet includes its statutory
authorities (including law enforcement), multimission cutters, boats, aircraft,
and C4ISR systems designed for the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions. All
ships, boats, aircraft, and shore command-and-control nodes of the National
Fleet will be interoperable to provide force depth for peacetime missions, home-
land security, homeland defense, crisis response, and wartime tasks. Coast Guard
assets and expertise will continue to flow to the Navy in selected niche naval-
defense operations, and U.S. Navy assets and expertise will flow to the Coast
Guard, when necessary, in connection with our lead role for maritime homeland
security.
Expanded Navy–Coast Guard collaboration extends from acquisition plan-
ning to current operations—an area where there is more than enough fight for
each of us. This strengthened Navy–Coast Guard partnership occurs at a critical
time. When Admiral Clark addressed the International Seapower Symposium
last year, he asserted that sea lines of communications are under attack all over
the world. During the first half of 2003 alone, he said, there was a record 234 re-
ported attacks against seafarers—the worst six-month period since the Interna-
tional Maritime Bureau started compiling piracy statistics in 1991, and a full 34
percent increase over the same time period in 2002. Successful terrorist attacks
against lucrative maritime targets and the U.S. maritime transportation system
are especially worrisome because they could wreak economic havoc. The Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development, based in Paris, estimated
that a terrorist strike against the American cargo-shipping system could cost the
U.S. economy as much as fifty-eight billion dollars.
Four years ago, the Coast Guard and the Navy produced a landmark joint in-
telligence forecast of the maritime security environment, projecting two de-
cades into the future. This assessment still serves as a valuable guide to anticipate
future trends and to understand how our increasingly interconnected world will
continue to be highly reliant upon the sea for food, commerce, and energy. The
study concluded that legal maritime trade, driven by global economic growth
and international trade, will triple by 2020—with the most explosive growth in
the container-shipping industry. Organized crime also will increase in influence
and scope through 2020 as demand for and profits from the illicit transportation
of people, drugs, and contraband multiply. Criminals will take advantage of
growing maritime trade to transport their products.
Completed two years before 9/11, this assessment described how adversaries
of the United States will be more likely to engage in asymmetric warfare, such as
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terrorism, sabotage, information operations, and chemical or biological attacks.
The report projects that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will remain a con-
cern, and it foresees that international migration, fueled by tremendous popula-
tion increases in developing countries and uneven global economic growth, will
be another important factor in the future U.S. maritime security environment.
The mandate for closer Navy–Coast Guard collaboration, framed by our joint
National Fleet policy, is clear.
The policy’s focus on operational integration provides the foundation for
closer cooperation to synchronize planning, training, and procurement in order
to provide the highest levels of maritime capabilities for the nation’s security in-
vestments. The policy will continue to remain a cornerstone for the Coast Guard,
reaffirming its expeditionary capability as well as the requirement for the modern
fleet that will become a reality as Deepwater’s assets and systems enter service.
Shortly before relinquishing his responsibilities as deputy secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security in October to reoccupy his office in the Pen-
tagon, Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England stated that our two services’
roles and missions need to be defined in terms of specific authorities, responsi-
bilities in the chain of command, and responses during any given emergency. He
noted that the already strong relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard
will continue to grow closer but that there is more that can be done to assist the
relationship.
The discussion about the Coast Guard’s role in relationship to both national
defense and homeland security requirements has been, is, and will continue to
be appropriately reexamined, especially in the post-9/11 security environment
we face today. A review of the past year’s operations demonstrates quite vividly
that the Coast Guard’s military and multimission character has never been more
relevant. The Coast Guard offers unique capabilities, competencies, authority,
and access in its military, law-enforcement, and intelligence roles. Whatever the
ultimate defense/homeland security tasking of the Coast Guard, preserving a ro-
bust, seamless, and totally interoperable collaborative relationship with the U.S.
Navy remains one of my top priorities. We serve the nation best when we sail and
fight as one team.
AN ENDURING CHARACTER
What of tomorrow? How, amid transformational changes of immense scope and
complexity, will the Coast Guard position itself to achieve even higher levels of
operational excellence in the decades ahead? I see two primary and connected
ways to achieve this vision.
Part of the answer rests in our ability to forge more robust capability, capac-
ity, and strategic partnerships through attention to the fundamental enablers
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of people, readiness, and stewardship. I codified this focus in my Commandant’s
Direction* soon after I assumed my duties as Commandant in 2002, and I reaf-
firmed it in 2003. An unswerving commitment to people, readiness, and stew-
ardship will sustain our service, allow us to transform it to meet evolving
demands, and preserve our enduring character. If change is the price of progress,
continuity must be the coin of the realm as we hold fast to our core characteris-
tics—as a multimission, military, and maritime service—and precious core val-
ues of honor, respect, and devotion to duty.
Preserving our enduring characteristics, traditions, and values will give the
Coast Guard the flexibility, discipline, and capability to respond to evolving na-
tional priorities and an ever-changing national security environment. We will
nurture, preserve, and build on a legacy forged over more than two hundred
years as the nation’s maritime guardian and shield of freedom.
We begin with people—the bedrock of our service. Our ability to attract, de-
velop, retain, and deploy quality people is the key to the Coast Guard’s future; it
is a top priority and perhaps our greatest challenge. People in tomorrow’s Coast
Guard will operate in a more complex and technologically sophisticated envi-
ronment—one characterized by modern deep-water cutters, superior response
boats, new manned and unmanned aircraft, and advanced systems for com-
mand, control, and communications. Our people must be properly trained,
equipped, organized, and motivated. Transforming our service with new tech-
nology requires that we also transform our dedicated and professional
workforce with the same care and foresight. We must restructure decades-old
human resource policies and processes. We must be more agile in adapting to
the new marketplace for people, provide for both quality of life and workplace,
and ensure performance-based policies to lead and manage the workforce.
During the years ahead, we will increase our commitment to people through a
new emphasis on education, training, and professional growth. We will expand
the workforce to meet increasing mission demands. We will identify new strate-
gies to recruit, train, retain, and deploy a diverse, highly capable, and flexible force.
Readiness—a capable, competent, and vigilant force, mission-ready in all
areas—is, simply stated, the Coast Guard’s raison d’être. Superior operational
service is our core purpose. America expects that we will bring the same level of
professionalism and maritime leadership to the war on terrorism that we have
traditionally brought to all our other missions. We are doing so, and we will. We
must ensure that our units are trained in sound and safe doctrine and tactics, are
supported with integrated logistics systems, are adequately staffed with properly
trained people, and are equipped with modern and well maintained cutters,
boats, aircraft, equipment, and facilities.
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We are building robust maritime homeland security strategies, capabilities, and
competencies. Through the Integrated Deepwater System we are designing and
implementing a maritime domain awareness capability that provides integrated
afloat, ashore, and airborne command, control, and communication capabili-
ties as well as improved means for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
We will ensure future readiness by leveraging the Deepwater project, Rescue 21,
and homeland security initiatives as the strategic recapitalization of the Coast
Guard for the twenty-first century gathers momentum with each passing year.
Lasting strategic partnerships will help us to sustain readiness in the future
and will enhance mission outcomes at all levels—federal, state, and local; inter-
national and bilateral; public and private. Coast Guard missions reach to every
port and waterway, to small towns as well as cities, and beyond to international
venues as well as domestic ones.
Stewardship, the final building block in preparing for the future, is a reflection
on the trust granted to the men and women of the Coast Guard in our role as
public servants. We have earned an enviable reputation for excellence in manag-
ing our resources as we strive to be the best led and best managed organization
in government. We must strengthen our commitment to stewardship—embrac-
ing innovation, technology, and effective leadership and management principles
to achieve measurable outcomes. Performance-based program planning and ac-
quisition, resource planning based on sound strategic analysis, risk-based man-
agement, and cause-and-effect metrics are indispensable.
Adapting to change is one of the most difficult tasks we face as individuals or
as an organization, but with change comes new opportunities. We must inspire a
culture of innovation and process change so that technology is infused creatively
in all mission areas so as to enhance productivity and reduce workload—all the
while driving toward quality outcomes. The results of our programs and opera-
tions must support the President’s Management Agenda* and directly contrib-
ute to achieving the desired outcomes of the Department of Homeland Security
and the Coast Guard Strategic Plan.
Past and future organizational realignments at Coast Guard Headquarters in
Washington, D.C., will help to ensure a rapid flow of information, facilitate
better decision making, and improve performance. This reorganization effort
began with the establishment of a new Assistant Commandant for Intelligence
in 2003 and will include integration of selected operational functions within the
Operations and Maritime Safety Directorates, as well as of support processes.
New posts also have been established for an Assistant Commandant for Com-
mand, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Technology
and for an Assistant Commandant for Planning, Resources, and Procurement.
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This reorganization will more closely align the Coast Guard’s resource plan-
ning and execution structures, enhance our ability to integrate information
technology and allocate resources more effectively, and ensure that we have the
capabilities we need to perform all Coast Guard missions. There is more that we
must do.
AN AGENDA FOR STRATEGIC CHANGE
We continually live in the “tyranny of the present,” where endless budget battles,
hearings, audits, operational tempo, and organizational “churn” seem to crowd
out every other activity. While these things are important and need to be at-
tended to, we must demonstrate that we can take a thoughtful approach to lead-
ing and managing the Coast Guard. We need to provide the type of leadership
that allows our people, programs, field commands, and partners to sense the
right priorities and allocate resources to the highest needs of the service. Most
importantly, we must chart a path in a direction we desire, not one we are forced
to accept. Through “Project EVERGREEN,” we have in fact taken the time to break
free intellectually from the tyranny of the present and think critically about
what it will take to continue to be successful in a variety of “futures” that may
come to pass. Through this project, we are using scenario-based planning to cre-
ate a forward-looking agenda that will guide our service through major changes
currently under way, as well as others not yet on the planning horizon.
The EVERGREEN Project is a comprehensive approach to creating continuous
strategic renewal within the Coast Guard (hence the name). It is not just a strate-
gic plan; it is even more than strategic planning. It is really a strategic framework
that delivers my strategic intent, my Commandant’s Direction, through linkage
to our daily operations and activities. It assumes that we have applied our finite
resources—time, energy, and money—in current operations and future invest-
ments in a purposeful way.
EVERGREEN is supported by an in-house “Red Cell,” with a charter to reflect
on past large-scale efforts to institutionalize change in our management sys-
tems. The Red Cell will identify barriers to the Coast Guard’s transformation—
the cultural and organizational disablers that inhibit our ability to seize the op-
portunities before us.
To prepare for and “shape the future,” the EVERGREEN Project has highlighted
the criticality of enhancing capabilities and competencies in four enduring mis-
sion areas: defending national and homeland security interests; enforcing laws
and treaties in the U.S. maritime domain; promoting safe and efficient maritime
activities; and protecting the marine environment. To this end, EVERGREEN has
helped us identify our “world of work,” where we must:
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• Shape the global maritime setting to promote American national interests
• Know maritime conditions, anomalies, and threats to prevent, protect, and
respond (maritime domain awareness)
• Create and manage an integrated U.S. maritime domain to preserve and
promote the national interest, and
• Position the Coast Guard, as a member of the Department of Homeland
Security, to act with strategic intent in a complex and uncertain
environment.
Indeed, the overall goal of the EVERGREEN Project is to revitalize our strategic
thinking and to ensure that we plan, program, budget, train, equip, and deploy
with strategic intent—with strategic performance outcomes in mind that are di-
rectly relevant to our mission in the Department of Homeland Security.
One definition of transformation holds that it is the productive integration
of technological change. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Richard B. Myers, argues that transformation goes far beyond technology and
organizational change. In his view, transformation is as well a process and a
mindset associated with managing change entailing intellectual, cultural, and
technological dimensions. This is the definition of transformation that we
readily identify with in the Coast Guard—and it is our pathway to the future.
Despite some of the most sweeping changes in our 213 years, the constants
that have guided our service through other perilous times in our nation’s past
will endure. By confronting and leading the challenge of change in a spirit of
continuity with our proud traditions, the future Coast Guard will remain the
military, multimission, and maritime service that we know today. However, with
a transformed and recapitalized force structure, it will be a Coast Guard adding
substantially more value—through the right set of authorities, capabilities, and
capacities matched to a range of maritime “futures” and productive domestic
and international strategic partnerships—to the task of providing for the safety
of our citizens and the security of our nation.
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A TALE OF TWO FLEETS
A Russian Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the
Mediterranean
Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov
Slightly more than three decades have passed since the United States and theSoviet Union confronted the most severe maritime crisis of the Cold War. Oc-
curring when the strategic focus of the U.S. Navy had been on the Vietnam War
for several years, this standoff witnessed the effective exploitation of American
political, strategic, and tactical vulnerabilities by an adversary that ten years
prior had had virtually no Mediterranean naval pres-
ence whatsoever. Indeed, this substantial maritime
challenge had emerged from a continental power that
had traditionally focused its naval strategy exclusively
on coastal defense.
In an age when the many battles of the global war
on terror could distract the U.S. Navy from its core
mission of sea control, this often forgotten episode of
superpower brinksmanship is a timely reminder that
naval threats can emerge rapidly. The Mediterranean
crisis demonstrates that America’s opponents could
achieve local sea-denial capabilities in the face of se-
vere constraints, even in a theater of traditional U.S.
naval dominance.
In examining Soviet maritime strategy in the Medi-
terranean before and during the October 1973
Arab-Israeli War, this study draws on new evidence
from Russia made available through cooperation with
Dr. Goldstein is an associate professor in the Strategic
Research Department of the Naval War College’s
Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He earned a Ph.D. in
politics at Princeton University in 2002. His first book,
Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction:
A Comparative Historical Study, is forthcoming from
Stanford University Press. His scholarly works include
(with William S. Murray) a study of the Chinese sub-
marine force in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Strategic Sur-
prise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first
Century.
Yuri Zhukov is a technical research adviser/translator
with Science Applications International Corporation.
Since earning a B.A. with honors in international rela-
tions at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Is-
land, he has conducted research for the Naval War
College and the Watson Institute for International
Studies at Brown, among other organizations.
The authors published a substantially shorter treatment
of this material in Sea Power (October 2003).
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the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg, interviews with ex-Soviet naval of-
ficers, and newly available Russian memoirs and military journals. These new
sources—many of which have never before been exploited by Western ana-
lysts—include an unpublished personal journal of Captain First Rank Yevgenii
V. Semenov, one-time chief of staff of the Soviet Fifth Eskadra (the Mediterra-
nean squadron). It offers day-by-day accounts of ship movements and firsthand
insight into Soviet strategic thinking.1
This new evidence paints a picture of a Fifth Eskadra on the verge of direct in-
tervention and much more willing to engage in hostilities than previously
thought. This work stands in contrast to scholarly works on the topic that have
tended to emphasize Soviet restraint and reluctance to exercise force in local
conflicts.2 In addition, this study has empirical value in that most previous un-
classified sources have relied almost exclusively on an American viewpoint.3
Russian perspectives can help us understand the significant challenges faced by a
land power in creating and employing an oceangoing fleet.
THE CARIBBEAN PARALLEL
The Mediterranean standoff naturally brings to mind its more famous predeces-
sor, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Whereas, the earlier crisis demonstrated the
importance of naval might in enabling both flexibility and political leverage, in
the later episode described here the more balanced capabilities of the opposing
fleets formed a major constraint on U.S. decision makers during the crisis, lead-
ing to a much more ambiguous outcome.
The U.S. maritime advantage during the Cuban missile crisis was over-
whelming and incontestable. President John F. Kennedy chose the naval block-
ade option—as opposed to immediate ground invasion, surgical air strikes,
further diplomatic pressure, or simple inaction—largely because the prospect of
a naval confrontation with the Soviets was the opening scenario most favorable
to Washington.4
Post-Stalin cutbacks in naval construction had left the Soviet fleet’s blue-
water ambitions effectively moribund. The Caribbean represented for Soviet
captains an unfamiliar area of operation at a prohibitive distance from home
ports. Moscow was unable to support or even effectively resupply or reinforce its
land-based forces in Cuba from the sea.5 Soviet merchant ships heading to Ha-
vana were generally unescorted; usable naval forces in the region were virtually
nonexistent.6
Four Soviet long-range diesel submarines (of a type known to NATO as
the Foxtrot class and to the Soviet Navy as “project 641”) under the com-
mand of Captain First Rank Vitalii Agafonov—each carrying twenty-two
conventional torpedoes and one nuclear-tipped weapon—left the Northern
2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:38 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss2/1
Fleet on 1 October for a new
base in Havana.7 They faced
the unenviable task of pene-
trating a U.S. blockade con-
ducted by (on average) forty
ships, 240 aircraft, and thirty
thousand personnel.8 In ad-
dition to this overwhelming
force, the Soviet submariners
were tackling immense tech-
nical and mechanical difficul-
t ies. Since Soviet nuclear
submarines were at that time
relatively unsafe and untested,
older diesel boats were sent in their place.9 The diesel Foxtrots proved unsuitable
for the operation. The boats, especially in that climate, were hot; temperatures
inside reached 50°C (122°F), forcing the crew to cool off by sitting neck deep in
water. The boats also lacked cooling systems for their batteries, which greatly
complicated recharging. The Foxtrots furthermore had to surface often to re-
ceive instructions from Moscow and recharge batteries.10
The noisy engines and regular surfacing made the boats particularly vulnera-
ble to U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces. Land-based hydroacoustic in-
stallations discovered the submarines off the Azores, and American aircraft
constantly trailed the boats for the rest of the voyage. To escape their shadowers
the Foxtrots were forced to dive to depths of over two hundred meters, out of
communications with each other or with Moscow.11
A fifth submarine, the long-range diesel boat B-75 (Zulu class/pr. 611) carry-
ing two nuclear torpedoes, was sent to the region at the end of September with
orders to defend Soviet transport ships if they came under attack. However, it
was recalled shortly after Kennedy announced the blockade. By 10 November,
the boat had returned to the USSR.12 The four Foxtrots never made it to Cuba.
Three returned to base after being forced to surface by U.S. Navy warships; the
last Foxtrot in the region (B-4) received orders to return to its home port of
Polyarnyi on 20 November.13
Although an utter embarrassment for Moscow, the Cuban Crisis taught the
Soviet Navy some important lessons with respect to long-range submarine op-
erations. The battery-cooling problem on diesel submarines was fixed in
fairly short order. More importantly, fresh emphasis was placed on the cre-
ation of a credible oceangoing fleet. Subsequent efforts increasingly focused on
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Soviet sailors shake their fists at a U.S. P2V Neptune flying over a submerging Soviet submarine in the
Mediterranean.
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expanding operations beyond the Soviet littoral.14 The rapidly growing perma-
nent naval presence in the Mediterranean after 1964 was perhaps the most im-
portant consequence of this radical shift in Soviet naval policy.
THE OBSTACLE OF GEOGRAPHY
In clear contrast to the United Kingdom and the United States, Russia has always
been a continental power. The “tyranny of geography” has historically been the
greatest constraint on the deployment of Russian naval forces to distant waters;
Russia has 37,653 kilometers of coastline (45,169 kilometers in Soviet times),
the overwhelming majority of it in the arctic north.15
Russia was without a warm-water port until Catherine the Great annexed the
Crimean Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire in 1783, but the Turkish Straits—
consisting of the Bosporus and Dardanelles—still stood between Russia and the
Mediterranean. The great distances between Russia’s Black Sea, Baltic, North-
ern, and Pacific Fleets have also made it virtually impossible to achieve unity of
mass in crisis situations.16 Before and after the Second World War the Soviet na-
val mission focused primarily on coastal defense rather than forward
deployment.
A quick glance at a map immediately suggests that from the Russian perspec-
tive, the Mediterranean is not a convenient theater for naval operations. Access
to the sea is limited by three narrow choke points—the Gibraltar Strait, the
Turkish Straits, and the Suez Canal—each easy to monitor, guard, and, if neces-
sary, block. Moreover, the Mediterranean is, and always has been, a place of vital
strategic and economic interests for outside powers, especially the United King-
dom in the two centuries preceding World War II.
A Historical Prerogative
The Soviet justification for maintaining a permanent presence in the Mediterra-
nean was rooted as much in perceived historical entitlement as in national secu-
rity priorities. The Mediterranean and Black Seas were historically regarded by
many Russian elites as constituting a single body of water. As the preeminent
Black Sea power, then, the Soviet Union was compelled to extend its weight into
the adjoining waters. Such notions were reinforced by a rich history of Russian
naval operations in the Mediterranean. Admiral Ivan Kasatonov—commander
of the Black Sea Fleet in the early 1990s—recalls a conversation with a subma-
rine crew docked at Vlora, Albania, in 1959, during the Soviet Navy’s first ex-
tended deployment in the Mediterranean:
It seemed to me then, that the sailors understood the necessity of the presence of our
naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea.
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“Ships of the Russian Fleet have been here, on the Mediterranean Sea, since the times
of mommy Catherine [II, the Great]—said the senior torpedo crew member.—We
know how sailors under the command of Spiridov, Ushakov, Senyavin traversed and
fought here.”17
In a similar vein, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, the Fifth Eskadra’s chief of staff
from 1970 to 1973, writes of the Mediterranean squadron’s development: “The
Russian fleet was again affirming itself in the Mediterranean Sea, as in centuries
past, making a stand for the interests of Russia.”18
The first-ever deployment of Russian naval forces to the eastern Mediterra-
nean took place during the 1768–74 Russo-Turkish War, when Catherine II sent
an expeditionary force of the Russian fleet from the Baltic to the Aegean and
eastern Mediterranean Seas to support the land campaign against Turkey. Al-
though outnumbered almost two to one, the Russian force achieved significant
successes in battles off Chios and Chesme, devastating virtually the entire Turk-
ish fleet; fifteen battleships, six frigates, and over forty smaller vessels were sunk
in a matter of hours.19
The Russian Navy kept a permanent Mediterranean presence for several
years, maintaining a blockade of the Dardanelles and exercising total sea control
in the major Aegean choke points. The 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji gave Russia
considerable territorial gains, as well as protectorship over the Ottoman Em-
pire’s Greek-Orthodox subjects. It also allowed Russian ships to navigate the
Black Sea and pass through the Turkish straits, although control of the straits
would remain a point of contention for some time.
The Montreux Restrictions
A century and a half and six Russo-Turkish wars later, the Montreux Conference
of 1936 turned control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus over to Turkey and
greatly restricted the movement of warships through them.20 Moscow was ini-
tially a supporter of the Montreux initiative—the conditions would protect the
Soviet Union from superior hostile fleets and greatly strengthen the potential
Soviet role in the Mediterranean, as long as Turkey remained friendly, or at least
neutral.21 However, Turkey signed a mutual assistance treaty with France and the
United Kingdom in 1939; after unsuccessful post–World War II Soviet attempts to
obtain greater control over the straits, the Soviet Union found that the Montreux
restrictions hindered its ambitions to become a Mediterranean naval power.
The provisions of the Montreux Convention most pertinent to the Soviets
were the following: light surface vessels (smaller than ten thousand tons and
with guns not exceeding 203 millimeters), minor war vessels, and naval auxil-
iaries could pass, with few restrictions; all warship transits had to be declared
to Turkish authorities eight days prior; and foreign warships could pass only in
G O L D S T E I N & Z H U K O V 3 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:39 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
35
Naval War College: Full Spring 2004 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
groups totaling fifteen thousand tons or less. Black Sea powers were granted
special privileges not permitted to other foreign powers: capital ships (surface
vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, exceeding tonnage limits of light
surface vessels) and submarines (if en route to or from repair facilities) could
be sent singly through the straits. The above conditions could be suspended,
however, in the event of a war involving Turkey or if Turkey was otherwise un-
der threat; the Turkish government was permitted complete discretion in such
circumstances.22
The Soviets found ways to circumvent some of the treaty’s restrictions. They
skirted the eight-day waiting period on warships through the use of contingency
declarations, which allowed Black Sea Fleet ships to augment rapidly the stand-
ing force in the Mediterranean during crisis situations.23 For example, on 11 Oc-
tober 1973, during the Arab-Israeli conflict, a group of Soviet warships passed
through the straits to make a port visit to Italy, its declared destination. Subse-
quently, however, the ships joined the other Soviet naval forces in the region.24
On the foreign-policy front, the Soviets also effectively exploited tensions be-
tween Turkey and its NATO allies, particularly Greece and the United States. For
example, after Turkey dropped an alleged 340 kilograms of bombs and napalm
on Greek Cypriot strongholds in northwestern Cyrus in August 1964, the U.S.
president, Lyndon Johnson, and much of the international community publicly
condemned Turkish involvement in that local crisis. Ankara responded by relax-
ing restrictions on passage of Soviet ships through the straits; shortly afterward,
the Soviets moved a cruiser and two destroyers into the Mediterranean from the
Black Sea.25 Later, the Soviets further exploited Turkey’s easing of the regula-
tions, in response to U.S. support for Israel. This situation helped facilitate So-
viet operations during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, specifically the airlift
and sealift to Egypt and Syria, and the rapid reinforcement of the Fifth Eskadra
by Black Sea Fleet forces.
THE BROADER CONTEXT
Although Moscow had initiated arms transfers to Egypt as early as 1955 (thereby
extending Soviet influence into a vacuum left by Britain) and had established a
brief naval presence in the Aegean Sea thanks to the use of Albanian ports in
1959, it was not until the American deployment of Polaris submarines in March
1963 that a forward naval presence in the Mediterranean became a central na-
tional security interest for Moscow.26
Polaris
On 14 April 1963, the USS Sam Houston (SSBN 609) visited the Turkish port of
Izmir, in the first Mediterranean patrol ever made by a ballistic missile
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submarine. The submarine, armed with Polaris missiles, was capable of deliver-
ing an explosive yield greater than the combined bomb tonnage dropped in
World War II by Allied and Axis powers (including the bombs dropped on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki).27 The missile’s range (2,800 kilometers for A-2 missiles,
four thousand for A-3), underwater launch capability, and mobility made Po-
laris a milestone in the Cold War nuclear deterrence calculus. A ballistic missile
fired from the eastern Mediterranean could thus potentially hit Moscow or Le-
ningrad.28 Such a threat was not entirely new to Moscow—the first Polaris sub-
marine, USS George Washington (SSBN 598), had completed three patrols off
Russia’s northern coastline by mid-1961.29 However, Polaris submarines patrol-
ling in those waters, home to the Northern Fleet, were considerably more vul-
nerable to Soviet ASW operations than were those in the Mediterranean. In light
of its strategic weakness in the new area of U.S. ballistic missile deployment, the
Kremlin prioritized the creation of a permanent counterforce in the Mediterra-
nean. In the words of a former British defense intelligence officer,
The initial response was first to establish a 1500 nm [nautical mile] ASW defence
zone . . . which covered the Norwegian Sea, Arctic and the Eastern [Mediterranean],
followed, in due [course] by a 2,500 nm zone, a radius of threat that took in Arabian
Sea (deployments started in 1967–68) and (not coincidentally) reflected the range of
successive Polaris systems.30
Moscow’s singular focus on the emerging U.S. SSBN threat reflected the dom-
inance of the Soviet ground forces in making overall strategy. It was likely these
elements that initiated the deployment of often unprotected surface forces to
serve as “forward observation posts,” providing continuous target data on the
location of U.S. and NATO nuclear strike forces.31
Soviet Support for Arab States
In its renewed quest for bases in the Mediterranean, Moscow turned to the Arab
states. Egypt’s aversion to European imperialism and to American support for
Israel made it especially susceptible. After economic difficulties in the early
1960s, and especially after the devastation wrought by the June 1967 Arab-
Israeli War, President Gamal Abdel Nasser had become increasingly open to So-
viet aid, receptive to the urgings of leftist political forces in his own country, and
permissive toward Soviet use of Egyptian ports, airfields, and shore support fa-
cilities.32 Egypt rapidly became Moscow’s principal client in the Mediterranean.
In general, Soviet wartime assistance to Egypt, as well as to Syria and other
Arab states, consisted of, variously: provision of military equipment and intelli-
gence prior to hostilities; delivery of supplies during the conflict; the demonstra-
tive use of military power in the vicinity of the war zone; transfer of military
advisers and specialists to the warring countries; and finally, engagement of Soviet
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personnel in combat operations. Moscow’s willingness to provide one or another
of these kinds of support in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world had
remained fairly consistent during the entire Cold War period, but it intensified
in the 1970s, reflecting Moscow’s more robust power-projection capabilities.33
Détente
In the 1970s, Moscow’s commitment to its client states was supplemented by a
parallel interest in U.S.-Soviet concord. The growing presence of the Soviet
Navy in the Mediterranean lent much credence to Henry Kissinger’s argument
for détente—that is, since U.S. efforts to maintain regional hegemony would
only provoke greater countermeasures by the Soviets, the interests of both sides
would be better served by a policy of mutual restraint.34 The new policy of
détente began with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (November 1969) and
was affirmed when President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev signed the “Basic Principles of Relations Between the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R.” in May 1972. This document—which outlined the principles of
détente—stipulated that bilateral relations were to be based on reciprocity, re-
straint, economic interdependence, and conflict mitigation. Further, it asserted
that efforts of one state to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other
would be inconsistent with such objectives.
The principles of détente, however, often proved incompatible with Mos-
cow’s foreign policy toward client states. Egypt, which had been able to exploit
Cold War rivalries to meet its own agenda—both in the domestic realm and in
its ambitions to reclaim territory occupied by Israel in 1967—now fretted that
détente would take precedence over Soviet support for Cairo and other Arab re-
gimes.35 Therein lay the dilemma for Moscow—such support risked direct su-
perpower confrontation, but failure to provide it risked the loss of local port
access, which was of tremendous strategic value to the Soviet Navy.
A NATO “LAKE”
The U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO had long enjoyed such strategic advantages over
the Soviet Navy that the Mediterranean was described as a NATO “lake” during
the early phases of the Cold War. Most notably, NATO members controlled the
two primary choke points into the sea—the Gibraltar and Turkish straits.
U.S. Advantages
The Sixth Fleet benefited from an abundance of local naval bases and facilities—
among others Rota (Spain), La Maddalena (Italy), Naples (Italy), and Souda Bay,
Crete (Greece). Furthermore, due to well developed underway replenishment
techniques, the Sixth Fleet had generally been capable of operating for pro-
longed periods without shore access.
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The Western alliance could draw on its carrier air wings in addition to NATO
air bases in Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Carrier-based aircraft were capable
of dropping conventional or nuclear ordnance and had a range of more than a
thousand miles, bringing Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and the southern USSR
well within reach.36 The deployment of even one extra carrier into the region (as
had occurred during the October 1973 war) added an additional ninety aircraft.
One notable disadvantage encountered by the U.S. Navy in the Mediterra-
nean, however, was the absence of a deep sound channel that could be exploited
by the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), a network of seabed listening arrays
deployed to detect submarines from great distances.37 These arrays of
hydrophones spaced along undersea cables had been installed in the Bahamas,
along the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and most significantly in the North At-
lantic.38 The lack of SOSUS capabilities in the Mediterranean was somewhat al-
leviated by the deployment of surface ships equipped with towed-array
surveillance systems.39
Soviet Disadvantages
The principal constraints on Soviet Mediterranean operations, aside from the
Montreux Treaty, included periodic restrictions on shore access, burdensome
deployment distances, and air inferiority. Such factors made the exploits the So-
viet Navy was able to achieve in the Mediterranean all the more remarkable.
Bases and Anchorages. The Soviets had never had permanent bases in the Medi-
terranean, and their access to local port facilities had always been tightly regu-
lated by often-erratic host governments. The brief, limited use of Albanian port
facilities ended in the Soviet Navy’s expulsion and confiscation of its military
equipment by Tirana in 1961. Moscow’s subsequent Arab hosts were no more
reliable. Captain First Rank Yevgenii Semenov, chief of staff of the Fifth Eskadra
on the eve of the October War, recalls an occasion when two Black Sea Fleet sub-
marines, having waited for two days to enter Annaba, Algeria, were finally, on 13
June 1973, forced to leave.40 In such an unpredictable atmosphere, the Fifth
Eskadra was compelled to diversify its points of contact along the Mediterra-
nean littoral, maintain a standing force of auxiliary vessels to reduce dependence
on local bases, limit on-station times, and request augmentation of Black Sea
Fleet elements by Northern and Baltic Fleet forces.41
As mentioned above, the USSR, as a relative newcomer to the region, bene-
fited from anti-imperialist sentiments endemic in the Arab world.42 The Soviets
were thus reluctant to undercut their propaganda by establishing permanent
bases of their own in Arab lands. Instead, they relied on twelve offshore anchor-
ages, which generally included floating dry docks and repair facilities.43 Most of
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these anchorages were in international waters; the main ones were located off
the Greek island of Kithira and in the Gulf of Sidra, near the north-central coast
of Libya. Relatively underdeveloped underway replenishment techniques forced
Soviet vessels to detach periodically from their operating stations and return to
these anchorages to refuel.44
Despite the inherent drawbacks, however, these anchorages lent the Soviet
forces a “mobile character,” facilitating regular active combat training. They also
simplified resupply duties, though only limited repairs were possible.45
Deployment Distances. The Montreux restrictions on submarine transits meant
that submarines could be deployed to the region almost exclusively from the
Northern and Baltic Fleets, through the Strait of Gibraltar. A former Soviet sub-
marine officer recalls one method of passing through this NATO choke point:
Every ship had a special method for a forced crossing underwater. The diving depths,
speeds, . . . and the course were all predetermined. . . . A submarine, having come
abeam the Sao Vicente cape, went south, confirming its location via the depth of the
sea. Coming up to Cape Spartel (Morocco), the sub came up to periscope depth, and
in literally one or two minutes used its radio-location system to determine the dis-
tance to the shore, while the navigator took a visual bearing through the periscope on
a Spartel lighthouse. . . . After determining the location, the submarine crossed the
strait at a high speed, . . . since strong currents could impede a slow crossing. After
one of the Soviet boats hit the bottom near the banks of Phoenix, we were required
to cross the strait with the fathometer on, so as to have constant control over the
depth under the keel. We understood that this compromised stealth, although it was
understood that in peacetime safety was more important.46
Sending submarines from the remote northern Soviet fleets both limited the
strength of the local undersea force and slowed deployment or reinforcement in
crisis situations.47 Part of the Soviet solution was to extend the ships’ stays in
the region.
After 1967, access to Egyptian ports extended the time diesel submarines
could remain in the Mediterranean from two months to six.48 Facilities in Alex-
andria were set up to repair diesel submarines (a floating dry dock was towed to
Tartus, Syria, for the same purpose). Port Said was the most heavily used of the
Egyptian ports. Groups of two to three ships docked there (to curb Israeli ambi-
tions in the Suez region) for two or three-month shifts, always in a high state of
operational readiness.49 Nonetheless, submarines were relieved much more fre-
quently than were surface ships—if not due to the condition of the submarines
then for the sake of the worn-out crews. By 1973, however, Northern Fleet SSGNs
(nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines) were being deployed to the Medi-
terranean for up to thirteen months at a time. The only permanent deployments
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in the Mediterranean were of the eskadra’s commander and staff, embarked on
one or another of the larger cruisers.50
Air Cover. Soviet Air Force flights into the Mediterranean were effectively
blocked by NATO air defenses in Turkey and Greece.51 Even in the period of
short-lived access to Egyptian airfields at Aswan and Cairo-West—used by the
Soviets to deter Israeli advances during the War of Attrition (1967–70) and to fly
reconnaissance missions against the Sixth Fleet—the prospect of achieving air
superiority was virtually nonexistent.
After 1967, the Mediterranean became the first theater for Soviet sea-based
aviation, on a limited basis. Considerable investment was initiated after the 1963
deployment of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean to put the USSR on the
same footing as the West in antisubmarine warfare. The cruiser Moskva (pr. 1123)
was the first large ship to emerge from the program, and it drew much attention
from the United States upon its deployment to the Mediterranean in 1967.
Although its design was unambiguously that of a helicopter carrier, the Soviets
designated it a “large antisubmarine ship,” thereby evading the capital-ship clause
of the Montreux Convention and enabling it to deploy from the Black Sea.52
This experiment in naval aviation, however innovative, was never intended to
offset U.S. air superiority. The Ka-25 helicopter, of which the Moskva and its sis-
ter ship Leningrad could accommodate a maximum of eighteen each, was slower
and of shorter range and endurance than its U.S. counterparts, and an easy tar-
get for NATO fighters. One
hypothesis is that the Moskva
had been originally designed
to extend the r ange of
shore-based ASW helicopters
engaged in anti-Polaris opera-
tions in the Barents Sea. In the
Mediterranean, however, with-
out proper support facilities,
the ship proved ineffective, “far
too small and vulnerable for
operating . . . on the far side of
the Straits.”53 The many defi-
ciencies in the Moskva’s de-
sign—ranging from inadequate length and poor seakeeping characteristics in
rough weather to an aircraft complement too small for its intended ASW pur-
pose—accelerated the ship’s replacement by the first full-size Soviet carrier, the
Kiev (pr. 1143), which first operated in the Mediterranean in 1976.54
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THE FIFTH ESKADRA, 1967–1973
The Fifth Eskadra’s first Deputy Chief for the Southern Theater of Operations,
Captain First Rank Georgii G. Kostev, notes that the Mediterranean squadron
was “perhaps the most unusual formation of the Soviet Navy in the postwar pe-
riod.”55 According to Kostev, it was created in 1967 to counter the United States
in an area of vital American interests, specifically in response to an upsurge in
U.S. and NATO maritime activity in the region after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli
War.56 The core elements of the squadron’s mission were surveillance of the
Sixth Fleet in the areas of its activity, constant shadowing of U.S. carriers, detec-
tion of American ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) deployments, assessment
of the threat posed to the continental USSR by American SSBNs, and the disrup-
tion of U.S. sea control.57
Because of the operational organization of the opposing Sixth Fleet and the
sheer size of the operating area, the Mediterranean Theater of Military Opera-
tions (TVD) was divided into three zones—Eastern, Central, and Western. To
serve the tactical objectives of the squadron, six task forces (OSs) were created
within it. OS-50 consisted of the flagship and its escort vessels; it had no fixed
operating area. OS-51 comprised submarines (an average daily strength of six to
eight units) pursuing U.S. SSBNs, usually in the Western and Central zones.
OS-52 was made up of surface ships armed with surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) tailing U.S. carriers from the points of entry to the Central and Eastern
zones. OS-53 contained antisubmarine vessels, such as the Moskva, operating in
the Western and Central zones with the support of aircraft and submarines.
OS-54 was an amphibious task force, consisting of two or three landing ships
and an escort ship, generally based in Port Said. OS-55 consisted of auxiliary ves-
sels, tankers, floating repair facilities, and other support ships.58
THE LIBYAN COUP D’ETAT, 1969
An episode in September 1969 offers a telling example of the Fifth Eskadra’s ex-
panding capabilities. Increased access to local port facilities after the 1967
Arab-Israeli War afforded the Soviets the option of conducting extensive exer-
cises at sea, using a greater number and variety of forces than ever before. One
set of such exercises, begun in mid-August 1969, saw the number of Soviet war-
ships in the Mediterranean swell to over seventy;59 this figure included
twenty-seven surface combatants at the exercises’ peak.60 During the coup of 1
September of that year in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, in which King Idris’s gov-
ernment was ousted by a group of young officers led by Muamar Qaddafi, the
heavy local presence of Soviet warships may well have been a crucial, if serendip-
itous, deterrent to U.S. and British intervention.
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Although on the eve of the coup Washington did not see the existence of
Wheelus Air Base, just east of Tripoli, as creating a de facto commitment, to the
Libyan state—the United States, unlike the United Kingdom, had no defense
pact with the Libyan monarchy—a British intervention was a serious possibility.61
King Idris indeed appealed for U.S. and British assistance during the crisis, but any
commitments notwithstanding, no Anglo-American intervention took place.62
Semenov recalls that in July 1969 the SSM-equipped cruiser Groznyi (Kynda
class/pr. 58) and the surface-to-air missile (SAM) destroyer Bedovyi (Kildin
class/pr. 56E) left Sevastopol for a port visit to Cuba. In early August the group
was returning to the Mediterranean with the tanker Lena. Meanwhile, several
groups of Black Sea Fleet ships from Sevastopol had entered the Mediterranean:
the Moskva, the SAM light cruiser Dzerzhinskii (Sverdlov class/pr. 70E), four
large submarine chasers, four destroyers, three escort vessels, three large am-
phibious ships, and three medium amphibious ships with naval infantry
onboard.63
On 13 August the Dzerzhinskii, flying the flag of Admiral V. S. Sysoev, led the
SAM destroyers Reshitel’nyi (Kashin class/pr. 61) and Nakhodchivyi (Kotlin
class/pr. 56) out of Varna, Bulgaria, where they had helped commemorate Bul-
garian Navy Day. The group proceeded into the Mediterranean to participate in
a training exercise code-named BRONYA.64
In early September, a series of Soviet-Egyptian-Syrian naval exercises com-
menced, involving an amphibious landing on the Egyptian coast twenty miles
southwest of Alexandria. During the mock assault over a hundred warships
from the three states formed a 210-mile protective screen from the Gulf of
Sollum (seventy miles east of British tank bases at Tobruk and Al Adem) to east-
ern Crete.65 By the end of the month, over forty Soviet vessels had concentrated
in the extreme southern part of the Ionian Sea off the coast of Libya; they in-
cluded the group that had returned from the Caribbean.66 Many of the units out-
side the screen were concentrated between Sicily and Tripoli.
The British bases at Tobruk (which was also the site of an airfield) and Al
Adem were of most concern to the Libyan coup plotters, since the British kept
the tanks in a state of operational readiness, needing only to fly in crews from
Cyprus. It is plausible that the need to overfly Soviet SAM-equipped ships to
reach Tobruk made any decisive move against Qaddafi’s men unattractive to
Britain. London announced on 5 September—after the old regime had col-
lapsed—that the United Kingdom had no intention of intervening.67
American freedom of action may also have been affected by the Soviet pres-
ence. After 1 September, Semenov asserts, the USS John F. Kennedy (CVA 67) car-
rier battle group left port at Cannes and began a passage through the Tyrrhenian
Sea at high speed to the Straits of Messina. The Sixth Fleet flagship, the cruiser
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USS Little Rock (CLG 4), and its escorts departed from the Italian port of Gaeta
around the same time and on 5 September entered the Ionian Sea on a course
to Tripoli.68
The U.S. carrier groups were met by four cruisers (Moskva, Dzerzhinskii,
Groznyi, the gun-armed light cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov [Sverdlov class/pr. 68-A]),
three SAM destroyers (Bravyi [converted Kotlin class], Bedovyi, Boikii [Krupnyi
class/pr. 57bis]), three SAM destroyers (Reshitel’nyi, Soobrazitel’nyi, and Krasnyi
Kavkaz [all Kashin class]), four gun destroyers (Nakhodchivyi, Blagorodnyi
[both Kotlin class], Sereznyi, and Sovershennyi [both Skoryi class/pr. 30bis]), six
escort vessels, six SSGs (conventionally powered cruise-missile submarines of
the Juliett class/pr. 651), and
one SSN (nuclear-powered at-
tack submarine of the Novem-
ber class/pr. 627A). To the east
of these forces was the am-
phibious force, which now in-
cluded two large amphibious
ships, five medium amphibi-
ous ships with naval infantry
and their equipment on board,
minesweepers, and support
vessels.69 According to a Center
for Naval Analyses study, “The
exercise schedule thus put the
Soviets into a good position to
counter . . . the Sixth Fleet com-
ing from the west.”70
This is not to suggest that the Soviets planned the exercises to coincide with
the coup; the contrary is generally believed to have been the case. However, the
episode revealed much about the developing operations of the Fifth Eskadra. In
this case, the force may have effectively, though perhaps inadvertently, neutral-
ized British and American options for intervention.71
THE JORDANIAN CRISIS, 1970
An equally significant, if less impressive, Soviet show of force occurred at the
time of the 1970 Jordanian crisis. On 9 September 1970, after members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine flew two hijacked commercial air-
craft to a dirt runway near Amman, Jordan, President Richard Nixon ordered
the USS Independence (CVA 62) carrier task group to a position off Lebanon, to
await further instructions. Meanwhile, as the Kremlin urged the White House to
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exercise caution, Fifth Eskadra warships positioned themselves among the U.S.
carrier task forces as well as between the American ships and the coast.72
On 17 September, Jordan’s King Hussein ordered his army to move against
Palestinian terrorist camps throughout the country. Two more U.S. carrier
groups were then ordered to the region to support the Jordanian army—USS
Saratoga (CVA 60) headed east from Malta, and the John F. Kennedy set sail
across the Atlantic—while the Sixth Fleet’s amphibious element, Task Force 61
(consisting of a helicopter carrier and landing ships), left Crete for the Lebanese
littoral.73
Disregarding a direct warning from Nixon against such an action, Syria began
moving forces into Jordan on 20 September in support of the Palestinians. As
preparations for U.S. intervention appeared to be under way, the Soviets took a
more aggressive approach to naval diplomacy. The Fifth Eskadra, increased from
forty-seven to sixty ships, took up battle positions and ran missiles onto
launcher rails in plain view of U.S. forces;74 its fire-control radars began tracking
American aircraft.75 At one point, seven SSM-equipped Soviet ships were within
striking range of the U.S. carriers.76 In response, Sixth Fleet escorts armed with
rapid-fire guns were given orders to trail the Soviet ships so as to, if need be, de-
stroy most of the cruise missiles before they could be launched.77 Fortunately,
developments on the ground obviated the need for superpower intervention; in
two days’ time, the Syrians lost 120 tanks to Jordanian artillery and to mechani-
cal malfunction and were forced to withdraw.78
The ability of the Fifth Eskadra to maintain a deterrent capability during the
Jordanian crisis was relatively modest, however, compared to the October 1973
Arab-Israeli War. There were several debilitating factors at play, from the
Kremlin’s point of view. The crisis coincided with the death, on 20 September, of
Nasser, Moscow’s main patron in the region. Although Egyptian-Soviet rela-
tions remained essentially unaffected at first, this event introduced a degree of
uncertainty concerning the effect Soviet action could have on the region.79 Fur-
thermore, the Soviets were undoubtedly shocked at the rapid losses of Soviet-
supplied tanks and at the failure of the Syrian army (trained by Soviet advisers)
to mount a substantial challenge to Jordanian forces. Under such conditions, it is
likely that Moscow simply preferred a quick, clean end to the conflict, without
superpower entanglement.
Washington, for its part, had its own reasons for shock. U.S. forces had proved,
in the later recollection of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,
“so far from [formidable] that the [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff (JCS)] and [Deputy]
Secretary [of Defense David] Packard expressed repeated concern about the in-
adequacy of U.S. naval capability in the Eastern Mediterranean.”80 The chairman
of the JCS, Admiral Thomas Moorer, had reported on 9 September that in their
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current state of readiness, U.S. forces would have very little staying power in the
Middle East. He argued that in view of the difficulty of reinforcing from South-
east Asia, where most American forces were then concentrated, “the United
States should make every effort not to become involved in large-scale military
action.”81 The Jordanian crisis thus afforded Moscow a key lesson—that the U.S.
military was stretched thin in the Middle East.
EXERCISES BEFORE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
The Fifth Eskadra’s activities before the October 1973 war centered largely on re-
connaissance, intelligence gathering, and antiaircraft warfare (AAW) exercises.
Because of their lack of carrier aviation and nearby airfields, the Soviets stood at
a critical disadvantage with regard to air operations in the Mediterranean. With
the expulsion of Soviet Air Force personnel from Egypt in July 1972 (a result of a
row over Soviet foot-dragging on arms deliveries—an upshot of détente), the
Fifth Eskadra lost much of its reconnaissance capability in the Mediterranean.
Largely due to unrivaled U.S. air superiority in the region, first-strike was
given special importance in the 1973 exercises, reflecting the Soviet “battle of the
first salvo” doctrine. In his 8 January 1973 journal entry, Semenov writes of an
officers’ briefing on anticarrier warfare: “Ship attack groups need to use all
weaponry for assaults on aerial attack groups: missiles, artillery, torpedoes,
jet-propelled rockets—the whole lot![—] since it is unlikely that anything will
remain afloat after an air strike. We are kamikazes.”82 A retired Soviet submarine
officer recalls the doctrine in similar terms: “Of course, it was assumed that we
would be fighting for the ‘first salvo.’ This was very important, to be the first to
deliver the blow, before the other side could send its aviation into the air. It’s dif-
ficult for me to judge whether we could have delivered the first blow or not, but
we were ready for it.”83
Semenov recalls debates on 26 February 1973 concerning antiaircraft and
anticarrier tactics, especially over methods of surveillance by various ship-
attack groups (surface ships and submarines) and the organization of strikes on
U.S. forces. The eskadra was actively exploring ways to adapt to the Sixth Fleet’s
tendency to use island regions, extend detachments out as far as fifteen miles,
and constantly shift the composition of its contingents.84
Problems with relaying intelligence to Soviet cruise missile–carrying and other
submarines were also of great concern, largely prompted by embarrassing epi-
sodes on 11 January in which U.S. ships forced a Soviet diesel submarine south
of Crete to the surface and aggressively pursued another in the Gulf of Sidra. Ac-
cording to Semenov, in both instances the crews had followed the General Staff ’s
commands precisely but in the end had cruised straight into the “mouth of the en-
emy.”85 Other problems with communications had similarly embarrassing results;
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discrepancies in the fleet’s surveillance and intelligence communications fre-
quently led to “blind” sorties. Semenov recalled that two medium-sized vessels
had recently been sent to the Spanish coast for no apparent reason.86
There were also significant tensions between Fifth Eskadra officers and the
Black Sea Fleet command in Sevastopol. Fifth Eskadra commander Admiral
Yevgenii Volobuyev was for some time unsure how to address a perceived short-
age of ships in the Mediterranean. To appeal to Sevastopol for more would likely
have led to a confrontation, since Black Sea Fleet commanders did not appreci-
ate being corrected by subordinates.87 Moscow’s insistence on the use of diesel
submarines was also a point of dispute; Fifth Eskadra commanders found them
ineffective in areas where the enemy had control of the air.88 The Sixth Fleet had
proven highly proficient at spotting Soviet submarines, and the need of diesel
boats to surface at regular intervals to recharge batteries made stealth difficult.
Nevertheless, naval headquarters did not entertain assertions that the diesel sub-
marines were obsolete and stood firm on the boats’ continued utility.89
Fifth Eskadra surveillance activities in this period were highly focused, as
they would be during the war, on U.S. carrier task groups. Soviet destroyers
shadowed the USS Forrestal (CVA 59) in mid-January 1973 in the area of
Thessaloniki, Greece.90 Fifth Eskadra warships conducted surveillance, and
analysis of extensive NATO exercises (involving the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, and Turkey) that took place across the Mediterranean
on 21 February.91 Semenov asserts that helicopters launched from the Moskva,
with assistance from the ASW cruiser Nikolayev (Kara class/pr. 1134B) and the
destroyer Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin class), surveilled and pursued Ameri-
can SSBNs in the Tyrrhenian Sea on 5–6 April.92 A massive search operation for
U.S. forces was launched in the eastern Mediterranean on 9 May during clashes
between Lebanese forces and Palestinian guerillas. The operation involved sev-
eral cruisers, destroyers, large and medium amphibious ships, minesweepers,
monitors, gunboats, and other ships; it stopped when the Soviets became con-
vinced that the Sixth Fleet was not planning to intervene ashore.93 According to
Semenov, Operation NAKAT, also launched on 9 May, involved surveillance of
U.S. ballistic missile–carrying submarines from their departure from their base
at Rota, Spain.94 Sea-based helicopters undertook another intensive ASW opera-
tion on 14 May, searching for the USS George Marshall (SSBN 654) in the area of
Sicily.95 The carrier Independence was also shadowed by a Fifth Eskadra battle
group starting on 29 June, when it left Cadiz.96
WAR
Egypt’s decision to go to war with Israel was made by President Anwar Sadat and his
Syrian counterpart Hafez al-Assad in the summer of 1973. The planned date of
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attack was kept from the Kremlin until 4 October, two days before the outbreak of
hostilities.97 On that day Leonid Brezhnev sent a message to Sadat stating that the
decision to fight must be the Arabs’ alone, although Egypt could rely on Soviet sup-
port. Brezhnev’s only request was that Soviet civilians be allowed to evacuate.98
At this time, the Fifth Eskadra consisted of fifty-two ships, including eleven
submarines (at least two of them equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles),
three cruisers (two with guided missiles), six guided-missile and conventional
destroyers, five frigates, two minesweepers, and two amphibious ships.99 The
flagship Volga (an Ugra-class submarine tender, project 1886) was in the vicinity
of the Balearic Islands east of Spain, when Admiral Volobuyev learned of the im-
minence of war. Around 0100 (1 AM local time) on 4 October, he ordered a mass
redeployment to the Egyptian and Syrian coasts to evacuate Soviet families from
the war zone to a point south of Crete, where they would be transferred to trans-
port vessels. Although efficient, the evacuation effort was somewhat draining
for the Fifth Eskadra; its captains were eager to be relieved of their passengers so
as to concentrate on raising their level of battle readiness.100
Other Soviet combatants were redirected to the war zone. A former subma-
rine officer recalls the revision of his ship’s orders:
In October 1973, when we were already preparing to leave our area of operations . . .
in the Ionian Sea, we received a radio transmission, saying that the sub, in connec-
tion with the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, must extend its tour of duty
in the Mediterranean by ten days. After this, our boat was redirected east, near the
coast of Egypt. Of course, we were very disappointed, and no one hid this. To us,
these “unplanned” ten days would last longer than all other active duty combined.
However, no one lost their heart. We were all young.101
On the following day, 5 October, a guided missile destroyer, four submarines,
and an auxiliary ship arrived in the Mediterranean, seemingly to relieve previ-
ously deployed Soviet forces. However, no detachment occurred; the six ships
thus augmented the size of the Fifth Eskadra to fifty-eight vessels.102
Phase 1
The first phase of the Yom Kippur War—spanning from the outbreak of hostili-
ties on 6 October to the beginning of the U.S. airlift to Israel on 13 October—
saw relatively little tension between the Sixth Fleet and the Fifth Eskadra.
Despite their augmented numbers, Soviet forces mostly continued normal
peacetime operations.103 Liberty ashore was canceled for the Sixth Fleet, but the U.S.
Navy announced that no American ships had been ordered to the conflict area.104
On 6 October, there were forty-eight U.S. warships in the Mediterranean. The
force consisted of its flagship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), at sea south of
Crete, four SSNs on patrol in the Mediterranean, and Task Forces (TFs) 60 and
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61.105 Task Group (TG) 60.1 consisted of the Independence and its group, then in
Athens; the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42) group, then in various Spanish
ports, made up TG 60.2. TF 61, the amphibious force, at this point included the
helicopter carrier USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7) and nine other amphibious ships,
carrying a Marine battalion landing team (about three thousand men).106
The Fifth Eskadra then included eleven submarines, one SSM cruiser (Kynda
class/pr. 58), one gun cruiser (Sverdlov class), five SAM destroyers (three Kashin
class and two converted Kotlin class), two gun destroyers (Kotlin class), nine frigates
and corvettes (Petya class/pr. 159, Mirka class/pr. 35, and Riga class/pr. 50), two
medium landing ships (Polnocny B class/pr. 771), two minesweepers, and several
auxiliary vessels. Altogether, the Soviet forces were then capable of launching
twenty SSMs in their first salvo.107
The staff aboard the flagship Volga was already on edge. Many of its officers were
standing watches “port and starboard”—even the chief of staff, Aleksandr Ushakov,
who was relieved by Semenov at night. Semenov’s diary notes that the life of the staff
became one of “wild, frantic work! Aleksandr Petrovich Ushakov turned out to be a
very emotional person, like the commander [Volobuyev]. They go berserk in con-
cert. What’s good for the ship (emotion), is not what suits the staff. . . . The mind of a
staff officer works better under calm circumstances.”108
Although the October war has been typically characterized as one initiated by
a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria, Semenov contends that the element of sur-
prise was in fact lacking. According to his account, Israeli forces in the Suez
Canal area were placed on alert as early as 1 October, and a partial Israeli mobili-
zation began on 4 October.109 Full mobilization of Israeli forces took place at
1000 (10 AM) on 6 October in anticipation of imminent attack.110 Semenov
argues that this apparent Israeli foreknowledge forced the Arabs to launch their
attack earlier than intended.111 Egyptian and Syrian forces began their respective
advances over the Suez Canal and into the Golan Heights at 1430 (2:30 PM), after
bombarding Israeli airfields and communications facilities.112 The Independence
group left Athens the following day for an area south of Crete, trailed by a Soviet
destroyer.113
By 8 October Egyptian forces had captured two beachheads eight to ten kilo-
meters deep on the east bank of the Suez Canal; the Syrians halted their advance
after moving seven to ten kilometers forward on the Golan Heights.114 Subse-
quently, Israel counterattacked on both fronts. Meanwhile, Independence joined
Mount Whitney south of Crete, while TF 61 was ordered to Souda Bay (on the
northern coast of Crete), where it would remain at anchor until 25 October.115
On 9 October, thanks to extended deployments, the Fifth Eskadra’s subma-
rine force numbered sixteen boats, including at least four SSNs (probably No-
vember class).116 By this date, the evacuation effort was all but complete.117 On 10
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October, the Soviet surface combatant force strength in the region was
twenty-one ships, including three cruisers and nine destroyers, many equipped
with missiles, and two amphibious ships. The combatants were positioning
themselves near Sixth Fleet ships in the eastern Mediterranean, where the Soviet
Navy was already well on its way to achieving effective sea denial.118
Moscow began sending equipment and supplies to Syria and Egypt on 9 Oc-
tober.119 Soviet and Eastern European merchant ships and Soviet amphibious
ships conducted the sealift, while the airlift—Turkey having granted Moscow
permission to overfly its territory for resupply, in protest against U.S. support
for Israel—was taken on by Soviet military transports and civilian aircraft.120
The transports were loaded in Black Sea ports with up to ninety tanks each, as
well as armored vehicles, and other heavy equipment. The need to guard these
transports accounted for much of the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterra-
nean. For that mission a special group of up to ten destroyers was formed, under
Captain First Rank N. Ya. Yasakov
(commander of the 70th Warship
Brigade in the Black Sea Fleet). The
magnitude of the escort forces was
dictated by reports of recent attacks
on Syrian ports by Israeli jets and
missile boats.121
As resupply efforts began, the
flagship Volga, the SSM cruiser
Groznyi, and the SAM destroyers
Krasnyi Kavkaz, Provornyi, and
Skoryi (all Kashin class) began tail-
ing the U.S. carrier groups south of
Crete.122 In response, three more es-
cort ships joined the Independence
carrier task group.123 Almost simul-
taneously, Soviet intelligence collec-
tion ships (AGIs) began monitoring
the U.S. amphibious task group at
Souda Bay, remaining there until the
25th.124 In effect, Moscow was send-
ing Washington a signal that inter-
ference with its resupply operations
would be met with force.
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October 1973
6th
Egypt and Syria launch offensives in Sinai Peninsula and
Golan Heights, respectively. The Yom Kippur War begins.
8th
Egyptian forces capture two beachheads on east bank of
Suez Canal. Syrian forces halt advance after having moved
10 km into Golan Heights. Israel counterattacks on both
fronts.
9th Soviet Union resupply effort to Egypt and Syria begins.
10th
Israel drives Syrian forces from Golan Heights but suffers
defeat in Sinai.
11th
Israeli missile boats sink Soviet merchant vessel Ilya
Mechnikov during raid on Syrian port of Tartus. Moscow
responds by deploying pair of destroyers off Syrian coast.
13th U.S. airlift to Israel begins.
17th Israeli armored units cross Suez Canal.
22d
United Nations Security Council Resolution 388 passes,
stipulating end to hostilities within 12 hours. Commander
of encircled Egyptian 3d Army disobeys cease-fire and
tries to break free. Israel advances on Suez City.
24th
Brezhnev sends direct message to Nixon, threatening uni-
lateral intervention to enforce cease-fire. Washington
moves to DefCon 3.
25th
Israel halts advance on Egyptian front, putting an end to
ground hostilities.
26th
Soviet Union launches intense anticarrier exercises against
Sixth Fleet carrier and amphibious task groups.
30th
Washington grants freedom of maneuver to Sixth Fleet
task groups.
November 1973
19th
Sixth Fleet taken off alert and returns to “normal training
condition” status.
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At this time, and until the very end of the episode, the American task groups
were especially vulnerable to Soviet cruise-missile attack because Washington
had denied them freedom of maneuver. The carriers were to stay in a defined
area south of Crete, in order to signal U.S. concern and interdict a potential air-
lift of Soviet troops to Egypt. However, this strategy backfired to some extent, by
greatly simplifying the targeting problem for the Fifth Eskadra.125 “So far we’ve
been in luck—good weather . . . and the Americans are maneuvering in one re-
gion at slow speeds,” writes Semenov in one journal entry.126
Volobuyev very much wanted to keep the Sixth Fleet uneasy as the two forces
became more tightly coupled. One of his methods was to convey an exaggerated
impression of the Soviet submarine threat to the carriers. Semenov recalls an in-
teresting ruse: “[U.S.] Airplanes and helicopters are flying nonstop, looking for
our subs. We dropped a grenade, as if for communication with our sub, and
again the intensity of the flights rose.”127 “Let them be nervous,” said
Volobuyev.128
The Soviet submarine forces were, in part, actually deployed as follows. An
Echo II SSGN (pr. 675) and a Juliett SSG were maneuvering west and south of
the Sixth Fleet task groups near Crete, while a November SSN was to the east.
More Soviet submarines were being sent to the region from the Atlantic and the
western Mediterranean.129 One Soviet submarine officer aboard a Charlie-class
SSGN (pr. 670) in the October crisis, recalls:
During the events of 1973, our submarine carried out its service for some time in the
vicinity of the Sidra Gulf, by the Libyan coast. Here, a group of U.S. Navy antisubma-
rine ships, evidently acting on some intelligence, or maybe simply presuming that
there might be a Soviet submarine about, was vigorously carrying out a search opera-
tion for two days. However, we gathered the impression that the ships achieved no
success. Nothing suggested that our boat had been discovered, even though we were
thoroughly listening to their hydroacoustic transmissions and sometimes the hum of
the ships’ propellers.130
On 10 October, the Fifth Eskadra’s surface force was also augmented by a
Black Sea Fleet group consisting of the gun cruiser Admiral Ushakov (Sverdlov
class), flying the flag of Rear Admiral L. Ya. Basyukov, and the SAM destroyers
Soznatelny (Kotlin) and Otvazhnyi (Kashin).131
The following day, the Fifth Eskadra was drawn more directly into the con-
flict. During an attack on the Syrian port of Tartus on the night of 11 October, Is-
rael inadvertently sank the Soviet merchant ship Ilya Mechnikov, which had
arrived before the resupply operations began.132 Israeli officials expressed regret,
explaining that the merchant ship had not been the intended target, but rather
two Syrian naval craft, which had been sunk as well. A similar incident had
G O L D S T E I N & Z H U K O V 4 7
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:41 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
51
Naval War College: Full Spring 2004 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
happened the previous day at the Syrian port of Latakia, where Israeli antiship
missiles sank a Japanese and a Greek freighter during a strike against Syrian mis-
sile ships maneuvering among civilian vessels.133 Nevertheless, Moscow was re-
luctant to accept the Israeli apology. The Soviet ambassador to Washington,
Anatolii Dobrynin, delivered a message from the Kremlin protesting the attack,
as well as recent deployments of U.S. ships to the eastern Mediterranean. The lat-
ter complaint was likely a reference to the John F. Kennedy task group, which had
been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 October to leave Scotland, and
which, as Henry Kissinger had hinted to the Israeli ambassador on the 12th,
would shortly arrive in the Mediterranean.134
For its part, on 11 October Moscow placed three Soviet airborne divisions on
alert.135 Two days later it also stationed a destroyer off the Syrian coast to guard
supply transports.136 By that time Israel had halted its counteroffensive on the
Syrian front and had consolidated defensive positions.137 On 14 October, the So-
viet Navy authorized captains of individual warships in the Mediterranean to
open fire as necessary on Israeli and other planes and naval combatants should
they threaten Soviet convoys and transports.138
Phase 2
The second phase of the conflict—which was to end with the cessation of major
ground hostilities on 25 October—began on 13 October, when the U.S. Military
Airlift Command initiated the delivery of high-priority munitions to Israel.139
The resupply mission was not an easy one; virtually all NATO nations had re-
fused to allow the jets to refuel at their bases, with the exception of Portugal,
which permitted the United States to use the Azores.140 The Sixth Fleet was or-
dered to support the C-5 and C-141 transports flying to Israel with navigation,
surveillance, air defense, and search and rescue. The carrier groups south of
Crete lost many of their escorts to that effort, leaving them even more vulnerable
to Soviet antiship missiles.141 The John F. Kennedy group’s passage into the Medi-
terranean was also delayed; the carrier was sent instead to a point west of Gibral-
tar to support the airlift.142 At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the
helicopter carrier Iwo Jima (LPH 2), carrying a two-thousand-man battalion
landing team, to deploy to the Mediterranean.143 This last decision was a precau-
tion against a potential Soviet troop landing, which the growing Fifth Eskadra
force—sixty-nine ships as of 14 October—seemed increasingly capable of sup-
porting. Soviet submarines deployed to the Atlantic were ordered to the vicinity
of the Gibraltar Strait to await the U.S. reinforcements.144
On 15 October, Israel launched a full-scale counterattack in the Sinai, having
on the previous day crushed an Egyptian offensive aimed at relieving Israeli
pressure on Syria.145 Meanwhile, Soviet involvement in the crisis had begun to
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intensify, as a second destroyer was deployed just off the Syrian coast and Soviet
submarines began to monitor activities near Israeli ports.146
There were several recorded instances in which Soviet surface ships engaged
in limited combat operations against Israeli forces. In one such case, the Black
Sea Fleet minesweeper Rulevoi (Natya class/pr. 266), under Senior Lieutenant
P. Kozitsyn, and the medium landing ship SDK-137 (Polnocny B class/pr. 771),
under Lieutenant Captain L. Lisitsyn, guarding Soviet civilian transport ships at
Latakia, fired upon approaching Israeli jets on 16 October.147
While the Israeli jets had certainly been fired upon in self-defense, Soviet
commanders were undoubtedly aware of the risks involved. The restraint with
which Soviets traditionally approached direct involvement in local conflicts in
the détente era seems to have been at least partially suspended.148 The root of the
danger was that the tactical situation on the ground and at sea was beyond the
control of the superpowers—the Soviets were responding to threats to their own
ships posed by warring third parties, not by American forces. The imperative to
avoid conflict with the United States, however keenly appreciated by Soviet
strategists, may have been a remote concern to individual ship captains threat-
ened by imminent strikes from Israeli missiles. The pace was intensifying, as
Semenov’s 19 October journal entry makes clear: “Over the last few days, the sit-
uation has become so complicated, that it seemed we were just on the verge of
becoming engaged in war.”149
On 16 October, the cruiser Murmansk (Sverdlov class) and the destroyer
Naporistyi (Kotlin class/pr. 56PLO), both armed with guns only, replaced the
SSM-equipped cruiser Groznyi and a Kashin-class SAM destroyer trailing the
Independence south of Crete.150 Although the effect was to reduce the immediate
threat to the carrier, the rotation was conducted more for logistical reasons than
for diplomacy. Unable to replenish under way, the Groznyi and its escort had
been forced to proceed to an anchorage at “Point 15” (east of Crete) to refuel
from five support vessels.151 Semenov complained to his diary, “American ships
are all supplied by the giant Sacramento [AOE 1, first of the world’s largest class
of combat logistics ship]. Our planning is the apex of inventiveness and an over-
load of communications. Our vessels are not fit for the transfer of cargo at sea—
they are transporters of cargo from port to port! With envy I look upon the
[Americans’] giant floating warehouse!”152
As Israeli armored units crossed the Suez Canal on 17 October, preliminary
plans for a limited “demonstration” landing of Soviet naval infantry on the west
bank of the canal were drafted.153 Such an operation would not have been en-
tirely unprecedented—Captain First Rank V. I. Popov recalls that such a landing
had occurred in January 1968, in response to an Israeli attempt to secure the en-
trance to the Suez Canal.154
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A landing operation now would have been the same kind of a muscle-flexing
show of force as had occurred in the War of Attrition, but Moscow was probably
not contemplating direct intervention in the Yom Kippur War at this particular
point. Captain First Rank Vladimir Zaborskii, writing in 1999, notes that in
1973 logistics stood in the way of an amphibious landing. The bulk of the naval
infantry force was still in Sevastopol preparing for deployment into the Mediter-
ranean. One large and six medium landing ships were already in the region, but
they were all being used for equipment transport.155 Subsequently, the com-
mander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, ordered the al-
ready deployed landing ships to be used for troop transport and a landing force
to be assembled of “volunteers” from the crews of all combatant and auxiliary
ships. According to Semenov, there was no shortage of volunteers; some thou-
sand men signed up to fight Israeli forces on the ground.156 However, this resort
to volunteers is a sign that the eskadra was to some extent in over its head.
On 19 October, a semaphore message was sent from the commander of the
Sixth Fleet, Admiral Daniel Murphy, to Admiral Volobuyev asking that the So-
viet forces comply with the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and not aim their
guns and missiles at U.S. Navy ships.157 The Fifth Eskadra staff was convinced
that U.S. jets and helicopters were in equal breach of the accord, but the Soviet
Foreign Ministry had received an official complaint from the U.S. State Depart-
ment, and the Mediterranean squadron was given orders from the chief of the
General Naval Staff to comply more closely with the agreement.158 This readjust-
ment in Soviet disposition and tactics was, however, short-lived.
By this time, Arab defeat was a foregone conclusion. On 19 October and again
on the 21st, Sadat appealed to the USSR to take immediate measures to broker a
cease-fire.159 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 388 on 22 October,
stipulating an end to all military action within twelve hours.160 The cease-fire
was welcomed by the warring parties, and on the Syrian front it held. However,
fighting continued on the east bank of the Suez Canal, where the commander of
the Egyptian Third Army—completely encircled by Israeli forces—ignored or-
ders from Cairo and made repeated attempts to break free.161 Israel immediately
took advantage of the broken cease-fire to continue its operations against the
beleaguered units and advance on Suez City.162
Phase 3
The third and perhaps the most dangerous phase of the war began during the
final hours of combat ashore and persisted, largely out of the public eye, for
another week. A second UN cease-fire went into effect on 24 October but also
failed to stop fighting on the Egyptian front, where Israel continued its assault
on the encircled Third Army.163
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Brezhnev now responded to continued Egyptian pleas for help by sending a
direct message to Nixon, stressing Israel’s violation of Security Council Resolu-
tion 388 and proposing a joint U.S. and Soviet peacekeeping effort to man the
cease-fire lines (as had been requested by Cairo). If Washington rejected the pro-
posal, Brezhnev continued, the Soviet Union would have to consider unilateral
intervention.164
The message was especially disquieting to Washington in light of increasing
Soviet activity in the Mediterranean. The number of Soviet ships there was now
eighty-eight, forty-seven of them combatants, including thirty-one surface
ships and over twenty submarines (four or five armed with surface-to-surface
missiles).165 Altogether, the force was capable of launching at least forty SSMs in
an opening salvo.166
In an alarming development, on the day of Brezhnev’s note to Nixon, a Soviet
surface group was sent to Port Said.167 It consisted of the Admiral Ushakov, the
SAM destroyer Otvazhnyi, the SAM destroyers Neulovimyi (Kildin) and
Soznatelnyi (Kotlin), the frig-
ate Voron (Riga class/pr. 50),
the tank landing ship
Voronezhskii Komsomolets (Al-
ligator class/pr. 1171), and the
medium landing ships SDK-83
and SDK-164 (Polnocny B
class), the latter three possibly
carrying the “volunteer” ma-
rine force ordered by Gorshkov.
Semenov remarked in his jour-
nal, “Seems we’re going to save
Port Said from Israel.”168
Even more ominously, Soviet airborne troops were placed on alert—seven di-
visions consisting of fifty thousand frontline troops and a hundred thousand
support troops, a force outnumbering the U.S. Marine contingent in the Medi-
terranean.169 Soviet pilots were also reported to be flying Foxbat/MiG-25 aircraft
from Egyptian airfields in reconnaissance missions over the battlefield.170
Predicting that the Sixth Fleet might consider preemptive action to prevent a
Soviet intervention, Volobuyev reinforced the Soviet anticarrier groups south of
Crete with SSM-equipped ships. The Groznyi, escorted by the Provornyi and the
gun destroyer Plamennyi (Kotlin) joined the gun-only ships already stalking the
Independence—the Volga, Naporistyi, and Murmansk.171 This move would also
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screen a potential Soviet airlift, as the Independence was then astride Soviet air
routes to Egypt.172
The Soviet force around Crete now included two gun cruisers (Murmansk
and Admiral Ushakov), eight SAM Kashin and modified Kotlin destroyers
(Krasnyi Kavkaz, Krasnyi Krym, Provornyi, Reshitel’nyi, Smetlivyi, Obraztsovyi,
Nakhodchivyi, and Soznatelnyi), and two Kotlin gun destroyers (Plamennyi and
Speshnyi). The amphibious forces maneuvering north of Port Said included four
large Alligator-class landing ships, Voronezhskii Komsomolets, Krymskii
Komsomolets, Krasnaya Pesnya, and BDK-104, five medium landing ships with
naval infantry on board, the SAM destroyer Otvazhnyi, and several gun destroy-
ers, including Naporistyi. The escort ships Voron, Kunitsa, and SKR-77 (all Riga
class) were in the same zone, as were two minesweepers.173
More ships were on their way. A large cruiser—most likely Moskva—and six
destroyers were declared through the Dardanelles.174 The Soviet airlift to the
Middle East had ceased, suggesting that the military transports (notably the
An-22, the largest Soviet transport plane) were being relieved to ferry the air-
borne troops.175 Two additional amphibious ships, together capable of carrying
a thousand fully equipped Soviet naval infantry, were expected to be deployed
from the Black Sea, and five additional Soviet submarines were en route to the
Mediterranean, which would make the Fifth Eskadra’s submarine force twenty-
eight strong.176
Early on 25 October, after a late-night cabinet meeting, the White House re-
sponded to Brezhnev’s message with a worldwide alert, moving to Defense Con-
dition 3.177 The JCS ordered John F. Kennedy, still west of Gibraltar, and Franklin
D. Roosevelt to join Independence in the eastern Mediterranean.178 Orders were
then given to suspend Navy support for the airlift to Israel, allowing all but two
escort groups to return to Independence and Roosevelt.179
Informed by Washington of the Soviets’ intentions and aggressively prodded
by the Americans to halt its military operations, Israel now did so.180 Plans for a
Soviet landing on the Suez Canal were called off, reportedly at the last minute.181
During the afternoon of 25 October, the USSR agreed to a plan to man the
cease-fire lines with a UN peacekeeping force that excluded both superpowers.182
On the following day Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced that
the United States had begun taking forces off of DefCon 3 status, but the Sixth
Fleet remained on highest alert.183 On that day, the Fifth Eskadra initiated inten-
sive anticarrier exercises against the carrier and amphibious task groups in the
eastern Mediterranean, using the actual U.S. ships as targets of simulated at-
tacks. A group shadowed the Independence, while two more ships joined the
anticarrier exercises and began trailing the Roosevelt task group. The anticarrier
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group (KUG-1) following Independence consisted of the cruiser Groznyi, the
SAM destroyer Provornyi, and the gun destroyer Plamennyi. KUG-2, stalking the
Franklin D. Roosevelt, consisted of the cruiser Murmansk (Sverdlov class) and the
gun destroyer Smetlivyi. The helicopter carrier Guadalcanal was targeted by a
third group (KUG-3), consisting of the cruiser Admiral Ushakov and the SAM
destroyers Neulovimyi and Reshitel’nyi.184 Submarines armed with antiship
cruise missiles also took part in the exercises, and more boats were coming
through the Gibraltar strait from the Northern Fleet.185
One significant addition to the surface force arriving through Gibraltar was a
Kresta II ASW/AAW cruiser (project 1134A); however, this ship remained in the
western Mediterranean until its departure in November.186 Yet another Soviet
anticarrier group (KUG-4), built around a Kynda-class SSM cruiser, entered the
Mediterranean on 29 October and began trailing the Kennedy group on the 31st.187
A f i f th str ike group
(KUG-5) began stalking
the Iwo Jima near Crete
(see maps). Two SSM-
equipped patrol vessels
( Na nu ch k a c l a s s / p r.
1234), escorted by a de-
stroyer, also entered on 31
October, marking the first
deployment of that class
of surface combatants.188
The Fifth Eskadra’s
force strength peaked on
31 October at ninety-six
units, including thirty-
four surface combatants
(five armed with SSMs)
and twenty-three subma-
rines (at least seven with
SSMs), constituting a
force capable of launching
eighty-eight SSMs in a
first salvo.189 The sixty U.S.
ships then present, includ-
ing three attack carriers,
two amphibious assault
G O L D S T E I N & Z H U K O V 5 3
Tailing U.S. Sixth Fleet Carrier and Amphibious Groups, 6–16 October 1973
(scale not given)
Source: V. Zaborskii, “Zapiski o neizvestnoi voine,” Morskoi sbornik no. 3 (March 1999), p. 79. Translation by
Yuri Zhukov.
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helicopter carriers, and nine attack submarines, found themselves in an increas-
ingly uncomfortable position, in which a preemptive strike seemed the most at-
tractive option should combat seem inevitable. Around each carrier were three
Soviet ships—two destroyers (one carrying surface-to-surface missiles, the
other surface-to-air) and one “tattletale” AGI capable of providing midcourse
guidance to SSMs fired from elsewhere.190
If the situation ashore had been defused, the crisis at sea not only persisted but
now reached its most dangerous stage. The four U.S. task groups were constantly
targeted for a Soviet attack. The three anticarrier groups trailing the U.S. carrier
groups could have launched first salvos of at least thirteen SSMs each against
their respective targets.191 Four Soviet cruise-missile submarines were on sub-
merged patrol nearby. The U.S. amphibious task force south of Crete was like-
wise shadowed by a group of five Soviet warships, some equipped with SSMs.192
In his 30 October journal entry, Semenov described the standoff: “Our forces
have very powerful cruise missiles and they are directed only at five objects—
three aircraft carriers and two helicopter carriers. All others are secondary. Ev-
erybody’s waiting only for a signal. The pressure has risen to the breaking
point.”193 Had war been evaluated as imminent, the Sixth Fleet carrier groups
would have needed to attack preemptively, by destroying the fire-control radar,
missile launchers, and gun mounts, or sinking outright every Soviet SSM-armed
combatant within range before the missiles could be released.
For its part, the Fifth Eskadra would have needed to incapacitate the Sixth
Fleet carriers before their aircraft and escorts had time to respond.194 The Soviet
mission, then, was to survive just long enough to deliver a devastating blow to
the enemy. The mood at the tactical level during the standoff echoed the Soviet
“battle of the first salvo” doctrine and the “we are kamikazes” mindset expressed
by Captain Semenov. With the exception of their submarines (which could
probably have fought for days or weeks after the surface fleets had been annihi-
lated), neither the Sixth Fleet nor the Fifth Eskadra had any alternative to a first
strike.195 An ex-Soviet submariner offers this assessment:
I think that [the Soviet submarine fleet] would have withstood [a U.S. first strike]. . . .
There was no reason to believe that our submarine had been discovered by the
probable foe . . . in October 1973. If so, then it is entirely possible that we could
have been the first to deliver the blow. . . . As far as the “fighting spirit” is concerned,
the sailors were entirely prepared to carry out any order. On a ship, especially on a
submarine, the execution of orders for the use of weapons is perceived somewhat ab-
stractly, and . . . to contemplate whether [the order] is good or bad—is the last
thing on one’s mind.196
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On a similar note, Admiral Murphy, the Sixth Fleet commander, writes that
the two fleets were “sitting in a pond in close proximity and the stage for the
hitherto unlikely ‘war-at-sea’ scenario was set. . . . Both fleets were obviously in a
high readiness posture for whatever might come next, although it appeared that
neither fleet knew exactly what to expect.”197
Once it became clear that there would be no commitment of Soviet ground
troops to the war zone, and in accordance with a suggestion that Admiral
Murphy had made to the JCS several days earlier, Washington authorized the
Sixth Fleet carrier groups to leave their operating area south of Crete and move
westward.198 The movement was delayed until 1600 on 30 October by heavy
weather, but once it began, tension rapidly eased. From a tactical standpoint, the
decision gave the U.S. task groups room to maneuver and disrupted targeting for
the Fifth Eskadra. On a strategic level, the White House was unquestionably
sending the Kremlin a signal that its forces were returning to a more relaxed pos-
ture.199 Fifth Eskadra forces began to disperse on 3 November.
Nonetheless, both fleets remained at high readiness for the following two
weeks.200 The general belief in the Fifth Eskadra continued to be that war could
break out at any moment and that the superpower standoff persisted, albeit in a
more limited form.201 On 6 November, a port visit by Volobuyev to Algeria was
canceled, and anticarrier activities resumed against the Kennedy, Roosevelt, and
Iwo Jima west of Crete.202 On 9 November, the SSM anticarrier group trailing the
Kennedy was relieved by gun ships and was sent for rest to Alexandria.203 Two
more anticarrier groups were disbanded later in the day, leaving three. The
Groznyi subsequently left for Sevastopol, and the Murmansk proceeded back
through the Strait of Gibraltar, heading for the Northern Fleet base at
Severomorsk.204 Despite constant requests to return the worn-out ships to
base, however, Gorshkov did not permit a more significant reduction of forces
until the Kennedy, Independence, and Roosevelt groups headed to port on 15
November.205 Thereafter, the Fifth Eskadra operations returned to combat train-
ing, repairs, and some much-needed time off for crews.206
“UPSTART” NAVAL POWERS
Several lessons can be drawn from this most ominous Cold War standoff at sea.
First, naval threats can emerge quickly. The Soviet Union, like the Russian Em-
pire before it, was a land power and had traditionally employed its navy in the
role of coastal defense. Its disparate fleets universally suffered from burdensome
geography—the Baltic Fleet from home waters that are completely frozen in the
winter, the Black Sea Fleet from the forbidding Turkish Straits, the Northern
Fleet from prohibitive distances and a frigid climate, and the Pacific Fleet from
its sheer remoteness, lack of efficient supply routes, and consequent
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underdevelopment. Nevertheless, only ten years after Nikita Khrushchev’s hu-
miliation during the Cuban missile crisis, when Soviet blue-water capabilities
were embryonic at best, the Soviet Navy had established a permanent presence,
and a very substantial threat to the U.S. Navy, in what had hitherto been a NATO
“lake.” Moreover, it accomplished this feat without permanent basing in the
region and despite having to deploy all units to the theater through NATO-
controlled choke points.
A second lesson is that tensions between the United States and its allies, and
other U.S. political decision-making constraints, can be effectively exploited
by adversaries to serve their strategic aims. Turkey, opposed to U.S. support for
Israel during the war, eased the Montreux Treaty restrictions on the Bosporus
and Dardanelles to permit Soviet use of airspace. This concession greatly aided
the air and sea lift to Syria and Egypt, and it allowed the Soviets to reinforce the
Fifth Eskadra rapidly during the crisis. Furthermore, because Washington felt
itself compelled to keep its forces in the eastern Mediterranean as a political
signal of U.S. readiness to counter unilateral Soviet moves during and after the
war, the Sixth Fleet’s carrier task forces were confined to fixed operating areas.
This greatly eased the Soviet anticarrier problem and forced the United States
into a difficult dilemma—to move the forces west and risk sending the wrong
message concerning U.S. resolve, or keep them on station in an unfavorable
tactical environment. As Admiral Zumwalt said of the Jordanian crisis that had
preceded, but was rather similar to, the 1973 crisis, “The terrible danger of that
last state of affairs is . . . that in a major crisis . . . the alternatives [became] back-
ing down (abandoning old principles and old friends) or escalation (risking a
global war).”207
A third lesson is that a strategic focus on “strike” ashore versus “sea control”
can result in doctrinal and tactical unpreparedness for interactions with “up-
start” naval powers. One former U.S. naval aviator who served in the Sixth Fleet
during the crisis explains that for the seven years before the Mediterranean cri-
sis, the strategic focus of the U.S. Navy had been on supporting the bombing
campaign in Vietnam. The priorities in that war, of course, had been carrier warfare
and close air support for troops in combat. Antisurface ship tactics and surface-
to-surface missiles, which were perhaps more appropriate for a close-proximity
war-at-sea scenario than was naval aviation, were insufficiently developed at the
time. It is apparent, then, that the mission of projecting force “from the sea” in
Vietnam had a debilitating effect on the fundamental U.S. Navy task of sea
control.208
Another lesson, which is especially resonant in today’s age of unparalleled
U.S. prowess in military technology, is that the technology gap felt by the Soviets
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during the crisis seems not to have appeared crippling to them. In the words of
one participant:
It’s no secret that our ships had many flaws in their construction. Furthermore, we
were behind in the development of computer technology, in fact very seriously so, in
radio-location and in electronic warfare. The loudness of our nuclear submarines
was also no secret. We knew about all these drawbacks, and tried to solve the prob-
lem. . . . [However,] by the assessment of our commanders, all ships in the Fifth Op-
erational Eskadra performed with sufficient effectiveness during the Arab-Israeli
War. All the while, a certain level of expertise was accumulated with regard to trailing
and delivering blows onto aircraft carriers.209
Although the asymmetry in capabilities between the two fleets was unquestion-
ably acute, as it was for the duration of the Cold War, the Soviet strategy was
largely free of illusions to the contrary. In fact, it was oriented specifically to off-
setting this lack of parity.
The Mediterranean standoff contrasts strikingly with its more famous prede-
cessor, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Whereas the Soviets in 1962 lacked the le-
verage to use their navy as an effective instrument of diplomacy, this was not so
in the Mediterranean in 1973. In the Caribbean, the United States benefited
from superiority on all levels. The impressive display of U.S. deterrent power
fully reflected these advantages. Due to its ability to mount a blockade, the
United States was essentially able to control the direction and outcome of the
crisis. The Kremlin, having tried to establish a new status quo in the region, was
publicly forced to retreat from this gambit, with attendant humiliation. The
1973 crisis, however, saw a much greater degree of parity between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The United States had fewer options and failed to
seize the initiative. This failure enabled Moscow, through bold naval diplomacy,
to influence significantly the pace and outcome of the Mediterranean crisis, de-
spite the obvious inadequacies of its client states.
This research may be most applicable today to considering the rise of China.
The experience of confronting the Fifth Eskadra in 1973 might be reason for
Washington to approach the question of China’s maritime prospects with some-
what greater caution. Like Russia, China has historically been a continental
power. If Soviet sailors had to reach back to the days of Peter I and Catherine II to
find Russian naval heroes, the Chinese are forced to go still farther back into his-
tory—to the exploits of the early Ming. In the modern era, Chinese fleets have
borne humiliations comparable to the Tsushima Straits debacle of the Russian
Navy in the Russo-Japanese War. Like the Soviet Navy, the contemporary
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been widely overshadowed by
ground forces. Despite an impressive collection of ex-Soviet carriers that are
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now museums in various parts of China, the PLAN’s prospects for developing
carrier aviation remain bleak.210 Finally, it is generally agreed that the PLAN has
yet to find its own “Gorshkov.”
It is not surprising, therefore, that Washington takes China to be a naval up-
start and that few there take it seriously as a maritime power. That is a grave mis-
take. The Vietnam conflict distracted the U.S. Navy from its core competency
of sea control, and the global war on terror could offer the PLAN a similar
opportunity.
In some respects, China is a much more natural maritime power than the
USSR ever proved to be. Aside from its lengthy coastline, with its numerous shel-
tered anchorages, Beijing does not confront the ubiquitous ice, immense dis-
tances, isolated geographical outposts, and the narrowly confined straits that
always burdened Russian sea power. Chinese capitalism is full of vitality;
Beijing’s merchantmen increasingly dominate maritime commerce in a way to
which the Soviets could never have aspired. Perhaps most importantly, Beijing
has in the Taiwan question a maritime strategic issue that serves as a focal point
for naval development. With the possible exception of Berlin, Moscow never had
this kind of strategic focus—certainly not one that consistently encouraged its
maritime aspirations. Moreover, Taiwan is less than a hundred miles off the Chi-
nese coast—a much more amenable environment for operations than was the
Mediterranean for the Fifth Eskadra.
As we consider Chinese maritime power, therefore, it is useful to reflect on the
success that the Soviets achieved under much more adverse conditions. The
1973 episode, perhaps the most dangerous of all Cold War maritime crises, of-
fers a lesson in humility for the world’s supreme naval power.
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DEALING WITH RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Cash for Kilotons
Timothy D. Miller and Jeffrey A. Larsen
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have posed serious military and po-litical concerns for nearly two generations.1 While many security analysts
and the general public assumed that this issue disappeared with the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, such
was not the case. Indeed, one could argue that while
strategic nuclear and conventional arms control trea-
ties have resolved much of the central drama during
the Cold War, there remains one area left uncovered by
treaty constraints or reductions—the thousands of re-
sidual nonstrategic, theater, tactical, or battlefield nu-
clear weapons remaining on the territory of the former
superpowers.
One expert on this subject has recently reminded us
that “for fifty years non-strategic nuclear weapons have
been the main source of the crises, accidents, and diplo-
matic contretemps associated with weapons of mass
destruction. . . . In the complex world of the nuclear era,
non-strategic nuclear weapons have produced more than
their share of difficulty and danger.”2 There are a number
of reasons why this is so: the large numbers of these
weapons, their multiple and varied missions, the lack of
safety and surety controls when compared to strategic
weapons, and their relationship to geographic location—a
relationship that strategic nuclear warheads do not share.
Mr. Miller is a senior analyst with Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) in Arlington, Vir-
ginia. He is a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and
former ICBM operator who commanded U.S. portal
monitoring facilities in Russia and Ukraine under the
auspices of the START and INF treaties as a member of
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counterproliferation policy for the U.S. Air Force.
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colonel, he was a pilot, Air Force Academy professor, and
director of the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Secu-
rity Studies. Since joining SAIC he has served as senior
editor for the official Air Force studies of the air cam-
paigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and led the
effort to create a strategic vision for U.S. Northern Com-
mand. Dr. Larsen edited Controlling Non-Strategic
Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities
(2001), Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a
Changing Environment (2002), and The Future of
Nuclear Weapons in Europe (1992).
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors
and do not reflect the positions of SAIC or its clients.
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Historically, nuclear arms control has focused on long-range strategic sys-
tems, although Russia continually tried to include U.S. tactical weapons in such
talks as well—a move that the United States always resisted. Only in recent years
have the tables turned, with the United States now taking the lead on nuclear ini-
tiatives. During the Cold War the Soviet Union demanded that American nu-
clear weapons stationed in European NATO countries be considered strategic,
because they could reach the Russian homeland; once negotiations began, how-
ever, the Soviets always conceded the case. Nevertheless, in 1991 and 1992 the
presidents of the United States and Russia unilaterally decided to reduce their
respective arsenals of NSNW, and in the Helsinki Summit of 1997 they agreed
that future strategic nuclear arms control negotiations would include a separate
venue for discussions surrounding the nonstrategic weapons of both sides.3
The first years of the new century have witnessed several headlines regarding
strategic nuclear arms: the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the suc-
cessful elimination of thousands of nuclear warheads under the terms of the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the American withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the signing of the Moscow Treaty, and the develop-
ment of a new strategic relationship with Russia. Yet beneath all this movement
in the strategic realm, the troubling issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons has
largely been ignored. The large imbalance in the numbers of NSNW possessed
by Russia relative to NATO and the opacity of intentions this imbalance may
represent create real concern among U.S. and alliance security decision makers.
The lack of formal agreement between the new “partners” to address this re-
maining legacy of the Cold War makes this situation even more disconcerting.
Yet Russia has indirectly promised to engage this issue—it has committed itself
to embark on a path to new relations in the twenty-first century and to develop a
relationship with the United States based on trust, openness, and cooperation.
Key to recent progress in the U.S.-Russian relationship has been a mutual un-
derstanding of the intentions of the partners toward one another. In Soviet days,
intentions on both sides were clear—to oppose one another ideologically at ev-
ery turn. Today that ideological opposition has disappeared. During the Cold
War strategic nuclear weapons were the dominant concern of the parties be-
cause of the direct threat they represented. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons were
of less interest in that environment. As the strategic threat has eased, the tension
in the relationship has diminished as well. However, until the remaining vestiges
of conflict represented by the tactical nuclear forces of the parties are resolved, it
is difficult to see how nuclear tensions can ease much further. When it comes to
nuclear weapons, policy should rest (to paraphrase former secretary of state
George Shultz’s observations about the fundamental principles guiding the for-
mation of national security) on capabilities of other states, not intentions. One
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must believe that as NATO and Russia draw closer, the glaring imbalance in tac-
tical nuclear forces will necessarily require some sort of dialogue. Otherwise it
will be difficult to clear the way to other partnership goals. Without greater spec-
ificity about the size and composition of the Russian tactical nuclear stockpile,
there is inadequate information to make an informed judgment about the verac-
ity of Russia’s intentions.
We believe that there is a way to achieve greater dialogue and cooperation in
the matter of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This article describes one possible
solution to the problem of dealing with Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal—a plan
that relies on direct purchase of Russia’s weapons by the West and dismantle-
ment of the warheads in Russia. We recognize this idea may be politically “radio-
active” for some, but in the absence of alternatives it may represent a change of
approach for which the time is right. Before going into the details of what we be-
lieve could be a win-win solution, however, we need to set the stage by reviewing
the historical background of these weapons.
UNRESOLVED COLD WAR LEGACY
The United States first introduced nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons
into the European dimension of the East-West conflict in 1953. Its nuclear
stockpile in Europe eventually grew to some seven thousand warheads. It signifi-
cantly reduced its tactical nuclear arsenal in late 1991 as part of the presidential
nuclear initiatives (PNIs) that accompanied the end of the Cold War. These uni-
lateral reductions led to the dismantlement of most U.S. nonstrategic nuclear
weapons in Europe, in a move that was meant to communicate to Russia and
others the American desire to decrease tensions and usher in the post–Cold War
era. Russia reciprocated with its own PNIs. Unfortunately, over twelve years later
the status of Russia’s NSNW remains unclear. There are vague Russian claims
that the stockpile has been reduced, but many questions remain about what “re-
duced” means. How many weapons are there really? Where are they located?
What is their level of readiness, their viability? Are they secure from theft? Why
does Russia still need so many of these weapons? On none of these issues has
Russia been forthcoming. All are unanswered questions that lessen confidence
in the fidelity of Russian claims. The ambiguity represented by Russia’s stated
willingness to reduce these nuclear weapons while refusing to engage in mean-
ingful discussion on any of these questions is indeed troubling.
Over the years, for a variety of reasons, most strategic nuclear weapons have
been covered by treaties between the United States and Russia. Tactical nuclear
warheads, on the other hand, have been neglected in international negotiations.
Ironically, success in strategic arms control has been so sweeping that the global
balance of nuclear weapons has tilted dramatically in favor of unregulated
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tactical weapons. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons are today more prominent than
strategic warheads. For the most part, strategic nuclear weapons were postured
to be employed promptly on an intercontinental basis. Shorter-range tactical
weapons were meant for “battlefield” use; they typically took more time to pre-
pare and were both lower in yield and shorter in range than strategic systems.
Thus they appeared less threatening to the United States. Relative to the size of
the strategic nuclear arsenal, their numbers and posture also made them less
consequential in the strategic environment of the Cold War. Today, however, the
situation having been reversed, thousands of strategic weapons are gone or go-
ing away as a result of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties and the Moscow
Treaty; in contrast, NSNW reductions are not legally binding and are difficult to
measure.
It has been argued that the George W. Bush administration “needs to place
tactical nuclear weapons control at the top of the U.S.-Russian agenda” and that
the “failure of arms control to address tactical nuclear weapons in a treaty belies
the threat they pose.”4 But this issue is extremely complex, and a way ahead is not
easy to discern. Russia presumably does what it does for logical reasons, whether
the United States understands them completely or not. Ambiguity in national
policies associated with the presence and capability of nuclear weapons is not
new. Ambiguity has been employed by all nuclear states in an effort to introduce
uncertainty in the minds of would-be challengers. Nor is there any requirement
for Russia to explain its actions. But if Russia is to be a genuine partner, more
transparency regarding its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal and policies would help
strengthen that relationship.
In November 2000 the U.S. Air Force convened a seminar to study this issue.
Many of the West’s leading experts on the subject of nonstrategic nuclear weap-
ons in Europe and Russia participated. Those experts estimated the current size
of the Russian nonstrategic nuclear arsenal as between two thousand and fifteen
thousand weapons.5 This range was validated by draft language for the 2003 De-
partment of Defense authorization bill, in which the Senate Armed Services
Committee estimated that Russia had from seven to twelve thousand such war-
heads. The American inventory of tactical nuclear warheads is estimated to be
less than twelve hundred. Of this total, multiple sources cite “a couple of hun-
dred” U.S. gravity-drop bombs remaining in Europe, assigned to dual-capable
NATO aircraft and stored in alliance facilities in theater, while the bulk of the re-
mainder of these weapons is reportedly stored in the United States.6
Further complicating the picture is the fact that not all of Russia’s nuclear in-
ventory is truly tactical in nature. Some of Russia’s weapons are quite large, up-
ward of a megaton in yield, making them larger than many strategic nuclear
weapons in either country. In addition, the range of delivery is determined not
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by the weapon but by the delivery system. Since many weapons can be separated
from delivery systems and easily mated to other means of delivery, range be-
comes fungible, and the distinction between strategic and tactical is moot. In to-
day’s new world order, as Russia and the United States struggle to reorient their
Cold War military infrastructure, both place a higher premium on flexibility
and interoperability of weapons and delivery systems rather than on size or
numbers. As a result the terms “tactical” and “strategic” are practically
meaningless.
One other subtle distinction is found in the rules for counting nuclear war-
heads. Often overlooked is the fact that the START, Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF), and Moscow Treaties only dealt with “offensive”weapons. Defensive
nuclear weapons for use on antiballistic or surface-to-air missiles are uncounted
by any arms control agreement. The United States no longer has that type of
weapon, but Russia reportedly has over twelve hundred, many of them with
large yields.7
The Defense Science Board explicitly recognized the difficulty of distinguish-
ing strategic and tactical weapons in 1998. Its Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence
recommended that future arms control efforts focus on dealing with deployable
warheads and declared that they “must deal with important asymmetries in
U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons infrastructures.” This recommendation went far-
ther than just recognizing the need to scrap the artificial distinctions between
classes of nuclear weapons, suggesting that the Department of Defense address
support infrastructure asymmetries related to production and refurbishment of
warheads in both countries.8
RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR A WAY FORWARD
A clear understanding of today’s environment is needed if this issue is to move
forward to a satisfactory resolution. This understanding includes a better pic-
ture of the interests of the parties, exploration of appropriate solutions, identifi-
cation of incentives and disincentives, and a willingness on the part of the
parties to seek a path to resolution.
Do the Parties Want to Change the Situation?
In 1997, Presidents William Clinton and Boris Yeltsin signed the Helsinki Agree-
ment. This instrument laid the framework for START III negotiations and
placed nonstrategic nuclear weapons at the forefront of future bilateral discus-
sions. The new relationship between Russia and the United States developed fur-
ther under Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, as shown by the
commitments expressed in the “Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relation-
ship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation.”9 When
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this communiqué was released in early 2002 it appeared that the parties had
agreed to discuss just about everything, including nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
During a press conference following the signature of the Strategic Offensive
Reduction Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) in Russia in June 2002, Secretary of State
Colin Powell responded to a question about the threat posed by Russian NSNW
by acknowledging that indeed these weapons concerned him. He pointed out
that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had “made a particular point of urg-
ing the administration to pin down how the Russians are handling so-called
‘tactical’ nuclear weapons.”10 During testimony to the Senate in July 2002 Secre-
tary Rumsfeld himself argued the necessity to do something about the imbal-
ance in tactical nuclear forces between Russia and the United States, indicating
that even America’s European allies understood this need.11 Clearly the U.S. gov-
ernment is interested in discussions on NSNW.
But no matter how seriously the United States wishes to engage the topic, if
Russia is not willing to sit down and discuss the issue and possible solutions,
nothing will happen. However, there may be indications of a changing Russian
attitude. It was reported in April 2002 that the Kremlin intended to dismantle its
tactical nuclear weapons and propose “unprecedented peace initiatives,” that
“Russia intends to fulfill its unilateral obligations on tactical nuclear weapons
reduction by 2004.”12 Such evidence, in conjunction with statements in the Joint
Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, gives the impression that the bi-
lateral relationship has changed enough to make the two countries truly part-
ners, committed to open dialogue, to resolving their differences, and to getting
along better. If all was as it appeared, the path to dealing with the Cold War’s nu-
clear leftovers would also be clear.
But on closer examination the Russian article in which the hopeful state-
ments appeared also raised serious questions; in fact, it serves in itself as an ex-
ample of the ambiguity facing the West. First, the source was the “Kremlin,” not
a specific government official. Unclear too was what made this initiative so un-
precedented, especially given President Yeltsin’s 1992 commitment. The article
included the usual Russian linkage to U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, stating
that “in planning to dismantle its tactical warheads, [Russia] is merely asking
Washington to return the nuclear weapons from NATO storage facilities in Eu-
rope to the United States.” Why, twelve years after the 1991–92 presidential nu-
clear initiatives, is Russia still “planning” to dismantle these weapons? For years
Russia insisted it had complied with its obligations under the PNIs. Now we are
told Russia is still in the planning stages and “merely” asking Washington to
make compromises in return.
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The Interests of the Parties
The United States has two straightforward interests: adequate physical security
for all of Russia’s nuclear weapons, to avoid pilferage by and proliferation to un-
savory characters opposed to Western interests; and improved transparency and
understanding of Russia’s nuclear intentions.
European NATO’s interests are similar to those of the United States but are
more pressing and direct given its proximity to Russia. Many of NATO’s poten-
tial adversaries would gladly acquire a Russian nuclear device or fissile material.
Since Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons were originally built to counter NATO
during the Cold War, and in particular to be used on battlefields in the European
theater, it is easy to understand why many of the European members of NATO
remain concerned about Russia’s unwillingness to engage in discussions about
these forces, reduce them, or clarify its intentions regarding them. On a positive
note, the European NATO partners, judging by the comments made by Secre-
taries Powell and Rumsfeld and in NATO communiqués, are also interested in
discussions on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons.13
Russia’s interests are more difficult to discern. One obvious long-term goal is
the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO. These weapons have been a
thorn in Russia’s side since early in the Cold War. Without a quid pro quo on
these weapons, in Russia’s view, there is little incentive to deal. In addition, be-
cause Russia is compensating for conventional weakness with nuclear ambigu-
ity, anything that constrains its remaining nuclear forces is most likely to be
viewed as hurting its security. Again we see the value of ambiguity to nuclear de-
terrence; unfortunately, this ambiguity also hurts Russia’s relationship with its
new partners.
NATO’s tactical nuclear arsenal was acquired to compensate for the Warsaw
Pact’s conventional advantage in the Cold War. Many Russians must wonder
why these weapons remain in Europe even though the Warsaw Pact is long gone
and some of its former members are now NATO partners themselves. In an
ironic twist, the tables are turned—it is now Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear arse-
nal that shores up its conventional weakness vis-à-vis NATO and other
neighbors.
There is another subtle dynamic at work, particularly in Russia. When look-
ing at Russia’s security environment, many in the West fail to appreciate that the
success of previous strategic arms control agreements may now be undercutting
Russia’s incentive to resolve the NSNW imbalance. Over the years, strategic arms
control agreements have reduced Russia’s ability to employ strategic forces to re-
spond to threats on its southern front. For a country with eleven time zones,
strategic weapons in the Far East can represent significant capabilities, useful in
fending off hostile regional threats and bolstering national security by adding
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uncertainty to an enemy’s calculus. Past reductions in Russian strategic forces
that could have been called into a regional fight have increased the value of
Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. The outbreak of fundamental Islamic vio-
lence aimed at Russian interests makes even more understandable the value
Russia assigns to unfettered tactical nuclear options, as well as its reluctance to
engage this issue.
ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION: CASH FOR KILOTONS
What, then, can be done about Russian’s large tactical nuclear arsenal? We pro-
pose a simple solution—cut a deal to buy the weapons outright. This bold move
on the part of Western nations would reduce a serious threat, be in keeping with
capitalist precepts of a free market economy, provide badly needed capital for
Russia’s economy, and enhance cooperative business relationships between
members of the consortium formed for the purpose. At first blush, this sugges-
tion may seem a little too far outside the box. However, as recently as 12 March
2003 Senator Richard Lugar and former senator Sam Nunn, the founders of the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program for the dismantle-
ment of former Soviet nuclear weapons, called for a “reprioritization and accel-
eration of U.S. nuclear threat reduction programs.” Third on Senator Lugar’s
top-ten list of immediate priorities regarding Russian weapons of mass destruc-
tion was “doing something about tactical nuclear weapons.”14 The senator’s call
came in conjunction with the publication of a thorough review of the CTR pro-
grams in Russia by a Harvard University group, the Project on Managing the
Atom. This report, commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, calls on the
United States to champion new initiatives to expedite elimination or control of
nuclear materials in order to frustrate their potential use by terrorists. The Har-
vard team made specific reference in one recommendation to finding a way to
deal with the present imbalance in tactical nuclear forces. Our proposal to buy
these weapons would do just that.15
Historically, genuine arms control initiatives have been initiated by the West,
including nearly all of the prescriptions to date for solving the NSNW imbal-
ance. Arms control initiatives by the Soviets generally dovetailed with their
grand strategy and were often meant to preserve whatever strategic advantage
they held in the Cold War. Russia has offered virtually no suggestions to resolve
the tactical nuclear situation, other than regularly repeating its call for the
United States to pull its tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe.
For the most part, Western solutions have not been much more creative. Sev-
eral participants in the U.S. Air Force’s 2000 NSNW conference made proposals,
but these predictably boiled down to arms control or an extension of Nunn-
Lugar CTR programs currently in place. One recent monograph concludes that
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Russia and the United States have little interest in entangling themselves in more
arms control agreements. It suggests that all U.S. nuclear weapons be integrated
into a “comprehensive posture”—something that may eventually alleviate arti-
ficial distinctions—and recommended “seeking engagement through other
means aside from traditional arms control venues.”16
One reason why Moscow rarely offers either arms control or disarmament so-
lutions is that much of the burden of elimination would fall on Russia. This is
because Russia retains most of the world’s remaining Cold War nuclear forces,
its predecessor state having invested more heavily than the West in the atom as
the guarantor of national security in that period. Russian political and military
planners are still heavily reliant on this investment today. To them, leaping into
an arms control or CTR solution to regulate or reduce these forces probably ap-
pears to be an avoidable burden that would be counter to their national security
interests.
We are not saying that arms control or CTR solutions are wrong or bad but
that in the case of NSNW it is too soon to determine whether either would work,
or whether some alternative exists. Arms control is typically used when a rela-
tionship is adversarial, when so little trust exists that the parties must negotiate
rules governing their interaction. But the Moscow Treaty confirmed that today’s
U.S.-Russia relationship is no longer so adversarial. Accordingly, an arms con-
trol treaty may not be the best option for dealing with nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Another fundamental feature of arms control is that it is designed to
regulate militarily useful weapons so as to raise confidence and jointly reduce
tensions. Not knowing what is militarily useful inside Russia’s NSNW stockpile
makes arms control at this point unsatisfactory. Conversely, cooperative threat
reduction is useful for dismantling excess and obsolete weapons but is the wrong
tool for controlling militarily useful weapons. Without knowing what is excess
in the Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapon stockpile, extending the Nunn-
Lugar CTR program to all NSNW would be equally unrealistic. Until Russia is
willing to put its entire stockpile on the table and inform NATO which warheads
it wants to keep and which are excess to its needs, Western insistence on applying
a standard solution merely for the sake of doing something will be a meaningless
exercise, and one that will be resisted by Russia.
To be rational, nuclear force postures ought to be derived from national and
military strategy goals, not from arms control or disarmament negotiations
with other nations. If their political relationships truly have changed, the United
States, Russia, and NATO should be able to work together to clarify which nu-
clear weapons fulfill strategy goals and which are excess. In the euphoria of the
collapse of communism and the emergence of a free Russia, however, the United
States unilaterally reduced its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal to such a low level
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that it has little left to negotiate away on this issue. The West will need some sort
of incentive to get Russia to the table. Since the United States and NATO have lit-
tle in the way of further force cuts to offer—other than total removal of U.S.
weapons in Europe—to induce Russia to clarify its tactical nuclear stockpile,
some other enticement must be found or created. We suggest that the best en-
ticement would be monetary—in the form of cash and debt relief.
Russia is working hard to reinvent itself as a free market economy and inte-
grate itself in the economies of the world, and it will require massive amounts of
hard currency to do this successfully. The members of NATO are among the
wealthiest nations in the world and have a stake in seeing Russia succeed. Most in
the West also acknowledge that Russia cannot clean up its nuclear past alone,
that it will take large amounts of money—money Russia does not have.
INGREDIENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL
If a way to buy excess Russian nuclear weapons can be found, three positive
things could ultimately emerge: Moscow might be enticed to deal expeditiously
with its NSNW; NATO, for which the process would be transparent, could see its
proliferation concerns lessened; and Russia’s economic transformation could be
accelerated.
It appears the parties are able to identify courses of action that will not
work—cooperative threat reduction, arms control, unilateral presidential nu-
clear initiatives—but unable to define one that will work. We believe a winning
approach would be one that is multilateral, including NATO and Russia; one
that respects the rights of sovereignty and self-determination (including unilat-
eral determination of necessary force levels derived from national strategy
goals); one that is transparent enough to reveal both capabilities and intentions;
and one that provides incentives for Russia to move forward expeditiously. Our
suggestion takes a little from arms control and a little from CTR, and mixes it all
with financial carrots and old-fashioned market forces to get this process moving.
A Role for the IAEA
One key ingredient of a successful contract is a way to deal with distrust. For this
we call for the inclusion of a third party, ideally the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)—not as a party to the deal but as the implementer, the body that
accepts custody of purchased weapons, demilitarizes them, and stores the fissile
material until it is eventually blended into fuel or properly disposed of. We believe
that a neutral third party, one that would not pose a military threat to either side,
would enhance mutual confidence in a way that is critical to removing suspi-
cion. The IAEA has no stake in the nuclear balance of power between the parties,
thus making it an ideal organization to take possession of excess fissile material
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from nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The IAEA has the expertise and a reputa-
tion for doing this type of work, and its costs could be covered through increases
in existing funding mechanisms (or by a new approach proposed below).
Presumably the IAEA itself would perceive the value of its involvement in this
scheme and acknowledge its unique capabilities and experience for handling
such an assignment. Still, several questions about IAEA involvement must be ad-
dressed. Would it want this job? Could it do it effectively? Would the parties trust
it to do this job with full transparency? The idea of placing nuclear weapon fis-
sile material in an international “bank” for safekeeping and rendering for peace-
ful purposes is not new; President Dwight D. Eisenhower suggested it in his
famous “Atoms for Peace”
speech in 1953, a speech that
led to the birth of the IAEA.17
At the time, the international
community did not allow
Eisenhower’s far-reaching
proposal to come to pass; it
was primarily the objections
of the Soviet Union that pre-
vented this banking of fissile
material by what became the
IAEA. Now that the Soviet
Union is gone, the world need
not consider itself bound by
this decision, as it is yet an-
other vestige of the Cold War.
Our proposal is neither as far-
reaching as Eisenhower’s nor
as utopian in its intent. However, banking fissile material from excess nuclear
weapons and rendering it harmless may represent a small step toward fulfilling
President Eisenhower’s dream.
There is some question about whether the IAEA’s statute would permit it to
take on this mission. As we read the document, however, the IAEA not only
could do it but apparently would have no choice if asked to do so by NATO and
Russia. In part, Article III of the IAEA statute states:
Part A. The Agency is authorized:
1. To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application
of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to do so,
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Buying excess tactical nuclear weapons from Russia and converting them to
reactor fuel would:
• Assure sovereignty rights and respect for national self-determination
of the parties
• Place the NATO-Russian relationship on a new footing
• Employ the forces of a closed and regulated market to provide incen-
tives that will enhance security and surety of these weapons
• Create a safe and secure regulated market for excess and obsolete
weapons in a way that enables the parties to compare costs and work
together
• Improve the security of all parties by quickly reducing the prolifera-
tion risks associated with “loose nukes”
• Share the heavy security burden of Russian nonstrategic nuclear
weapons with a consortium of interested states
• Achieve enough transparency to suggest security measures to pro-
tect Russia’s remaining weapons from proliferation pressures
• Highlight for all parties the potential threats posed by nonstrategic
nuclear weapons
• Infuse hard currency into Russia’s economy, thereby accelerating its
market reforms and economic transformation.
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to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or
the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for
another; and to perform any operation or service useful in research on, or develop-
ment or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes;
2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, services, equip-
ment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical
application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of
electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas of
the world; . . .
7. To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment useful in carrying out its
authorized functions, whenever the facilities, plant, and equipment otherwise avail-
able to it in the area concerned are inadequate or available only on terms it deems
unsatisfactory.
Part B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall: . . .
2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received by the
Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are used only for peaceful purposes; . . .
Part C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance to mem-
bers subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions incompatible
with the provisions of this Statute.18
A request from NATO and Russia to accept fissile material from excess NSNW
and store it until it could be safely converted to fuel or properly disposed of
would, we believe, be a “practical application” in the sense of the subparagraphs
of Article III. The IAEA would be obligated to act as an intermediary and acquire
or establish the plants, facilities, and equipment necessary to safely secure and
store weapons pits (the plutonium “triggers” at the center of a thermonuclear
bomb, and hence the most critical piece) proffered by either party. Furthermore,
the statute requires the IAEA to establish control over the pits until they can be
used for peaceful purposes. When one considers that the leaderships of NATO
and the IAEA are drawn largely from the same nations, it would seem that
NATO, Russia, and the IAEA could agree on a procedure to make this happen.
Since its inception, the focus of the IAEA has been narrowed by the member-
ship to the control of nuclear reactors for generation of power; however, this
self-constraint appears to be changing. A recently published history of the
agency notes that since the end of the Cold War the United States has already
placed excess fissile material in IAEA storage and that Russia has committed it-
self to do the same.19 It would seem that our proposal represents an opportunity
to take this process one step farther and in so doing provide Russia and NATO an
example showing that they can work together to trim their nuclear stockpiles
without an arms control agreement.
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There could be no question in the minds of NATO or Russian leaders that the
IAEA was anything but an honest broker. Any agreement between the parties
and the IAEA must clearly specify that the IAEA is not to “choose sides.” Dispute
resolution must be left up to the parties and not involve the IAEA.
Elements of a Deal: First Steps
To begin this process, all parties must lay out all their holdings and sort the
“wheat from the chaff,” in a way similar to an arms control baseline declaration,
in strict confidentiality among the partners. Depending upon the demands of
the parties, this declaration will likely need to be verified by a joint inventory.
The parties could conduct a joint inventory themselves or ask an international
organization to do the accounting. Here too the IAEA may be the best choice,
since it presumably already has some grasp of the situation inside these states.
Once this baseline is established, both sides will identify weapons that are ex-
cess to security needs. This may be easy for NATO. Judging by the actions of the
alliance in the past decade, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons assigned to NATO are
all considered essential to the partners; otherwise, they would have been unilat-
erally withdrawn to the United States. However, it is impossible to guess the dif-
ficulty this selection would pose for Russia. We suspect that the Russian military
already knows precisely what it wants to keep and therefore should be able to
identify quickly what is excess and obsolete—should it wish to. The problem is
that the diffusion of responsibility for Russian NSNW could cause individual
commands to resist Moscow, potentially presenting a significant internal politi-
cal challenge to Russia’s civilian leadership. The risk of turmoil could be an im-
pediment to changing the status quo. A monetary incentive is specifically
valuable here—were the West to provide hard currency that could be used to
fund reform programs or improve service living conditions, the Russian mili-
tary leadership might be won over. The reciprocal declaration would be made
behind a veil of secrecy; the partners would gain security insights that could
strengthen their partnership but would retain ambiguity vis-à-vis nonpartner
states and other actors.
Even after this process was completed the tactical nuclear stockpiles would
undoubtedly remain imbalanced in Russia’s favor, but at least the parties would
know that all remaining weapons were considered militarily viable. That alone
would represent a significant improvement over the current state of affairs. At
this time the parties may wish to take the next step, addressing this imbalance
and its meaning, possibly opening up an arms control dialogue. But that is an issue
we leave for a future article.
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Elements of a Deal: Money
Obviously, the devil is in the details. We are speaking of a lot of money. When
large amounts of money are involved the tendency is for some of it to get di-
verted to unproductive efforts, or for the parties to bog down in lengthy discus-
sions about trivial issues—and time is the enemy of nonproliferation. To make
this process work, the wealthy nations will need to pool their resources and cre-
ate a closed market for these weapons. A new organization must be set up to
oversee this operation, supervised by an executive committee similar to that of
other international arrangements. This committee would be tasked by the par-
ties to administer the financial dealings—setting the price for weapons, budget-
ing for operations, arbitrating disputes, regulating the fuel conversion, and so
on. The logical choice would be the new NATO-Russia Council, established in
May 2002 to seek out venues of cooperation on a variety of issues. A May 2003
U.S. State Department Fact Sheet detailing U.S. progress toward the disarma-
ment goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty revealed that the United
States and NATO had already undertaken NSNW-related confidence-building
measures within the NATO-Russia Council.20 The council chose to establish a
separate working group to implement NSNW reductions through this initiative.
A Western consortium, under the guidance of the executive committee,
would negotiate a fair price for excess Russian nuclear weapons on a per-kiloton-
of-warhead yield basis. Linking price to a unit of measure for each weapon
would make it possible to determine relative values. Weapon yield, however, is a
very sensitive subject; a high degree of trust will be needed on both sides if it is
not to be a “show stopper.” Notwithstanding, if the parties have truly become
partners, they ought to be able to overcome this obstacle. The United States and
Great Britain, for instance, have no difficulty discussing weapon yields.
In the early days of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force and START negotia-
tions there was significant apprehension in the Soviet Union about revealing the
geographic coordinates of various nuclear facilities, which were state secrets, for
fear this information would facilitate targeting. Yet today such data is routinely
exchanged. In the area of weapon yield, it is doubtful that either side could really
surprise the other. Most nuclear physicists can calculate a weapon’s yield,
whether U.S. or Russian. Reluctance to exchange yield data, particularly when it
would be afforded confidentiality among the parties, all of whom have ample
understanding of weapon designs, is a surmountable problem. Furthermore,
yield data would be exchanged only for weapons no longer considered necessary
for military security.
If the parties are able to overcome objections to the use of yield to measure
the value of weapons to be sold in this market, they should also be able to de-
velop strategies to enhance nonproliferation goals in the process. Premiums
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could be paid for certain weapons, for example, in addition to a straight price
per kiloton of yield. Premiums could be offered for weapons with features of
particular concern, such as older battlefield weapons lacking permissive-
action links.
Elements of a Deal: Dismantlement
Weapons purchased would be secured immediately, dismantled, and demilita-
rized to reduce their proliferation value. Prior to turnover to the IAEA the own-
ing party could perhaps remove an agreed critical component, such as a trigger.
Demilitarization and dismantlement would be accomplished in a facility in Rus-
sia built by the consortium and operated by the IAEA. One aspect, however,
must be very clear: once custody is transferred, the process is irreversible—there
can be no returning of weapons from the bank to the parties. Once a weapon was
secured, the IAEA would remove and destroy nonnuclear components; the fis-
sile material could then be further demilitarized and eventually blended down
into nuclear fuel. “Down-blending” could be done either on the premises of the
new facility (again, with costs borne by the consortium) or at an existing Russian
facility operating within the confines of the U.S.-Russian HEU (highly enriched
uranium) Transparency Process. Ownership of the resulting low-enriched reac-
tor fuel would be shared by the participating states in proportion to respective
investment in the project, or sold into the legitimate nuclear fuel markets of the
world to help defray the cost of operations. See the figure for a nominal repre-
sentation of this process.
This process could borrow heavily from current U.S. CTR programs. Once
sold, secured, and demilitarized, the nuclear material would be converted to
fuel, or in the case of plutonium, rendered safe before disposal inside Russia. For
security and proliferation reasons as well as inventory control, it would be pref-
erable that this be done inside the same facility as demilitarization and storage,
in order to reduce proliferation and security risks. However, since Russia already
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does uranium down-blending, a new facility for that purpose might be a waste
of resources. An alternative could be an arrangement between this consortium
and the existing HEU blending-transparency process of the CTR program to
provide necessary transparency and ultimate elimination of these weapons.
Elements of a Deal: LEU Credits
Once blended down into fuel, the low-enriched uranium (LEU) could be cred-
ited back to the contributing nations, including Russia, in proportion to their
contributions to the effort. The parties could take delivery of the fuel for their
own power-generation needs, resell it on the open worldwide market to quali-
fied nuclear-power operators, or trade the credits with other IAEA-approved
parties. Effectively, these LEU energy credits could be managed in much the
same way as commodities are traded in markets around the globe. For some na-
tions the fuel would be a credit in the bank, while others may choose to take
physical delivery.
One potential problem presents itself—if a large number of weapons were
sold under this deal, the resulting fuel from down-blending could flood the mar-
ket. To hedge against this, the rate of fuel conversion and sales could be controlled
by the executive committee, acting much like a central banker. Unlike the initial
buy and transfer of weapons, which would be conducted as rapidly as possible, the
blending process and sale or credit back to members would be deliberately paced
and regulated with an eye on fuel market prices.
Sovereignty issues associated with this facility may concern NATO, Russia,
and the IAEA. However, these could be addressed by permitting Russian Minis-
try of Atomic Energy officials to visit the facility at any time or to establish a per-
manent observer presence inside the facility. As noted, the entire facility would
be owned by the consortium and operated by the IAEA; the area inside its secu-
rity fence would have diplomatic status akin to an embassy or a United Nations
facility.
Labor for these operations would be hired by the IAEA. Presumably a signifi-
cant portion of the staff would come from Russian nuclear experts the West
would like to see employed on productive endeavors, vice dangerous alterna-
tives. However, the parties could decide that labor could be drawn only from
nations supporting the consortium.
Negotiating the Deal
The executive committee would establish an initial market price per unit yield
for various classes of weapons, based on its budget; it would be up to the com-
mittee and Russia to negotiate from there. After a brief round of price negotia-
tions, the committee would set a final figure; Russia’s choice would be to take
it or leave it. “Leaving it” would mean maintaining and securing the weapon
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(already declared redundant) to Western standards to reduce the risk of
proliferation.
This buying process would begin immediately after the parties agreed on the
terms and could be completed fairly quickly. The total cost for a buy could be ex-
tremely large. Guaranteed payments could be distributed over a period of sev-
eral years; all the weapons, however, would be transferred immediately, and
additional incentives could be paid to accelerate the process. Were there delays
in rendering weapons or payments, the price would change (in either direction)
on a predetermined schedule. Russia, by virtue of its seat on the executive com-
mittee, would have an input into the entire process.
The price would be affected by the yield for each class of weapon previously
set by the executive committee. Russia could be tempted to inflate declared
yields to boost total cost; its assertions would have to be backed by empirical
data. Nuclear experts from member nations, serving as technical representatives
of the executive committee, would work closely with Russian nuclear scientists
to review the supporting evidence. The executive committee would then certify
the results, settle any disputes, and establish a yield for these weapons. Russia
would be given one opportunity to appeal a yield determination by the
committee.
However, both the yield for a class of weapons and the price per kiloton
would have to have been established even before Russia made the determination
of which weapons to keep and which to sell. In the case of viable weapons that
may be excess to needs, Russian military planners and decision makers could
thereby balance national security interests against the potential economic gain.
One final point about this market—it would be opened only by agreement of
the parties and would remain open only as long as necessary to arrange a pur-
chase. Once the weapons were transferred, the market would be closed. It would
be up to the parties to manage this. All weapons could be considered in a single
market session, or the market could open for particular categories of weapons,
such as gravity-drop bombs. If sales proceeded at a brisk pace and the parties
wished to draw down their force structures more quickly, the market could be
reopened from time to time.
WHY WOULD RUSSIA AGREE TO THIS?
If it is a radical idea for the West to offer to buy nuclear weapons, it is equally
bold for Russia to consider selling them. Traditionally Russia would have
scoffed at the idea of selling weapons to a former enemy. Cash would be a poor
incentive for any nation to compromise its security. However, Russia would be
selling weapons that it, and it alone, had determined were no longer necessary.
Furthermore, those weapons could represent a proliferation problem and a
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national security risk to Russia if not properly protected and maintained.
Therefore, it is likely Russia will come to the table and engage with NATO in
this endeavor.21
Financing the Deal
Members of the consortium would contribute funds. This proposal will cost bil-
lions of dollars, but the cost of the status quo is also very high. The Group of
Eight industrialized nations has already offered Russia twenty billion dollars in
assistance for arms reductions. However, there have been precious few initiatives
to dispense these funds, and even fewer to use them to solve the nonstrategic nu-
clear weapons dilemma. In addition, there are other ways to “pay” Russia for
these weapons, including trade in goods or services of value, or debt forgiveness.
A January 2002 article in Arms Control Today compared debt relief for
nonproliferation to the “debt for nature swaps” begun in 1984.22 It pointed out
that debt relief has been offered in exchange for national security considerations
on several previous occasions. In fact, the U.S. Congress passed the 2001 Debt
Reduction for Nonproliferation Act with key bipartisan support from Senators
Joseph Biden, Jessie Helms, and Richard Lugar. The United States could make
debt forgiveness a condition for reaping rewards from the cash-for-kilotons pro-
gram, thereby forestalling free-rider concerns that might arise.
Political Rewards
Why would the United States be interested in buying Russia’s nuclear weapons?
As spectacular as the military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq were, such inter-
vention may not be the solution to all of America’s security problems. Would the
United States be interested in kilotons for cash? Of course Washington would
support this program if it led to a real solution of the problem of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons proliferation. The United States prefers to work with other na-
tions in order to fulfill its national objectives. In his cover letter published with
the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, President Bush declared, “We will coop-
erate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to ac-
quire dangerous technologies.”23 The theme of cooperation with friends, allies,
and other like-minded states is woven throughout the strategy. Given the post–11
September 2001 flurry of forcible interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the
challenging diplomacy surrounding North Korea, the cooperative elements of this
strategy can be hard to see, but they are in place.
Given the sharp disagreement between Russia and the United States over the
2003 war in Iraq, restarting the dialogue will take extra effort. But if there was
ever a topic ripe for discussion, one that might measurably improve the relation-
ship, it is nonstrategic nuclear forces. Trading something the West has in abun-
dance—wealth—for something Russia has in abundance—tactical nuclear
M I L L E R & L A R S E N 8 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:47 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
85
Naval War College: Full Spring 2004 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
weapons—could focus the dialogue on a topic of keen interest to both parties:
reducing a major potential source of nuclear proliferation.
Any issue so complex and involving such high stakes and so many obstacles
begs for an answer. Are the costs of a solution high? Most certainly. But the costs
of no solution—those of defending against a threat that could have been re-
moved through cooperation—are exponentially higher. It would appear that
both presidents have a vested interest in progress. Many groups concerned with
proliferation and the improvement of U.S.-Russian relations are urging Presi-
dent Bush to take bold action on the nonstrategic nuclear issue. Resolution
would dovetail with the message that came out of the Moscow Treaty, putting
the Cold War farther in the past.
CAVEATS: FOCUS AND COUNTERPOINTS
Built-in incentives and empowerment of an executive committee as final arbi-
ter, as discussed above, should help keep the process from being sidetracked by
trivial issues and money from being diverted from its intended use. As a fur-
ther safeguard, however, tight time constraints must be established at the outset.
For example, the parties should agree in advance that if negotiations are not
completed within a certain period, possibly a year, the entire process would
stop, to be restarted only by mutual presidential agreement. This provision
would be supported by the price penalties already mentioned, whereby if dur-
ing implementation time gates are not met or performance lags, the price per
kiloton drops or rises (depending on the cause of the delay) on a predeter-
mined schedule. The time allowed for appeals of pricing and yield assessments
and for arbitration of them by the executive committee should also be limited
to ensure that matters do not languish. These incentives and penalties should
help move the process along, reduce quibbling, and get these weapons secured
and dismantled.
One other aspect of this process—indirect Western funding of Russian nu-
clear weapons production—needs to be controlled to avoid a serious unin-
tended consequence. Russian nuclear weapons production lines remain open;
Russia could sell old or obsolete weapons into the cash-for-kiloton market and
simply replace them with newly produced weapons. The end result could be an
upgrade in its nuclear forces, an upgrade that is funded in part by this
nonproliferation effort and that evades the costs of stewardship for older
NSNW. Two things must happen to avoid this possibility. One is already under
way: on 12 March 2003 the United States and Russia signed an agreement to
eliminate weapons-grade plutonium production by closing three Russian re-
actors.24 As to the second, additional transparency measures need to be taken
at remaining Russian reactors capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear
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materials to assure NATO that production corresponds to the declared, reduced
force. We offer no specific recommendations here, but the parties know what
their responsibilities are. The data declarations and inventory mechanisms of
this initiative may themselves be sufficient safeguards.
There may be a wide variety of other concerns with “cash for kilotons.” One
obvious point is whether our proposal could be “sold” to the U.S. public. Even
with bipartisan political support and a desire on behalf of the administration to
pursue this type of initiative, the domestic appetite for funding it would be a se-
rious question. The idea would probably not receive a warm reception among
the more conservative members of the current congressional leadership. House
and Senate Republican leaders are not greatly enamored with ideas that call for
spending millions or billions of taxpayer dollars for such purposes. Congress has
supported the cooperative threat reduction program with funding for nearly a
decade, but many of its members have done so with trepidation. Members of the
Bush administration also are reluctant to pursue CTR, sharing the concerns of
their Capitol Hill colleagues.
One of the most stinging criticisms of CTR spending is that it allows Russia to
shirk its commitments to dismantle and destroy weapons under treaties like
START and the Chemical Weapons Convention while it diverts an inordinate
percentage of its gross domestic product to continued production of Cold War–
style weapons. Russia in fact needs to demonstrate more urgency and contribute
more of its own treasure to the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons.
However, the potential good to be realized by the United States if NATO and
Russia ultimately work through these issues is significant.
Deals and arrangements of the type we propose are by nature the lesser of
two evils. Taking a pragmatic look at the current situation, it is apparent that
Western interests heavily favor controlling the proliferation of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. Working with Russia to buy its nonstrategic nuclear weapons
may be expensive and have a host of unsavory strings attached, but U.S. leaders
must face the question whether it would be better to buy these things, if Russia
will sell them, or to try to defend against one or two of them that fall into the
wrong hands.
THE COST OF PAYING LATER
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became apparent that the issue of non-
strategic nuclear weapons was one of growing concern to the West but of little
interest to Moscow. More than a decade later the Bush administration has not
demonstrated much desire to address this issue—not, we suspect, because it
considers these weapons irrelevant or unimportant but because the issue is ex-
tremely complex, with no clear win-win starting point, let alone solution. The
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key players may also be suffering from “arms control fatigue,” and the general
public, not fully understanding the NSNW issue, seems satisfied with the U.S.-
Russia relationship. Nonetheless, the pressure to do something bold to secure
these weapons and prevent their proliferation to terrorists is growing. Our sug-
gestion to buy these weapons from Russia is certainly that.
Arms control is not the answer to the NSNW problem. Nor is cooperative
threat reduction, in its current design. A market mechanism to purchase non-
strategic nuclear weapons on a price-per-kiloton-yield basis may interest all
parties as a way to achieve quickly their respective goals vis-à-vis these weapons.
Since the emphasis in this market would be on the elimination of excess weap-
ons, without undue meddling in respective security objectives, this approach
should not directly assault national sovereignty or a state’s ability to assess its
own security needs. The parties would be free to move on to the question of their
remaining “useful” weapons, of course, and the baseline established could serve
as a starting point.
No doubt this will be expensive and controversial in Washington as well as in
Europe and Moscow. But the costs would produce multiple spin-off benefits: re-
ducing risk, increasing security, and strengthening Russia’s economy and the
bond between Russia and its NATO neighbors. If the American leadership faces
a choice, so does Russia’s. It can continue the current process, laced as it is with
distrust, ambiguity, and urgent proliferation risks, or it can agree to sell its old
weapons for hard currency. Ultimately this is a “pay now or pay later” decision
for all sides. The costs later may be many times higher than they are now.
Indeed, times change. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, early in the present ad-
ministration, asked why Russia and the United States needed a strategic arms
control treaty; the United States and Great Britain, he pointed out, have no such
agreement. His point is well taken. The United States and Great Britain were
once enemies; prior to World War I, in fact, there was little cooperation between
them. However, over the course of two hundred years the ties between these two
nations grew to the point where even when each possessed enough nuclear force
to wreak havoc upon the other, there was never a time in the nuclear age when
the friendship was questioned. By comparison, the United States has never
fought a war with Russia (as it has twice with the United Kingdom).25 In World
War II, Washington and Moscow were allies (if reluctant ones). History suggests,
then, that Russia and the United States could emerge as great friends, strong al-
lies in the war on terror. Friends do not need to point nuclear weapons at one an-
other. Nor need they be ambiguous about their nuclear intentions. The proposal
we have outlined may prod the two nuclear powers to cooperate more closely to
eliminate the last vestiges of their Cold War tactical nuclear arsenals.
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N O T E S
1. In arms control, as in most negotiations, one
of the very first steps in moving any issue for-
ward is clearly defining what it is the parties
seek to control. When it comes to the re-
maining nuclear forces of Russia and the
United States, defining the “class” of weapons
is difficult. For reasons discussed at length in
this article, we settle upon calling the class of
weapons we wish to control “nonstrategic
nuclear weapons.” To us, this defines a class
of weapons that is neither offensive nor de-
fensive, and can be short or medium range.
Trying to parse the class further risks leaving
one group or another of these weapons un-
captured and therefore defeats the object and
purpose of any negotiations.
2. Rose Gottemoeller, foreword to Controlling
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and
Opportunities, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt
J. Klingenberger (Colorado Springs, Colo.:
U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security
Studies, 2001), p. xi.
3. See “Joint Statement on Parameters on Fu-
ture Reductions in Nuclear Forces,” Helsinki,
Finland, 21 March 1997, appendix F in Con-
trolling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, ed.
Larsen and Klingenberger, pp. 307–308); also
available at www.armscontrol.org/ACT/
MARCH/js.html.
4. Alistair Millar, “The Pressing Need for Tacti-
cal Nuclear Weapons Arms Control,” Arms
Control Today 32, no. 4 (May 2002), pp. 10–13.
5. See Andrea Gabbitas, “Non-Strategic Nuclear
Weapons: Problems of Definition,” and
William Potter, “Practical Steps for Address-
ing the Problem of NSNW,” in Controlling
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. According to
published sources, in 2002 Russia had at least
1,200 warheads for surface-to-air missiles,
1,540 bombs and missile warheads for air-
craft, and 640 naval warheads (for aircraft,
cruise missiles, and antisubmarine torpedoes
or missiles). See “Russian Nuclear Forces
2002,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no.
4 (July/August 2002), pp. 71–73.
6. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear
Forces 2003,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
59, no. 3 (May/June 2003), pp. 73–76. Ac-
cording to this source the United States
maintains 320 warheads for Tomahawk sea-
launched cruise missiles and 840 B-61 bomb
warheads (mods 3, 4, and 10).
7. William Potter, “Addressing the Problem of
NSNW,” in Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear
Weapons, appendix, tables 1 and 2, entries for
“Air Defense Weapons.” Also see “Russia’s
Nuclear Forces 2002.”
8. Gen. Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.), chairman of
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nu-
clear Deterrence, memorandum, recommen-
dation 6, 23 July 1998, transmitting the
report of the task force, dated October 1998,
to the chairman of the Defense Science
Board, Mr. Craig Fields; and Mr. Field’s sub-
sequent undated memorandum endorsing
the report to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology.
9. “Text of the Joint Declaration by President
George W. Bush and President Vladimir V.
Putin on the New Strategic Relationship Be-
tween the United States of America and the
Russian Federation,” 24 May 2002, available
at www.fas.org/nuke/control/sort/joint
-decl.html.
10. United Press International, “Russian Nuclear
Dangers Studied,” as reported in Johnson’s
Russia List 6272, article 6, published by the
Center for Defense Information, 25 May 2002,
available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/
6272.htm.
11. “Transcript of Testimony as Delivered by
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,”
Washington, D.C., 17 July 2002, available
at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/
s20020717-secdef1.html. Mr. Rumsfeld said:
“Let me just conclude by saying that I believe
that all sorts of possibilities with the Russians
that come from this—I had talked about the
tactical nuclear weapons. And you are proba-
bly right, this doesn’t cover all of that. But it
is something we probably ought to talk about.
Secretary Powell indicated as much, that he’d
like to talk about that. So would all of our Eu-
ropean friends. . . . They’re pretty close to
those tactical weapons.”
12. Yuri Golotyuk, “America Has No Say in
This,” Vremya novostei, 23 April 2002, as re-
ported in Johnson’s Russia List, no. 6203, 23
April 2002, item 7, at www.cdi.org/russia/
johnson/default.cfm.
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13. For example, see NATO Press Communiqué
M-NAC-2(2000)121, “Report on Options for
Confidence Building Measures, Verification,
Arms Control, and Disarmament,” December
2000.
14. See Senator Lugar’s prioritized list at lugar
.senate.gov/nunn_lugar_program.html.
15. Mathew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John P.
Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and
Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan,
Project on Managing the Atom (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and Interna-
tional Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, March
2003).
16. John Cappello, Gwendolyn M. Hall, and Ste-
ven Lambert, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: De-
bunking the Mythology, INSS Occasional
Paper 46 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: U.S. Air
Force Institute for National Security Studies,
August 2002).
17. “Atoms for Peace,” speech by President
Dwight D. Eisenhower to the UN General
Assembly, 8 December 1953, available at
www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html.
For a recent variation on this approach, see
Stansfield Turner, “The Dilemma of Nuclear
Weapons in the Twenty First Century,” Naval
War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001),
pp. 13–23.
18. Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, article III, part A, paras. 1 and 2;
part B, para. 2; and part C; available at
www.iaea.org/About/statute.html.
19. David Fischer, History of the International
Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years
(Vienna: IAEA Division of Publications, Sep-
tember 1997), p. 10. The end of the Cold
War has revived the idea of placing military
stocks of fissile materials, including material
from dismantled nuclear weapons, under
the IAEA’s surveillance, thus creating confi-
dence that it will not revert to military use.
20. Fact Sheet Provided to the Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Re-
view Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, 1 May
2003, available at www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/
20288.htm.
21. One Russian analyst who agrees that his
country would likely participate in such a
multinational endeavor is Nikolai Sokov, a
former member of the Soviet Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and currently at the Monterey In-
stitute of International Studies. In November
2003 he told an SAIC interviewer, “The Rus-
sian military . . . wants to get rid of excess
stockpiles and would appreciate money for
that purpose.” He suggested that “proposals
should be framed in CTR terms—assistance
in doing things that are in the interest of Rus-
sia and that the Russians intended to do any-
way.” Author’s personal notes, 10 November
2003.
22. James Fuller, “Debt for Nonproliferation:
The Next Step in Threat Reduction,” Arms
Control Today 32, no. 1 (January/February
2002), pp. 22–26. In 1984 the World Wildlife
Fund conceived of “debt for nature swaps,”
in which national debts were forgiven by
some nations in return for debtor nations’
dedicating some portion of their own curren-
cies for environmental projects.
23. The White House, National Security Strategy
of the United States, September 2002, avail-
able at www.whitehousegov/nsc/nss.html.
24. “Russia and US Sign Reactor Shutdown
Deal,” Rusnet, 13 March 2003, at www.rusnet
.nl/news/2003/03/13/currentaffairs04.shtml.
25. The 1919–20 American military incursion
into Siberia notwithstanding.
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STALIN’S BIG-FLEET PROGRAM
Milan L. Hauner
The Party is in favor of small submarines with a short range. You can
build three times as many submarines for your money as big ones. . . .
but the actual problem lay in a quite different sphere. Big submarines
mean a policy of aggression, to further world revolution. Small sub-
marines mean coastal defense—that is, self-defense, and postponement
of world revolution.
ARTHUR KOESTLER
This is the answer that in Koestler’s famous 1941 novel Darkness at Noon thepolice investigator Ivanov gives the accused Rubashov, who asked him why a
certain admiral had to be executed. “The times are against us,” Ivanov continues;
“we are in the hollow of a wave and must wait until we are lifted by the next.” His
explanation suggests what actual Soviet naval strategy
advocated prior to 1936, when Joseph V. Stalin, believ-
ing that the uplifting wave had finally reached the
vessel of socialism, decided to change abruptly to a
new tack and ordered the construction of “big
submarines.”
Toward the end of 1935 Stalin’s mind became in-
creasingly preoccupied, in an almost obsessive fash-
ion, with plans to acquire rapidly a large oceangoing
navy, larger in its total displacement than any other at
that time and capable of achieving supremacy on all
four seas and oceans that circumscribed the Soviet
Union. Super-dreadnoughts were laid down in Soviet
yards beginning in 1938. Immediately after the
nonaggression pact of 1939, what the Soviets mainly
wanted from the Germans in exchange for wheat,
manganese, and petroleum was naval equipment.1
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The new capital ships were, however, destined never to be completed. Con-
struction of other warships—cruisers, destroyers, and submarines—continued,
in most cases to completion; the half-built carcasses of the battleships (clearly
visible on German air reconnaissance photographs at the time) disappeared.
Why had they been begun? What had been in the minds of Stalin and his collabo-
rators? Stalin must have resolved that without a powerful navy the Soviet Union’s
status as a great power could never be complete. Though the ruthless industrial-
ization policies of the five-year plans of the mid-1930s produced rapid buildups of
air and ground forces, especially tanks, the Soviet navy was a Cinderella, the least
potent and most obsolescent of the three services. During the interwar years a large
number of submarines were added, but the surface fleet had to rely on the few ves-
sels of the old imperial navy that had survived the Civil War.
In the second half of the 1930s, however, Sleeping Beauty seemed to wake up. The
utopian vision of an industrial giant that would provide the army of the World Pro-
letariat with an iron fist had instilled pride and megalomania among Soviet leaders.
Under Stalin’s direct inspiration and involvement, plans for creating a huge ocean-
going navy—bolshoi okeanskii flot—took shape.2 Why was it not enough to arm So-
viet proletariat with guns, tanks, and warplanes? Why would the Soviet Union, so
disadvantaged at sea by geography, need to join in a naval race with traditional sea
powers, to build capital ships with the declared aim of overtaking within ten years
the British and U.S. fleets? Was Stalin’s design to produce a Soviet Flottenpolitik,
with a daring Risikogedanke (policy of risk) to take on Japan in the Pacific?3 How did
he plan to deal with other naval powers? Questions of this kind persist. Much new
information has become available in the last fifteen years, but because of the nature
of Soviet dictatorship under Stalin, the puzzle may never be resolved completely.
Since Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, openness, in the last years of the
USSR, many specialized studies and personal memoirs of direct participants in
these events have been published. Former naval officers have gained access to the
main archives in question: the Russian Naval State Archive (Rossiiskii
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota, now declassified through
1942) in St. Petersburg; and to some extent the Central Naval Archive
(Tsentralnyi Voenno-Morskoi arkhiv) in Gatchina, for all post-1941 naval rec-
ords. However, in contrast to the enormous volume of information available on
the growth of the Soviet ground and air forces, which during the 1930s had over-
taken in numbers of tanks and warplanes those of all other powers put together,
there remains a dearth of information about the expansion of the Soviet navy.4
John Erickson’s magisterial Soviet High Command (1962) has a mere handful of
scattered references to the Navy. Another highly acclaimed work, said to unravel
Stalin’s enigmatic behavior on the eve of Hitler’s invasion of Russia on the basis
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of the author’s unique access to Russian archives, ignores the naval dimension
completely.5
From the vantage point of Russian history, Stalin’s decision to build a mighty
oceangoing fleet was not a unique one. Other leaders had constructed fleets to
solidify their rule. The founder of the Russian navy, Peter the Great, had started
with a clean slate. He brought in shipbuilding specialists and in less than twenty
years produced a Baltic fleet, about thirty men-of-war, ranging from hundred-
gun to fifty-four-gun ships of the line, designed to be capable of defeating Swe-
den, the dominant Baltic naval power.6 Stalin’s big-fleet program was to be even
more ambitious.
In prerevolutionary Russia, however, periods of naval expansion were fol-
lowed by long stretches of stagnation. It usually took Russia much longer to re-
bound at sea than it did on land after losing wars. Such low points for the
Russian navy were the aftermaths of the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War,
and of course World War I, as well as the subsequent civil war, at the end of
which what little remained of the tsarist navy was hardly combat worthy.
After each disaster, Russian ambition to sail again seemed to become stron-
ger. It would take fifty years after the defeat at the Crimea to rebound, but by the
eve of the 1905 war with Japan Russia had risen to third among sea powers. After
the crushing defeat at Tsushima, Russia almost immediately produced an ambi-
tious naval rearmament program, launching dreadnoughts for the first time on
the Baltic and Black Seas. These capital ships were built mainly for reasons of
great-power pride and prestige; their limited tactical purposes could have been
better performed by other, less expensive means.
One of Russia’s chief problems remained geography. Neither the tsarist nor
the Stalinist regime was able to solve the dilemma posed by the utter isolation of
the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, the remoteness of the Pacific Fleet, or the harsh-
ness of the Arctic Sea, which kept the Northern Fleet icebound for most of the
year. The canals built under the tsarist regime to connect the Baltic and the
White Sea were not for large warships. The Bolsheviks, using slave labor, wid-
ened the canals and eventually linked them to the mighty Volga. Nonetheless the
fundamental isolation of the Black Sea was solved (partially) only after World
War II, with the construction of the Volga-Don Canal, again with slave labor.
Deeply committed to the Mahanian doctrine that only dreadnoughts could
fight dreadnoughts, Russian navalists insisted these costly capital ships were the
only effective naval weapon against the nation’s immediate maritime adversar-
ies, Germany and Turkey. Except in the Black Sea against Turkey, Russia could
not maintain this ship-against-ship race without assistance. Tsarist Russia could
count on naval allies to offset the negative impact of maritime geography, but
communist Russia was to be a permanent target of capitalist encirclement.
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The closest historical parallel to Stalin’s big-fleet program was Russia’s ship-
building program of 1912 (for which naval records, including private papers of
the principal actors, are now accessible for the first time). The two shipbuilding
programs faced the same geographical constraints and industrial shortcomings.
Moreover, both programs seemed to be governed by the same naval philosophy,
assigning to capital ships tasks for which they proved quite unsuitable in the
shallow and narrow waters of the Baltic and Black Seas. As a result, in World
Wars I and II the main role of the Russian navy (tsarist and Soviet) was much the
same: defending the coast and assisting ground forces. In both cases Russian
ships rarely ventured on the open sea; surface ships, rather, were extensively used
as gunnery platforms against shore targets. Russian warships in World War II
usually did not even protect Anglo-American convoys carrying Lend-Lease sup-
plies to the Soviet Union; the Allies provided their own convoy protection,
which proved more efficient.
The Soviet government was ready, for strategic reasons, to expand its ship-
building industry even into some of the most inaccessible regions of the vast
Eurasian continent, but the severe limitations imposed by climate, distance, and
bad communications prevailed. Even intensification of the Gulag system of slave
labor—a very sinister but important factor in the rapid Soviet industrialization
and remilitarization—could not overcome these problems. Because of these natu-
ral limitations, in conjunction with competing priorities in the military and
civilian sectors and the need for reconstruction after wartime destruction, the
big-fleet program could never have been completed during the dictator’s lifetime.
Nonetheless, this program is well worth examining, for several reasons. First,
it fills an important gap in Russian as well as comparative naval history, for
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Stalin’s big-fleet program has scarcely been mentioned, let alone studied, in
Western naval colleges and research institutions.7 Second, on the Russian side,
because of Stalin’s mania about foreign spies and military secrets, prior to glas-
nost adequate information was simply not available. The big-fleet program coin-
cided with the great purges in the Soviet Union, during which the Soviet navy
suffered extensive losses, especially among its senior officers, and very few survi-
vors understood the details of the plan. Third, the lessons of Stalin’s big-fleet
program can be usefully compared with other, similar naval building projects. In
addition to the 1912 Russian naval program, Admiral Tirpitz’s Navy Laws of
1898 and 1900, designed to provide Germany with a High Seas Fleet to challenge
the Royal Navy, and the great “White Fleet” of Theodore Roosevelt should be
mentioned in this connection. Finally, Hitler’s short-lived “Z-Plan” of January
1939 was an obvious parallel to Stalin’s big-fleet program.
All these programs, however, including the Russian one of 1912, had a strat-
egy behind them, something that we do not find behind Stalin’s big-fleet design.
Did the Soviet dictator imbue his dream with a particular strategic idea, a Stalinist
Risikogedanke? Or, as it seemed to most witnesses, was it simply a product of
blind determination to achieve numerical superiority in the USSR’s home wa-
ters, combined with an appreciation of the deterrence that every fleet-in-being
radiates and of the incalculable propaganda effect of sending the red flag around
the world on handsome (Italian-designed) capital ships?
Finally, a study of Stalin’s big-fleet program will give us a yardstick to examine
present-day regional navies that are largely based on Soviet platforms and
equipment and that now are undergoing considerable growth. Among this
number, the Indian navy and, especially, the Chinese navy would appear to have
important elements in common with Stalin’s big-fleet program. The present ex-
pansion of the Chinese navy from a coastal to an oceangoing fleet during the next
ten years or so suggests a parallel that is hard to ignore.
RASPLATA: RECKONING AFTER TSUSHIMA
In 1905 Russia suffered the most crushing naval defeat in its entire history. The
defeat was even more humiliating because in Russian eyes the winners were
Asian upstarts. Russians faced the shocking realization that they had been
smashed to pieces by Japanese sailors who had learned their new trade over-
night, who sailed in warships recently purchased abroad. Moreover, it was not
only Russia’s navy and army that collapsed in the Far East but eventually the coun-
try itself, as a colonial power; a revolution generated by social and ethnic forces
struck the interior of the vast Eurasian empire. The shock waves of this devas-
tating naval disaster would affect the Russian navy deep into the Soviet period.
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But the year 1905 should be also remembered for an amazingly quick attempt
to restore Russia’s maritime power. Two of its best fleets having been destroyed
in quick succession in the Far East—the Pacific Fleet in and around Port Arthur,
and the Baltic Fleet, after its epic journey around the world, at Tsushima—the
Russian navy found itself without a battle fleet to protect the imperial capital, St.
Petersburg, and the Baltic coastline.
However, the Mahanian quest for an oceangoing battle fleet to win the com-
mand of the sea was not the only policy being proposed. The “Young School”
(named after the French Jeune Ecole, developed in the 1880s by Admiral Aube)
seemed to reflect better Russia’s strategic requirements. The state’s enormously
long coastline, shallow coastal waters, and virtual lack of access to the open sea
made mine warfare and coastal defense in the Baltic and the Black Sea the logical
priorities. Moreover, the Young School seemed to find support in the most re-
cent experience of sea warfare, that against Japan. Most seapower analysts inter-
preted the lessons of the 1904–1905 war in terms of the Japanese experience,
which overwhelmingly favored the Mahanians. The Young School contradicted
the argument that Japan’s success lay in the efficient application of aggressive
seapower, in a decisive encounter of battleships and cruisers. Of Admiral
Heihachiro Togo’s original six modern battleships, two had been lost to Russian-
laid minefields, not gunfire. The other Russian naval success story had been
aggressive cruiser raids against Japanese shipping at the beginning of the war.
Captain Nikolai O. von Essen, in command of the fast cruiser Novik, attached to
the Port Arthur squadron, and the Vladivostok-based cruiser squadron had dis-
rupted communication between the home islands and the Japanese troops on
the mainland.8
Von Essen was promoted and in November 1908 appointed commander of
the Baltic Fleet. He came up with a radical war plan that was in essence
anti-Mahanian. He proposed that, instead of waiting passively for the superior
German High Seas Fleet to come out and offer a gunnery duel, the Baltic Fleet
concentrate close to the German border at the ice-free base of Libava (now
Liepaja). From there the Russians would initiate offensive minelaying opera-
tions at night, deep in enemy waters, close to the likely routes from Kiel, Stettin,
and Danzig. The proposal was unmistakably similar to Japanese and Russian
minelaying tactics in the Pacific in the 1905 war.
But the Naval General Staff did not like this plan, considering it too risky, and
suggested that the fleet be transferred to Kronstadt and assume as its main task
the defense of the capital against sea attack. Von Essen submitted a compromise
plan, according to which the approach to St. Petersburg, at the narrowest section
of the Gulf of Finland, between Nargen (off Reval) and Porkkala, would be pro-
tected by advanced minefields, by coastal artillery on either shore, and by the
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main Baltic battle fleet, in a central position east of the island of Hogland.9 This
was the war plan with which the tsarist navy entered war in 1914.
The only Russian battle fleet available after Tsushima to demonstrate the va-
lidity of the Mahanian doctrine of seapower survived on the Black Sea. It had
survived the strange masochistic frenzy of Russian patriots who had been ready
to send every floating device against the Japanese at the height of the war.
Leading that choir had been Russia’s most outspoken Mahanian, Captain
Nikolai L. Klado (1862–1919), responsible for the main strategy courses at the
Nikolaevsky Naval Academy in St. Petersburg.10 The Black Sea Fleet consisted
primarily of five predreadnought battleships (with two more being commis-
sioned). Their crews, in a state of semipermanent mutiny, were considered a
greater threat to their officers than to the enemy.11 Moreover, they had no strate-
gic value outside the Black Sea, into which the fleet was locked by Turkish hostil-
ity. (An Allied attempt to open the Dardanelles in 1915 was to fail completely.)
Under such circumstances the costly proposal to introduce four dreadnoughts
to the Black Sea seemed to make little sense. The weak and obsolete Turkish navy
posed no threat (and would not until the German battle cruiser Goeben joined
the Turks at the outbreak of World War I, enabling the Turks to conduct forays
against the Russian coast).
With regard to the Far East, after Tsushima Russia’s dominant feeling was one of
reckoning and revenge, epitomized in the Rasplata—“the payback”—which became
the title of the best-selling Russian book of the era.12 This feeling generated desire
for reconquest as an act of self-defense against the “Yellow Peril,” and irrational fear
that quite a few Russians visualized in the form of a combined Sino-Japanese inva-
sion of Siberia, advancing as far as Irkutsk.13 To offset this threat, huge sums had
to be found for doubling the tracks of the Trans-Siberian Railway and complet-
ing its new branch along the Amur (which was to provide an alternative route to
Vladivostok after the Russian withdrawal from Manchuria).
The crushing military defeat in the Far East, of which the word “Tsushima”
was emblematic, remained deeply engraved on the hearts of Russian patriots.
They were echoed forty years later when Stalin welcomed, in an address free of
any notion of proletarian internationalism, the reoccupation of Port Arthur by
Soviet warships after Japan’s surrender.
THE NAVAL PROGRAM OF 1912
On 29 June 1905, only four weeks after Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II announced
the intention to “reestablish our battle squadrons.”14 Even more amazing was the
continuing vitality of Russia’s professional classes, in spite of the military disas-
ters and revolutionary upheavals at home. This innovative spirit was especially
noticeable among the naval intelligentsia. With the advent of dreadnoughts they
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believed that the Russian navy would ride on the crest of societal modernization
in the Empire. The young officers felt they were being propelled overnight into a
new age. The demise of Russia’s once numerous but obsolete Navy had been dev-
astating, but the young officers now felt they could start with a new slate.
In early 1908, six Russian and twenty-one foreign companies entered the de-
sign competition for the first Russian dreadnought. The priorities of the Naval
General Staff were known to include four in-line turrets, on the same deck, to
avoid superfiring, and an original arrangement of boilers and turbines that
would produce a top speed of no less than twenty-three knots. The first Russian
dreadnought was meant to be more powerful and faster than any known British
or German dreadnought finished or under construction at the time. (In fact,
however, because of the notorious slowness of Russian shipyards, which needed
three years on average for a capital ship, as against eighteen to twenty months
elsewhere, it would be obsolete at launching.)15
After the first round of solicitations, three foreign designs remained on the
shortlist: those of Blohm & Voss of Hamburg, British Vickers, and the Italian
naval designer Vittorio Cuniberti (with an innovative layout of four in-line tur-
rets on the centerline).16 However, the Baltic Works of St. Petersburg ended as
the favorite, due to the complexity of credit financing and strong government
pressure. Blohm & Voss seemed to be winning the contract, but Paris protested
strongly. A well-timed French loan proved decisive.
The final Russian design was largely based on that of Cuniberti but with a
number of improvements and special features, such as an eccentric icebreaking
bow.17 Eventually, three series of Russian dreadnoughts were designed: the
twelve-inch-gun Gangut class of four battleships for the Baltic, followed by the
twelve-inch-gun Imperatritsa Maria class of four for the Black Sea, and finally
the faster and bigger fourteen-inch-gun Kinburn class of four battle cruisers for
the Baltic. The battleship classes were completed between 1914 and 1916; the
battle cruisers were launched but never completed.
However, it was not only in the category of dreadnoughts that the Russian
navy scored a success. An even more spectacular innovation was achieved with
the launching in 1911 of the Novik, the fastest and most heavily armed destroyer
in the world.18 It had many features unmatched in any other navy, such as four
quick-firing four-inch guns of exceptional muzzle velocity. Its torpedo arma-
ment was a unique arrangement of three triple launching tubes. It also carried
minelaying equipment, another characteristic feature of Russian destroyers in
the Baltic waters. Novik was built in the Putilov yard in St. Petersburg; its large
oil-fired boilers, supplied by the German Vulcan works in Stettin, gave its tur-
bines an output of almost forty-two thousand horsepower (about the same as
the dreadnought Gangut), which produced a top speed of 37.3 knots during sea
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trials—a speed unmatched by any other destroyer anywhere at the time. Novik
was the name-ship of a whole class of large destroyers subsequently built for the
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets; they were to be workhorses through the early Soviet
period until the Second World War.
Novik would probably have been a match for a light cruiser, in addition to be-
ing fast enough to escape from any ship. No battle fleet commander would relish
a night encounter with a flotilla of Noviks, collectively capable of launching in
one salvo almost a hundred torpedoes, in the narrow waters of the Baltic. Such a
group could also lay a field of about six hundred mines in enemy waters. With
the Noviks Russia had acquired virtually a new class of all-round ships ideally
suited for the major naval task in the Baltic: the protection of the defensive mine
barriers. The creators of the Novik thus provided a weighty argument for the
anti-dreadnought lobby, whose message was that at least for the defense of the
Baltic coast, the four cherished dreadnoughts were unnecessary.19
As a direct consequence of the domestic shakeup following the disaster in the
Far East, the Russian autocracy had to make way for constitutional reforms. In
spite of war and revolution the Russian Empire completed its first comprehen-
sive modern census in 1897–1907; its statistics placed Russia in second place
among the great powers, after the United States.20 The discussion concerning
new ship constructions and the reorganization of the Russian navy after
Tsushima was wide-ranging. The debate did not merely involve Russian
Mahanians and their opponents; many formal and informal groups (kruzhki)
and individuals joined in, as did the leading naval journal, Morskoi sbornik.
Other participants in the debate—such as the Naval General Staff, the Navy
Ministry, the War Ministry, the Army General Staff, the State Defense Council,
the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and legislative groups and
committees in the State Duma (the imperial parliament)—completed the pic-
ture of late-imperial Russian as a bustling and intellectually vibrant community,
of which no equivalent was to be found in Stalin’s dictatorship twenty years
later.21 Pressure groups like the Navy Renewal League (Liga Obnovleniya Flota)
followed the pattern established in the British navy by the Navy League and the
German by the Flottenverein.22 The Special Committee for Strengthening the
Fleet by Voluntary Donation carried out a fund-raising and national subscrip-
tion effort that paid for the Novik.23 Of great importance was the Naval Technical
Commission, with its Chief Shipbuilding Inspector, A. N. Krylov, known as “the
master of Russian hydrodynamics,” whose long career extended from Tsushima
to the eve of World War II. Other ship constructors of this period—like I. G.
Bubnov, A. I. Maslov, G. F. Schlesinger—were still to be around when Stalin’s
big-fleet program was launched.24 By that time, however, there was to be no open
discussion; critical questions could cost one’s life.
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In 1912, the argument could be reduced to three basic questions. What sort of
navy does Russia need? Where and how should it be deployed? Were the re-
sources needed for it at hand? As we shall see, the same questions were to haunt
Stalin twenty years later.
Tsarist Russia aspired to three more or less balanced fleets in three parts of the
world: the Baltic Fleet in northeastern Europe (the newly founded Arctic Flotilla
was an extension of the Baltic Fleet), the Black Sea Fleet in southern Europe, and
the Pacific Fleet in the Far East. The latter had been the strongest in 1904; in the
war, however, it lost most of its ships and its chief base, the ice-free Port Arthur.
Only a small cruiser squadron based in Vladivostok was left. Underlying the in-
tensive discussions on the post-Tsushima naval programs was always the ques-
tion of whether Russia could afford to remain a great power in three seas
simultaneously.
In 1914, after the launching of the first Russian dreadnought, an enterprising
naval enthusiast who wished to remain anonymous suggested building a canal
system between the Baltic and the Black Sea, should all of the anticipated twelve
Russian dreadnoughts be needed in one sea for a decisive action. He recom-
mended connecting Russia’s navigable rivers with a canal big enough for huge
pontoons about 120 feet wide with twelve-foot drafts, in which dreadnoughts
could be towed by tugboats downstream to the Black Sea in from twenty-five to
thirty days. The recent successful widening of the Kiel Canal and the construc-
tion of the Panama Canal may have inspired the author.25 Not even the Soviets,
with their almost unlimited supply of slave labor, were able to take up such a
challenge. They did, however, use both river canals and railways to move small
naval craft and segments of ships. Even during World War I small submarines
were transported by rail to the Pacific, and destroyers assembled in Kherson on
the Black Sea had subsections shipped from elsewhere.
In spite of recommendations by the State Defense Council and the em-
peror’s endorsement, new construction could not begin immediately, because
the Duma could not bring together the necessary votes. It took more than a
year of bitter and exhausting debate before the necessary measure passed.
Class instincts, reflecting the recent revolution and breakdown of law and or-
der, were at issue rather than concern for regaining great-power status. The
right wing intuitively supported strengthening the army rather than the navy,
because the former could be also used to quell insurrections, for which sailors
were notoriously unreliable. However, once the finance ministry obtained
credits in France (mentioned below) for the construction of the four dread-
noughts in the Baltic, the moderate right, the Octobrists, supported the tsar’s
wishes for shipbuilding. In the center, the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets)
opposed any increase of the Baltic Fleet but voted for the expansion of the
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Black Sea Fleet. Their leader, the well known liberal historian Paul N.
Milyukov, argued that the Kadets opposed not the construction of a battle fleet
but the idea of having one in the Baltic, as a waste of resources since a European
war was, in their view, highly unlikely. The Near East was another matter. War
there could break out any moment, the Kadets were sure, and Russia should be
prepared for action in the south. As for the political left in the Duma, the Social
Democrats and the Trudoviki (properly, the Social Revolutionaries, known in
Russian as the “Esery”), true to their antimilitarist ideology, consistently voted
against any allocations for either the army or navy.26
Thus it was after considerable delay that the Duma finally voted the sums
needed for the “small” naval program of 1912. Even with the French loan, the
Russian naval budget in 1913–14 came close to 250 million rubles, thereby out-
stripping all other nations—with the exception of Great Britain and the United
States, but including Germany, the navy of which was by then number two in the
world. Had the Russian Empire survived to 1930 without wars or revolution, its
navy, according to the original, larger construction program of 1912, would have
consisted of twenty-four battleships, twelve battle cruisers, twenty-four small
cruisers, 108 large destroyers, and thirty-six submarines.27
These, then, were paper figures, but they were by no means unrealistic, given
Russia’s enormous potential and rapid industrial growth, sustained over two de-
cades and second only to that of the United States. The financial means having
been voted by the Duma, a carefully calibrated expansion of Russia’s shipbuild-
ing capacity was the next prerequisite. As it happened, however, the peaceful in-
terval of less than nine years Russia enjoyed after Tsushima proved too short.
The outbreak of the First World War resulted in the call-up by the army of ship-
yard workers, chaotic conditions on the railroads, and mass industrial unrest.
The half-finished Borodino-class super-dreadnoughts in the Baltic had to be
canceled, and out of fifty-three destroyers planned for the Baltic and Black Sea
only thirty were ultimately commissioned.28 So it was that when after the war-
fare and revolution that engulfed the nation between 1914 and 1922, Russia
reemerged in a new imperial reincarnation under a ruthless dictator, Joseph V.
Stalin, the naval strategic questions remained the same. Would Russia ever re-
gain its lost position as a great sea power? What strategy would it choose?
THE DAWN OF THE SOVIET ERA
When the Civil War ended Soviet Russia possessed several old battleships, two
modern and three old cruisers, and about two dozen destroyers, submarines,
and other smaller craft in various stages of immobility and decay.29 One battle-
ship was in the Arctic, four in the Baltic, and six in the Black Sea. When the Sovi-
ets decided to scrap all predreadnought battleships, they were left with four
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damaged dreadnoughts in the Baltic, three unfinished Borodino-class hulls, and
one dreadnought under construction in the Black Sea.
Sorting Out the Debris
Three of four completed dreadnoughts of the Gangut class were in disrepair in
the Baltic; the fourth, Poltava (in 1918 renamed Frunze), having been damaged
during the Civil War, was to be cannibalized for spares and turned into a
blockship. One dreadnought of the 1912 program remained unfinished in the
Black Sea’s main shipyard in Nikolaev (Nikolai I, renamed in 1917
Demokratiya); the Soviets were unable to complete the ship, and it was scrapped
after 1922. Its sister ship Imperator Alexander III (renamed Volya in 1917 and
General Alekseev in 1919) was taken in 1920, during the Civil War, by the Whites
to the French base at Bizerte in the Mediterranean. Its fate was inglorious; taken
over by France in 1924, it was briefly considered for recommissioning by visiting
Soviet naval experts but in 1936 was found unseaworthy and scrapped.30
As for the three launched Borodino hulls, the Soviet government toyed for a
while with completing at least one of them (Izmail) but decided to sell them all
to Germany for scrap. The three remaining Baltic dreadnoughts were slowly
modernized during the mid-1920s and recommissioned. One of them, the
Sevastopol, renamed Parizhskaya Kommuna, was transferred to the Black Sea
during 1929–30. A few gunboats were retained in the Caspian Sea for use against
the British in Persia. The Soviets were too weak to maintain any significant de-
fenses in the Arctic or in the Pacific; not until the early 1930s could the Arctic
and Pacific Fleets be reestablished, initially in a largely symbolic way.
The destruction and disintegration of the former tsarist navy during the Civil
War was a double blow. The fleet had been to a large extent physically destroyed,
but the navy’s human component had suffered perhaps even more. The navy, in
contrast to the semiliterate peasant army, had in the Revolution played a decisive
role. It was primarily sailors from the main base of the Baltic Fleet at Kronstadt
who carried out the Bolshevik coup of 7 November 1917 (25 October, according
to the prerevolutionary Julian calendar). Their feats had earned them the proud
epithet “Vanguard of the Working Class”—which was to be taken away after the
1921 Kronstadt mutiny, during which the “Praetorian Guard” of the Bolshevik
Revolution was crushed. The notion that “a sailor equals a Bolshevik” would,
however, endure (and even lead to successful feature films, like My z Kronshtadu
[We from Kronstadt, 1936] and especially Sergei Eisenshtein’s masterpiece
Bronenosets Potëmkin [1925]).
Early in the Soviet period, then, due to materiel and personnel losses, the for-
mer tsarist navy reached the lowest standard in Russian naval history. Further-
more, Russian bases and the former maritime frontier in the Baltic had
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substantially shrunk when the Bolsheviks lost all the advanced bases in Finland
and along the Baltic coast. Only ice-bound Kronstadt, guarding the approach to
Leningrad (ex–St. Petersburg, ex-Petrograd), remained.
The Old School versus the Young School
One of the little-known paradoxes of the period immediately after the Civil War
was that the young Bolshevik cadets at the former Imperial Naval Academy (now
the Voroshilov Naval War College) and the Frunze Army Staff College continued
to be exposed in matters of strategy to the same curriculum as their predecessors.
Ex-tsarist officers, pupils of Professor Klado, Boris B. Gervais, and Mikhail A.
Petrov, taught the Bolshevik midshipmen that in order to achieve effective com-
mand of the maritime approaches, the socialist Motherland must aspire to a
traditional high-seas fleet of battleships and cruisers.31 In other words, there was
no shortcut, even for a new proletarian power like Soviet Russia.
Gervais and Petrov became known as exponents of the Old School. They were
soon to be challenged by the Young School. Like their predecessors in the 1880s,
the proponents of the Soviet Young School would insist that the command of
the sea was to be obtained not through idle battleships but by cruisers, subma-
rines, and other smaller craft aggressively attacking enemy shipping. Led by the
Navy Commissar V. I. Zof and one of the younger Bolshevik commanders, L. M.
Ludri, they silenced their opponents.32
Unable to preach the tenets of the Old School, Gervais and Petrov underwent
a remarkable metamorphosis between 1923 and 1924, proposing a new “active
defense” theory that suggested the use of submarines and other small units un-
der cover of land-based naval aircraft.33 This approach proved acceptable to the
Soviet high command. (Unsurprisingly, this theory has today proven attractive
to another large regional power with a lengthy coast to defend, China.) The de-
fenders of the Old School were to meet a characteristically ironic fate: Gervais
and Petrov were eventually executed in the purges, even though their original
belief in big ships was embraced by Stalin himself.
FIVE-YEAR PLANS AND SOVIET SHIPBUILDING
Stalin’s ultimate determination to go ahead at full speed with his big-navy pro-
gram must be understood against the background of available shipyards, mate-
rial, naval architects, and skilled labor. This background, in turn, requires an
evaluation of the Soviet Union’s First Five-Year Plan (1928–32), as well as a brief
overview of the Soviet shipbuilding industry in the Second Five-Year Plan
(1933–37), when modernization of the principal old shipyards in Leningrad and
Nikolaev resumed.
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The most interesting initiative in the shipbuilding industry, however, was the
construction of entirely new yards in remote areas of the Arctic and the Far East.
Shipyards were built also in the interior at important industrial centers that
could be reached by canal from the open sea.
The new Shipyard 402 at Molotovsk (renamed Severodvinsk after 1957) can
serve as a chilling example of these efforts. An estimated 120,000 slave laborers
were brought here in the 1930s to construct the shipyard. Stalin envisaged it as
becoming the largest shipyard with covered building ways in the world. The con-
struction shed measured some 1,100 feet in length and 450 in width; it could ac-
commodate two super-battleships of the Sovetskii Soyuz class side by side. It
remains today the only major shipyard in the world above the Arctic Circle capa-
ble of building the largest warships, now mostly nuclear submarines. During
World War II the unfinished yard completed submarines laid down in Lenin-
grad and at the new Krasnoe Sormovo Shipyard 112, near Gorkii on the Volga
River, and brought to Severodvinsk through the canal-river system. After the
war several Sverdlov-class cruisers were built there.
Another Stalinist creation of this period was Shipyard 199 at Komsomolsk,
about 280 miles up the Amur River, started in 1932. Since the Amur is not deep
enough, larger ships must be towed downstream after launching to be fitted out
at coastal shipyards. Nonetheless, its location had the advantage of being out of
range of Japanese aviation and out of reach by warships. This shipyard would
later become a major shipbuilding facility for the restored Pacific Fleet. Like the
yard in Molotovsk (Severodvinsk), the Komsomolsk yard was to be capable of
constructing two battleships side by side in a covered building. In 1935 a large
iron and steel mill, known as Amurstal, was begun about five miles from
Komsomolsk. Complete self-sufficiency was not regarded as possible, however;
components were sent in from the European factories and shipyards. No battle-
ships were built at Komsomolsk, but in 1938 the keels of two heavy cruisers,
Kalinin and Kaganovich, were laid down. These cruisers, commissioned only after
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the end of the war, were the first and last cruisers built and finished here; surface
ships built at Komsomolsk were mainly destroyers and frigates. During the war
the shipyard had a workforce of five thousand, half of them women, and six
building ways in two large covered halls. In the 1960s Komsomolsk became, after
Molotovsk, the second Soviet shipyard to construct nuclear submarines.34
Although the Soviet Union had a longer coastline than any other nation, over
sixteen thousand nautical miles (by comparison, the U.S. coastlines without
Alaska total just under eleven thousand nautical miles), naval facilities and ship-
building industries were historically confined to certain areas. The St. Peters-
burg/Leningrad area and Nikolaev in the south were particularly important,
though the Black Sea shorelines (867 nautical miles) and the Baltic coast (988
nautical miles in pre-1991 borders) accounted for only a fraction of the total mari-
time frontier.
Thus the history of Russian shipyards on the Baltic Sea is inextricably linked
with the history of St. Petersburg. The oldest shipyard, the Main Admiralty
Yards, was founded in 1705 but closed in 1844; shipbuilding soon shifted to the
New Admiralty Shipyards about a mile downstream on the left bank of the Neva
(during the Soviet period renamed for A. Marti and referred to as No. 194). In
1908, the New Admiralty Yard merged with the second-largest shipyard in Rus-
sia, on Galernyi Island. The enlarged New Admiralty Yard built two Gangut-class
dreadnoughts and two of the Borodino class. In 1939 the keel was laid down here
for the first of the Kronshtadt-class battle cruisers (never finished) of Stalin’s
big-fleet program.
Next in size was the Baltic (Baltiiskii) shipyard, founded in 1856 (in the Soviet era
the Ordzhonikidze Shipyard, No. 189), also capable of building the largest warships.
It was located across the Neva from the Galernyi Island yard. The Baltiiskii yard
launched two cruisers of the Kirov class (1935–39) and two of the Chapaev class
(completed only after the war); in 1938 it saw the laying down of the first Soviet
super-dreadnought, the Sovetskii Soyuz, meant to be the mainstay of Stalin’s
big-fleet program. After World War II Baltiiskii built six of the Sverdlov cruisers.
The Putilov Works (renamed in 1935 for A. A. Zhdanov and designated
No. 190), divided into two separate plants, was the largest among the
prerevolutionary private firms. Its original engine plant opened a second loca-
tion as a shipyard in 1911, operated by the leading German shipbuilder, Blohm
& Voss of Hamburg. Putilov was in charge of the construction of the innovative
Novik-class destroyer.
Through 1917 the number of shipyards in the St. Petersburg area grew to
thirteen. Nine of them also built steam engines, and two of them, Izhora and
Putilov, also produced armor plate. Moreover, the Putilov and Obukhov works
produced heavy artillery pieces as well.35
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The second major center of Russian shipbuilding was the old port of
Nikolaev on the Bug River and the Black Sea. The Andre Marti Shipyard (No.
198) was once the largest private Russian shipyard on the Black Sea. Before the
Bolshevik Revolution it built many warships, including two of four Russian
Black Sea dreadnoughts. In the 1930s the Soviets initiated the construction here
of such warships as cruisers of the Voroshilov and Frunze classes, work that cul-
minated in the laying down in 1938 of the battleship Sovetskaya Ukraina of the
Sovetskii Soyuz class and in 1939 of the battle cruiser Sevastopol. (Work on the
two capital ships stopped in October 1940 and never resumed.) The Nikolaev
yard was to witness in 1949 Stalin’s capital-ship “swan song,” when it started
under direct orders of Stalin in 1949 the only Soviet postwar battle cruiser, the
Stalingrad. The ship is said to have been about 60 percent complete and ready for
launching when Stalin suddenly died in March 1953 and all work on the last Soviet
dreadnought ceased. The other large shipyard in the area, “The Sixty-one
Communards” (No. 200) yard, began in the eighteenth century as the major Admi-
ralty facility on the Black Sea. Most of the battleships for the Black Sea were built
here. In 1910 the government decided to close it, but it was reopened in the follow-
ing year as the French-owned Russian Shipbuilding Corporation (RUSSUD). Since
1930 the yard had built light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.
Owing to the severity of the Russian winter, all Russian building berths (with
the exception of those on the Black Sea) were covered. If construction was to
continue year round, it had to be done in a roofed shed with solid walls, with an
end that could be opened when the vessel was launched. Because domestic ship-
building potential was so limited and Stalin’s expansionist dreams were so big,
Soviet diplomats were ordered, paradoxically, to purchase from “capitalist ene-
mies” what was needed for the “Big Navy Program”: latest blueprints, parts,
weapons, engines, even entire battleships. This approach would give Stalin’s
big-fleet program a bizarre twist, normally encountered in the world of fiction—
like George Orwell’s Animal Farm—as teams of Soviet diplomats went abroad in
search of naval technology. Because Japan was excluded and Britain uninterested,
the choice was limited to the four remaining major naval powers. As early as 1934–35
negotiations were initiated with France to deliver plans for cruisers and flotilla lead-
ers, but the French were reluctant to close the deal. Help, however, was found in fascist
Italy. The firm Ansaldo of Genoa was approached during 1935 and agreed to deliver
blueprints for a battleship of forty-two thousand tons of displacement (design
UP-41). This design was used to make further improvements on the Soviet bat-
tleship “project 25,” which would eventually lead to a heavier version, the
super-dreadnought Sovetskii Soyuz class (project 23) of over sixty thousand tons’
displacement and equipped with nine sixteen-inch guns. Ansaldo was also respon-
sible for the first designs leading to the Kirov-class cruisers, to be built in Leningrad
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and in Nikolaev. Another Italian firm, Oderi-Terni-Orlando of Livorno, built and
delivered to the Soviet navy (in the midst of the Spanish Civil War) the Tashkent—
the fastest destroyer in the world.36
Meanwhile, the United States was approached in 1937 about battleships, armor,
and artillery. Various blueprints were purchased from Gibbs & Cox of Philadelphia,
including three variants of a hybrid battleship–aircraft carrier of monstrous pro-
portions and incongruous appearance. This amphibious hybrid was to carry forty
planes on a short flight deck between the two gun decks. One variant was to have
had four gun decks carrying eighteen-inch guns, which only the forthcoming Japa-
nese battleships of the Yamato class possessed; other variants featured battleship-
carriers with the same number of planes and ten to twelve sixteen-inch guns.37
Stalin himself considered the task of purchasing foreign technology so impor-
tant that in June 1938 he unexpectedly walked in on a session with the U.S. ambassa-
dor, Joseph Davies, to negotiate personally. Stalin’s main preoccupation was not
only to purchase blueprints of capital ships but to let the Americans build a whole
battleship for the communist navy. He was prepared to expedite these purchases by
all means, including the payment of prerevolutionary debts. He sent a high-level
mission under Admiral Ivan S. Isakov during March 1939 to America, but its nego-
tiations were made difficult by the resolute opposition of the U.S. Navy and were fi-
nally broken off when the Soviet Union invaded Finland.38
Smaller countries were also drawn into Stalin’s fantastic plan. The Soviets en-
gaged the Czechoslovak Škoda works—prior to 1918 the major supplier of the
Austro-Hungarian navy—to deliver naval guns;39 an order was placed with the
Swiss firm Brown-Boveri for a seventy-thousand-horsepower turbine set. But para-
doxically, some of the most useful help, in terms of both quantity and quality, came
from Nazi Germany—which was until August 1939 the chief ideological foe of the
Soviet Union.
“WHY DID STALIN BUILD AN OCEANGOING FLEET?”
One of the key questions is: what circumstances drove the Soviet government, or
at least its ruthless dictator, to the watershed decision to build an oceangoing
navy, literally from scratch?40
There were, of course, historical precedents, like the 1912 program, and the
achievements in forced industrialization and militarization during the First
Five-Year Plan were impressive, but it does seem that Stalin acted in part out of
megalomania. This led Stalin to insist on planting a new shipbuilding industry,
including gigantic shipyards, in distant areas to support the Northern (reconsti-
tuted in 1932) and Pacific Fleets (1933).41 The first warships to join the Northern
Fleet had been sent from Leningrad by the Baltic–White Sea Canal, completed in
the summer of 1933 by slave workers. The second impulse must have been the
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worldwide naval arms race, which would have increased his fear of surprise at-
tack, especially from Germany and Japan. A third cause can be traced to Stalin’s
desire to increase the international prestige of the Soviet Union as a great power
and at the same time as the motherland of the world’s proletariat, a motherland
that understands how to arm itself.
Regarding the first motivation, between 1931 and the end of 1935 the Soviet
Union produced for its armed forces, the “armed vanguard of the World Prole-
tariat,” almost fourteen thousand tanks and between 10,267 and 13,728 military
aircraft—a staggering volume exceeding many times the entire arsenal of the
world.42 Elements of these forces were to be tested soon in Spain and in China,
and their quality gained international recognition. It is not hard to imagine Stalin—
who, according to people around him, loved big warships in any case—asking
why the USSR could not build mighty warships as well to overawe its enemies.
Stalin’s second motivation was his gloomy assessment of the international situ-
ation, in which three particular “non–status quo” powers—Japan, Germany, and
Italy—were trying to bring about radical changes that might start another major
war. Stalin knew that the USSR was isolated. He chose two strategies to answer this
challenge. The first was the “If you cannot beat them, join them” strategy, by
which he allowed Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov to pursue col-
lective security, culminating in the USSR’s joining the League of Nations in 1934
and in signing mutual-assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia during
1935. The second strategy was that of massive militarization, even while dissemi-
nating intensive antiwar propaganda for domestic and foreign consumption. It
was against this background that in 1936 the big-fleet program was launched.
In attempting to explain why, naval historian Captain Mikhail S. Monakov
starts with Stalin’s decision making.43 Monakov remains convinced not only that
Stalin himself made all the key decisions but that he made them in late 1935—six
or ten months prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Moreover,
Monakov argues Stalin’s decision was preceded by a well-orchestrated and thor-
oughly prepared propaganda campaign, in which fleet reconstruction was tied
to a recent political education campaign on improving efficiency within the
navy. The Soviet Union was then in the grips of the Stakhanovite movement,
with its unrealistically high “norms,” and the quest for higher efficiency and pro-
ductivity was pursued within the armed forces with even greater vigor than in
the civilian sector. The emerging Soviet patriotism, which had replaced the earlier
“internationalism,” functioned as a powerful stimulus to link up naval rearma-
ment with the new nationalism.44
As has been mentioned, Soviet production of tanks and warplanes had been
remarkable and became one of the key factors in the new propaganda message
that modern warships could be built from scratch just as quickly. Stalin
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refrained from mentioning fleet expansion publicly; he let others do it for him.
At the XVII Party Congress in 1934, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commis-
sar for Defense Kliment E. Voroshilov linked the achievements in rapid industri-
alization with the expectation that “we shall be able to create our shipbuilding
industry and soon produce our fleets, which will become the most powerful
among workers-and-farmers navies.”45 In the following year pro-navy public
pronouncements were rather muted until Pravda reported on an important 24
December meeting in the Kremlin in which Stalin and the entire Soviet leader-
ship received a large delegation of younger commanders of the reestablished Pa-
cific Fleet. At the end of the reception, the Soviet leaders invited the
commanders of the Red Army and Navy to prepare and submit as soon as possi-
ble a draft proposal concerning the buildup of a “mighty sea and oceangoing
fleet.”46 It was clear that this was more than a casual public-relations exercise;
Stalin would not have allowed without premeditation or calculated purpose
such a conspicuous public pronouncement.
Another factor on Stalin’s mind was the international naval arms race, which
in the mid-1930s seemed unstoppable. One of the first trespasses against the
arms limitation treaties had already occurred, the completion by the Germans in
1932 of the “pocket battleship” Deutschland. This vessel did not fit any category
laid down by the naval treaties of Washington (1922) or London (1930). Two
more of the class were added before Germany launched two “fully grown”battle-
ships of the Scharnhorst class in 1936, to be followed two years later by two even
mightier ships of the Bismarck class. France first responded, building two fast
battleships of the Dunkerque class. Italy reacted by pushing the construction of
its first thirty-five-thousand-ton battleship, the Vittorio Veneto. In 1935 France
announced contracts for a Richelieu class, two battleships of 38,500 tons each. Italy
responded with two more heavy battleships, while England started five King
George V–class battleships, thirty-eight thousand tons each. The United States
produced two North Carolinas and four South Dakotas, armed with nine sixteen-
inch guns and exceeding thirty-five thousand tons. Last, but outsizing all their
competitors, the Japanese started to build in 1937 the four Yamatos, the heaviest
ships under steam, exceeding sixty thousand tons and armed with the biggest arma-
ment yet produced, nine eighteen-inch guns.47
As early as 1935 the Soviet navy minister, Admiral V. M. Orlov, instructed the
Voroshilov Naval War College to prepare preliminary drawings of battleships
that would respond to the new challenge. Several projects were drawn up for the
Baltic Sea, having in mind the new German battleship Scharnhorst as an oppo-
nent; for the Pacific Fleet a heavier type of thirty-five thousand tons and nine
sixteen-inch guns, modeled on the British Lord Nelson class, was proposed. At
the same time, as mentioned above, the Italian Ansaldo navy yard in Genoa was
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commissioned by the Soviets to prepare plans for a forty-two-thousand-ton bat-
tleship, similar to the Vittorio Veneto class.48
The first draft of a comprehensive big-fleet program was submitted by Admi-
ral Orlov in early February 1936. It called for construction of sixteen battleships
and twelve heavy cruisers during the next two five-year plans. The first substan-
tive steps, however, were not undertaken until June 1936 in a government ukase
detailing the composition of the future navy and its distribution among four
fleets after the completion of the program in 1947.49
On 28 November the Soviet public was told the details of this grandiose en-
terprise, in a speech of V. M. Orlov at an Extraordinary All-Soviet Congress. He
stressed that the building of a “genuine [nastoiashchii] Big Fleet” comprising all
classes of warships “was [due to] the worsening of the international situation
and imperialist encirclement.”50 Orlov dwelled in particular on the vulnerability
of the Soviet Union’s maritime borders, especially vis-à-vis Germany, Italy, and
Japan, which had recently attacked Spain, Abyssinia, and Manchuria and were
members of the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was imperative, Orlov urged, to defend
the Soviet Motherland from such aggressor states.
Were the Program’s Targets Realistic?
Russian naval historians are in little doubt that even had Soviet involvement in
the Second World War been somehow avoided—not that it could have been,
they are convinced, Hitler being determined to attack the USSR—the targets set
out in Stalin’s big-fleet program were unrealistic and could never have been ful-
filled. None of the capital ships laid down in 1938 and 1939 could have been
completed even under peaceful conditions. Even “collecting every penny,” as
Stalin put it, would have been of no help. The Soviets lacked much basic industrial
infrastructure: their gun factories could not yet produce or test guns of sixteen-
inch caliber; boilers for the powerful steam turbines could not have been manu-
factured until after the war; there was no sophisticated optical equipment for
fire control.51 An increase in the size of the Red Navy by a factor of eleven within
seven to ten years, given the USSR’s limited resources and capabilities, seemed
unattainable. In 1939 the navy’s budget had reached 7.5 billion rubles—18.5
percent of all defense expenditure and almost 5 percent of the entire state budget
of 153.1 billion rubles.52 The next year the four giant battleships of the
Sovetskii Soyuz class, already laid down, alone accounted for almost one-third
of the defense budget.53
None of the Russian naval historians can satisfactorily explain, however, why
Stalin chose to become in the mid-1930s one of the last “navalists” or
“Mahanians.” Kasatonov considers several arguments why, including the inter-
national situation, the naval armaments race, and Stalin’s megalomania,
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demonstrated in his fondness for “big things”—in this case an obsession with
big battleships.54 At least one Western historian sees it differently. Commander
R. V. Herrick, arguably the most perceptive American expert on Soviet naval
power, considers crucial Stalin’s rational assessment of the Spanish Civil War
and of the limitations imposed by the 1936 London Naval Conference. Appar-
ently Stalin concluded that Soviet diplomats had no chance to be listened to, be-
cause they had no big naval guns behind them. Other countries looked down on
the Soviet Union, assuming that the Soviet navy’s potential lay in small subma-
rines exclusively. Herrick also correctly recognized Stalin’s long-term interest in
transferring present and future Russian oceangoing warships to open waters
rather than keep them bottled up in the Baltic and Black Seas.55
It has been argued that in the beginning of the 1930s, Stalin would not oppose
the prevailing theory of the limited and defensive function of the Soviet naval
forces, as represented by the Jeune Ecole. Although inwardly he was already shift-
ing toward defense by big ships, he would not oppose the removal of the old offi-
cers from the tsarist navy who like himself supported big ships—for many of
whom “removal” was a one-way trip.56 Furthermore, the initiative to build the
big fleet could not have come from the military, for the Ministry of Defense was
under the control of the army and traditionally viewing the navy as supporting
the ground forces. Clearly there are inconsistencies either in our understanding
of the events or in Stalin’s behavior, or both.
In the end of 1935, under Stalin’s direct orders, a special commission was ap-
pointed, representing the highest national-security decision-making bodies of
the Soviet government—the Council of Labor and Defense of the Council of
People’s Commissars, as well as the chairman of the state planning agency—to
review existing and future naval plans.57 In early 1936 the commission severely
criticized the implementation of the shipbuilding program of the current Sec-
ond Five-Year Plan. Only two of eight light cruisers had been laid down. Such
delays also plagued three destroyer leaders of the “Project 7” Leningrad class, un-
der construction since 1932 (during the First Five-Year Plan). The first ship had
been launched in November 1933 but three years later was still not in commis-
sion. Heads began to roll.
Consequently, between 1936 and 1937, amid intensified political purges, several
plans for the “big navy” program were drafted. According to the April 1936 version
there were to be completed by 1947 fifteen battleships, twenty-two large cruisers,
thirty-two light cruisers, 162 leaders and destroyers, 412 submarines, and many an-
cillary vessels—exceeding 1,300,000 tons altogether. In June the number of battle-
ships was increased to twenty-four and that of the light cruisers reduced to twenty;
there were now to be 182 destroyers and 344 submarines.58 Four or five subsequent
modifications kept the cumulative tonnage of Stalin’s big fleet growing. By the draft
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plan of August 1939 the number of combat vessels had grown to 699, over 2.5 mil-
lion tons, in addition to several hundreds of auxiliary vessels totaling almost half a
million additional tons.
The reborn Pacific Fleet was to account for almost 40 percent of this inventory, in
order to be capable of defeating the Japanese on the open sea, to destroy their home
bases and fisheries, occupy the Kurils, and disrupt Japan’s sea communications. The
Baltic Fleet was expected to sink not only all German warships but also the Polish,
Swedish, and Finnish fleets, as well as the three small Baltic republics. Soviet subma-
rines were expected to sink 120,000 tons of German shipping monthly. The Black
Sea Fleet was to sink the naval forces of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. As for
the Northern Fleet, its task was to prevent Germany from landing troops in the Arc-
tic and to disrupt communications in the North Atlantic.59
There were, of course, substantial differences between views of the Army and
Navy in this connection—over the use of aircraft carriers, for instance. Marshal
Yegorov, the chief of the general staff, wanted six of them—two for the Northern
Fleet and four for the Far East. Orlov at first wanted only two small carriers, and he
later gave them up entirely to please Stalin.60
Drafts were usually prepared in great haste and in great secrecy, not by naval
experts but by top officials, who did not call upon the available pool of special-
ists and theoreticians. In any case, such experts, like M. A. Petrov, had already
been dismissed from the navy. According to testimony of Admiral L. M. Galler,
commander of the Baltic Fleet in 1936, one of the very few officers from the
tsarist navy who survived the purges, Stalin would summon his fleet com-
manders in 1936 and ask them briskly, “What kind of ships with what kind of
ordnance do we need?” Galler recalled that the fleet commanders would unan-
imously recommend that priority be given to submarines but disagreed on the
bigger surface ships. The commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral M. V.
Viktorov, favored big ships for his vast spaces, whereas the commander of the
Black Sea Fleet, Admiral I. K. Kozhanov, naturally advocated a fleet consisting
mostly of destroyers, with some cruisers. Stalin would impatiently and con-
temptuously release the admirals with the remark, “Even you yourselves have lit-
tle idea what you need!”61
Fearing his wrath, the navy leadership timidly avoided internal debate on this
issue. Admiral Orlov issued on 15 July 1936 the order, “Stop discussion between
the industry and professors from the naval academy.”62 The contrast with the in-
tellectual climate of the tsarist navy twenty-four years earlier could not have
been greater with the veil of absolute secrecy that surrounded Stalin’s big-fleet
program. Stalin himself insisted on it. Gensek—“General Secretary,” as he was
known—would regularly inspect the ship designs but would not allow fleet
commanders to learn what was going on in their own shipyards.63
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The Spanish Civil War
Earlier accounts often stated that it was because of Spain that Stalin felt the sud-
den urge to provide the Soviet Union with an oceangoing fleet. However, suffi-
cient evidence has now been assembled to prove that Stalin’s decision preceded
the outbreak of the Spanish mutiny in mid-July 1936 and that he already had the
big-fleet idea firmly fixed in his mind in 1935, the year in which the Soviet Union
was forced by Japan to, among other things, retreat completely from Manchuria.
Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War was, nevertheless, an important re-
inforcement of the dictator’s decision.
The seventy-six Soviet naval advisers and commanders of Republican sub-
marines and torpedo boats were unable to transcend the self-limiting assump-
tions of Soviet strategy.64 Unlike most of the traditional naval powers, the Soviet
Union in those years had virtually no experience of service in foreign waters or
of protecting convoys. They simply could not come to terms with the proper em-
ployment of a relatively powerful Republican fleet of cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines, which they allowed—when it was not escorting convoys—to sit in
port rather than take action against the weaker enemy.65
Also, the merging of the Soviet and Republican navies did not work. The mar-
itime war, which taught the Soviets a few serious lessons about contemporary
naval warfare as inseparable from the exercise of airpower, revolved around the
flow of foreign arms, vital to both sides. Between 80 and 90 percent of them
came by sea. Soviet naval aviators scored a few hits on enemy targets, including a
spectacular one on the German pocket battleship Deutschland, but because of
their extremely poor ability to identify between enemy and friendly ships they
usually posed a greater danger to the Republican ships they were supposed to
protect.66 Soviet manning of the Spanish submarines achieved little or nothing.
Clearly, a more assertive strategy was needed.
During 1937 the Germans and Italians took the calculated risk of using their
own submarines, and occasionally even surface warships, against merchant
ships—this time not only Soviet ones—running supplies for Republican Spain.
To counter this campaign, the French and British governments convened a con-
ference, at which the Soviet Union also participated, at Nyon in Switzerland. The
conference adopted a British plan to establish special routes and accompany
convoys with French and British warships. This plan turned out to be the most
efficient response to the Axis (Italo-German) piracy, but the notoriously weak
Soviet navy remained unable to protect its own supplies shipped to its client
government in Spain.67
Pressed from London by Ambassador Ivan Maisky and his naval attaché, the
Soviet leadership finally discussed the pros and cons of sending a small squad-
ron, to consist of one or two cruisers, up to four destroyers, a few submarines,
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and a depot ship, to participate in the international naval force. A recent interna-
tional agreement regulating the passage through the Dardanelles—a convention
reached at Montreux, Switzerland, in July 1936, just as the Spanish Civil War
broke out—authorized the USSR, as a Black Sea power, to send its warships
through the Straits freely in peacetime.
Admiral Orlov, however, was against naval intervention in Spain. In his opin-
ion the inadequate Soviet navy could not spare a single combat ship for overseas
duties. In any case, he argued, a squadron would be so weak and obsolete that the
impact on the country’s prestige would be utterly negative. Stalin seemed to accept
Orlov’s view at the time but would later use it against him.68 In July 1937 Orlov was
relieved of his command, arrested, and sentenced to be shot as a British spy.
The Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement of 1937
One of the important factors contributing to the big-fleet program—less to its
adoption than to the speed and direction with which it was carried out—was the
Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement of 17 July 1937. This agreement with Great Brit-
ain—traditionally the leading sea power—provided Moscow a cloak of respect-
ability in the international maritime sphere, as did its membership in the League
of Nations in the political arena. Once again, the deteriorating situation in the
Far East played a role in Stalin’s decision to come to terms with England, since
the Soviet navy could then direct the bulk of its big new warships against Japan.
It is not always easy to assess correctly the dual role that the Soviet Union
played on the international stage, first as the headquarters of a communist world
revolution, and only secondarily as an ordinary nation-state. Though it signed
international treaties with the newly created Japanese puppet state of Manchu-
ria and the new regime in Germany, Moscow had never abandoned the dream of
world revolution.69
Under the cover of its pacifist propaganda, the Soviet Union began to rearm
soon after the victory of Nazism in Germany. In the naval field this began during
1935, when Great Britain, to accommodate German aspirations, signed in June
1935—in a clear breach of the Versailles Peace Treaty—an agreement with Nazi
Germany lifting restrictions on all ship categories, including submarines. The
Soviets saw no option but to catch up with naval rearmament, which they had
neglected for so long.70
One of the practical signs of the seriousness of Soviet aspirations was the Anglo-
Soviet Naval Agreement of 17 July 1937, modified on 6 July 1938. The new
agreement extended the tonnage limit of capital ships to forty-five thousand
tons.71 The agreement also banned new Soviet cruisers until 1943, a proviso that
Moscow countersigned knowing that it was already in breach of it. The Soviet
Union had been invited to participate in none of the three international naval
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conferences during the interwar period limiting naval armaments—in Wash-
ington 1921–22 and two in London, in 1930 and 1936. The Anglo-Soviet Naval
Agreement was the first recognition of Moscow as a maritime power. The Soviet
Union also became a late signatory of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, signed
by France, the United States, and later Italy.
The absence of Japan from international naval agreements after 1936 enabled
the Soviet Union to push for removal of restrictions regarding the Pacific Ocean.
Article 9 duly removed limitations of size and armament from the Soviet Pacific
Fleet and relieved Moscow of any obligation to inform London of its new con-
struction in the Far East.72 Although the Soviet Pacific Fleet consisted at the time
of three obsolete destroyers, Stalin was looking ten years ahead to a strong fleet
capable of challenging even Japan. Entering the naval race so late, Stalin could
not be squeamish about ignoring provisions of its new agreement. The Admi-
ralty in London complained to the Foreign Office that whereas twenty-six ships
had been laid down in Russian shipyards in 1938, including capital ships, the So-
viets had declined so to inform London until 1 November.73 Their lordships, un-
amused, considered the delay deliberate and wholesale evasion of the terms of
the naval agreement.74
The Soviet premier, Vyacheslav Molotov, announced on 15 January 1938 the
creation of a separate naval ministry (Commissariat) and declared that a mighty
oceangoing fleet was necessary not only for defense but, especially, for an offen-
sive warfare.75 The British naval attaché in Moscow, however, was deeply skepti-
cal.76 In July President Mikhail Kalinin told the workers of the Baltic Shipyard in
Leningrad that they were entering into a fierce competition with leading capital-
ist countries and that they must overtake them all.77 The attaché concluded that
a decision had been taken at very high places to build battleships at the Baltic
Shipyard.78 He was right.
At the same time the purge of the senior naval personnel had reached its cli-
max. Thus a certain Commander Yevseev, using the Spanish War as a pretext,
was settling scores first with the Ludri School, which underestimated the offen-
sive potential of air force and submarines in modern warfare.79 Then Yevseev
turned against both the Old and Young Naval Schools, accusing them of anti-
Soviet activities. Because they “taught false doctrines thereby undermining the
mighty Soviet Union,” Yevseev stressed, the NKVD (the People’s Committee of
Internal Affairs) justly “decapitated the reptiles.” Yevseev went on, “The
Voroshilov Naval Staff College must become the forger of a sound naval doc-
trine. In the past this establishment has been the home of our enemies.80 Its lead-
ers must now expose all the harmful theories, which have been spread about and
ensure that in the future strong and healthy strategical, operational and tactical
opinions will take their place.”
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German-Soviet Naval Contacts
Few bilateral agreements had so revolutionary an impact on international rela-
tions as the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939. Historians ever
since have examined the origins of the pact and what motivated the two partners
behind the scene.81 A related question is seldom asked: Did Stalin’s Flottenpolitik
play any role in his decision to approach Germany?
Nazi Germany turned overnight into the main arms provider of the Red
Navy, to the surprise of many.82 Recent research in Soviet archives has confirmed
that Stalin was deeply committed to building his big fleet and obtaining naval
equipment from Germany even in previous Soviet-German trade negotia-
tions—seven sessions since 1933. One Russian scholar familiar with Stalin’s pri-
vate papers and having unique access to Stalin’s personal folder [osobaia papka
genseka] argues that naval equipment and other armaments were specifically
mentioned as early as December 1935.83 The archival record shows an extraordi-
nary, almost obsessive, involvement on the part of the gensek in naval matters;
Stalin would follow the smallest details. This close involvement with Germany
may constitute an important missing link in explaining Stalin’s irrational behavior
during the spring of 1941, in rejecting nearly a hundred warnings of the immi-
nent German attack.
On 26 October 1939, a Soviet delegation of over sixty experts, headed by Peo-
ple’s Commissar for Shipbuilding Ivan Tevosyan, descended on Berlin like a
swarm of locusts. More than half of the delegates were interested in buying naval
equipment. The initial wish list, which Tevosyan produced on the 27th at the
Foreign Ministry, confirmed that the Soviets wanted to purchase mainly Ger-
man technology, especially related to naval armaments.
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The Soviet shortlist seems endless, even in retrospect: complete materials for
the construction of four light cruisers; two hulls of heavy cruisers of the Admiral
Hipper class; coastal and ship guns of all calibers; torpedoes and mines; optical
range finders, fire control directors, and hydro-acoustical devices; and the entire
set of blueprints for the battleship Bismarck, the Hipper class of heavy cruisers,
the Scharnhorst-class battle cruiser, and the (never finished) aircraft carrier Graf
Zeppelin. In the early summer of 1940, the Germans reluctantly allowed the
Soviets to tow to Leningrad the half-finished heavy cruiser Lützow (renamed
Petropavlovsk), to be completed there. Stalin was hoping that by hard bargain-
ing, Hitler could be induced to sell further equipment needed for the big fleet—
“leftovers” from the unfinished third Bismarck. When the Soviets found out that
the Germans had six fifteen-inch guns and turrets in excess, two battle cruisers
of the Kronstadt class, their hulls already laid down, had quickly to be redesigned
to receive these much heavier main batteries. The new cruisers of the Chkalov
class (project 68-I), under construction in Leningrad, had similarly to be rede-
signed to receive German 150 mm guns and triple turrets.
By early 1940, the war in Europe was raging, and the race for time was be-
coming desperate; the U.S. shipyards were not delivering any battleships to the
Soviets, and the Germans were reluctant. It became obvious that the ambitious
targets of the Third Five-Year Plan could not be met. On 27 July the “big fleet”
program was reduced from fifteen battleships to ten, from sixteen battle cruisers
to eight, and to fourteen cruisers, although the plan now envisioned, for the first
time, two small aircraft carriers for the Pacific Fleet.84 The Soviet military leader-
ship began to prepare for strategic deployment in the West against possible German
attack. Stalin, however, wished to delay involvement in a general war “among impe-
rialists”as long as possible and to take advantage of the German technical assistance,
especially naval. When between the summer of 1940 and June 1941 the Soviet naval
high command wisely proposed to halt construction of capital ships to free capacity
for lighter surface craft and submarines and to save high-quality steel for other ar-
mament, Stalin stalled. When Kuznetsov asked to scrap the two battle cruisers on
the ways, still at least two years from completion, Stalin refused. He also refused to
cancel work on the Sovetskii Soiuz class and ordered the construction of the cruisers
to be continued regardless.85
More comparative research must be done in order to prove that Stalin had pur-
sued a Soviet Flottenpolitik since the end of 1935 and that it played a central role in
the Nazi-Soviet negotiations in the late 1930s. Moreover, if that policy weighed so
heavily on Stalin’s mind and his decision making, since Nazi Germany had become
in 1939 the sole foreign supplier of vital naval equipment, Stalin must have strongly
desired to avoid war with Germany in order to win even one extra year for the com-
pletion of the big warships. Thus, the “big fleet” hypothesis would directly oppose
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what is known as the “Icebreaker” theory, that Stalin wanted to attack Hitler first.86
The big-fleet hypothesis is still plausible even if Stalin’s navy, which relied so much
on German assistance, might have been eventually used against Germany (rather
than against Japan after 1946); this factor makes Stalin’s decision-making process
even more intriguing. In 1941, however, the years required for the fleet’s construc-
tion lay ahead, and Stalin had weighty reason for keeping the Nazis busy elsewhere.
“GOOD ONLY AS A MISSILE TARGET”
Russia’s history of wars and revolutions, the complex geographical impediments
to access to open seas and to ice-free harbors, have returned the country, espe-
cially after major wars, to the persistent question of what kind of naval strategy
would be optimal. There are three principal issues. First, should the strategy be
offensive or defensive, directed against sea or land? Second, what kind of a navy
should Russia have, and how large? Third, where should ships be built, main-
tained, and stationed?
Stalin’s big-fleet program was driven by the slogan “catch up and overtake”
[dognat i peregnat] (i.e., the West), a common phrase during the forced industri-
alization of the early Soviet era. The decision to build big warships, battleships,
and cruisers was, finally, Stalin’s own. Dissatisfied with his fleet commanders,
whose wishes were bound to be divergent, he provided his own answer, in favor
of big ships. Russian naval experts had time after time demonstrated that these
big ships were ill suited to the shallow waters and short distances of the Baltic
and Black Seas. Furthermore, big fleets could not resolve Russia’s fundamental
geographic and strategic problems. How could a great power with the largest
landmass in the world and four separated sea frontiers hope to protect enor-
mously long maritime frontiers without allies and to exercise Weltpolitik at the
same time?
Stalin seems to have fallen into much the same trap that his tsarist predeces-
sors tried to avoid after Tsushima. The big-fleet program was marred by its lack
of a clear strategic purpose, except to serve Stalin’s megalomania to use it (prior
to the arrival of the nuclear deterrent) as the ultimate military arbiter. Admiral
Kuznetsov later recalled that toward the end of 1939 he once asked Stalin, in a
moment when the dictator seemed to be in a good mood, how he planned to use
the big ships under construction, particularly in the shallow Baltic Sea, which
could be easily mined, and when Germany had ceased to be the main adversary.
Stalin angrily replied: “We shall build them even if we had to scramble the last
penny!” “Thus ended the conversation about battleships,” Kuznetsov has com-
mented drily, “whose construction was already going full speed ahead, while I as a
Navy Minister was still not quite clear in my head why they were being built at all!”87
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After the Soviet victory in 1945, incredibly, Stalin resumed his dream of ac-
quiring an oceangoing fleet but found that the acquisition of battleships from
abroad was even more troublesome than before the war. Stalin, who still refused
to have aircraft carriers, decided to settle for heavy (battle) cruisers, which became
the focus of his fantasy in the last three years of his life. The resulting Stalingrad
battle cruiser, however, was never to be completed. When Stalin died, Stalingrad
died with him. The construction of cruisers, however—the launching of the Kirov
class in 1936, to which the Chapaev class was added after the war—went ahead
under full steam. It continued even after Stalin’s death in 1953 through the
Sverdlov class, the most accomplished Soviet cruiser, of which half out of the
originally planned twenty-four hulls were completed by 1960. Thereafter the
Soviet Union took a different course as a naval power, relying more on nuclear
submarines with fast missile boats. Strategically too the world geopolitical map
changed radically after World War II. The superpower rivalry between the
United States and the USSR meant that the small and technologically inadequate
Soviet navy had to face global tasks on the world oceans while still confronted
with the old limitations in its regional waters. However, all of the Soviet navy’s
former rivals, including the Germans, the Italians, and above all the Japanese,
were no longer threats after 1945. The lack of hostile neighboring naval powers
made the gradual resurgence of Soviet seapower possible.
While the Soviet Union’s strategic dilemma regarding the closed Black Sea re-
mained the same, the USSR acquired two large ice-free naval bases, Kaliningrad
(ex-Koenigsberg) in the Baltic and Port Arthur in the Far East. However, when
measured against the superior NATO and U.S. naval power in the Mediterra-
nean, the Atlantic, and the Pacific, these Soviet gains were only marginal, not
revolutionary improvements in the global strategic constellation. The idea of a big
fleet had to be abandoned and replaced by a strategy based on smaller warships,
harassing enemy shipping, and securing command of the sea by other means.
Thus in 1946, instead of a battle fleet of twenty-four new battleships and bat-
tle cruisers able to challenge capitalist navies throughout the world, the postwar
Soviet navy had only its two old and several-times-refloated ex-tsarist dread-
noughts in the Baltic, one leased Royal Navy battleship of the same age in the
Northern Fleet, and two more dreadnoughts in the Black Sea, consisting of one
ex-tsarist and one ex-Italian war-reparation battleship. It had no battleships in
the Pacific Fleet at all.
However, Stalin’s successors wisely abandoned the urge to possess huge and
expensive capital ships for showing the red flag abroad. Nikita S. Khrushchev
even denigrated his own flagship during a 1959 trip to the United States “as good
only for state visits and . . . as a missile target!” and announced that the remain-
ing cruisers under construction were to be scrapped.88 This casual dismissal of the
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Soviet flagship was indeed the death knell of Stalin’s big-fleet program—but not
yet the end of the Red Navy itself. One could consider the launching of Sputnik
in 1957 to be the new watershed in the development of the Soviet navy. The new
leaders of the Soviet Union, while challenging the American superpower, looked
to space, not the sea.
Under the leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Kuznetsov’s successor, the
Soviet navy would undergo a remarkable metamorphosis, combined with a rad-
ical modernization and expansion program. During the 1970s, the Soviets
achieved a close parity with the U.S. Navy and in some categories—like subma-
rines and small missile-carrying boats—even gained the upper hand. In 1972,
Norman Polmar, the foremost U.S. authority on the Soviet navy, stated that “to-
day the Soviet Union can boast the world’s largest and most modern surface
navy; the largest and most modern ocean research and fishing fleets.”89
By the early 1980s, while still finding it impossible to challenge the U.S. su-
premacy in large fleet carriers, Russia was still a power to be reckoned with. Less
than ten years later, however, the once-threatening Soviet navy, together with the
rest of the Soviet armed forces, began an irreversible decline. In a matter of years
the collapse of the world’s most powerful war machine was clear for all to see in
the rusting ship-graveyards of Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok, Polyarnoe,
Kronstadt, Kaliningrad, and Sevastopol. But even after more than a decade of
steady decline—as well as tragedy, such as the loss of the nuclear submarine
Kursk with its entire crew—the Russian navy still remains nuclear and the sec-
ond most powerful in the world. It overreached itself under Stalin, but under
Gorshkov it took a more innovative approach against which the United States
for a while could not find an adequate response. It is now in the hollow of a wave,
but who can tell when the next uplift will arrive?
N O T E S
1. Schwendemann, Heinrich, Die wirtschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Deutschen Reich
und der Sowjetunion von 1939 bis 1941: Alter-
native zu Hitlers Ostprogramm (Berlin: Akad-
emie Verlag, 1993). English summary in
Cahiers du monde russe 36, nos. 1–2 (1995),
pp. 161–78.
2. See Admiral Kuznetsov’s memoirs, Krutye
povoroty (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya,
1995).
3. Risk was an indispensable element of Admiral
Tirpitz’s naval strategy to challenge England, as
it had to be assumed that England could smash
the budding German naval program during its
first years after inception (hence the nickname
of Tirpitz’s navy during the first years,
Risikoflotte).
4. D. C. Watt’s pioneering article “Stalin’s First
Bid for Sea Power, 1933–1941,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (June 1964), is a rare
exception.
5. Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin
and the German Invasion of Russia (New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1999).
1 1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:53 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
120
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss2/1
6. I. P. Spasskii et al., Istoriya otechestvennogo
sudostroieniya (St. Petersburg: Sudostroienie,
1996), vol. 1, pp. 170–71.
7. A good example that illustrates this ignorance
in the West is the commentary to Sergei
Gorshkov’s relevant chapter covering the recon-
struction of the Soviet navy, 1928–41. Although
Gorshkov refers explicitly to the big-navy
construction program of the late 1930s, his
American commentator, Vice Admiral J. F.
Calvert, decided to bypass the reference com-
pletely. See Sergei G. Gorshkov, Red Star Ris-
ing at Sea (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1974), pp. 65–75.
8. In the early days of the war Novik, accompa-
nied by destroyers, led sorties to harass the
Japanese blockade around Port Arthur. After
the loss of cruiser Novik in 1904 the name
was transferred to the fast destroyer built in
1912 in the Baltic. See also Charles E. Adams,
“Der Wiederaufstieg der russischen Kriegs-
marine in den Jahren 1905–1914,” Marine-
Rundschau 1 (1964), pp. 12–22.
9. Evgenii F. Podsoblyaev, “The Russian Naval
General Staff and the Evolution of Naval Pol-
icy, 1905–1914,” Journal of Military History,
no. 66 (January 2002), pp. 57–69; and J. N.
Westwood, Russian Naval Construction,
1905–1941 (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 34.
10. Among his more than one hundred works on
naval strategy and history, the most fre-
quently quoted are: Voenno-morskaya istoriya
[Military history; 1901]; Sovremennaya
morskaya voina: Morskie zametki o russko-
yaponskoi voinei [Modern naval warfare:
Maritime notes on the Russo-Japanese War;
1905]; and Etyudy po strategii [Studies on
strategy; 1914].
11. The legendary mutiny took place on board
the battleship Knyaz Potëmkin Tavritchesky,
glorified during the Soviet period by Sergei
Eisenshtein’s film masterpiece, made in 1925.
After the mutineers surrendered, the dis-
graced ship was renamed Panteleimon.
12. A. P. Semenov, Rasplata (1906, repr. St. Pe-
tersburg: Gangut, 1994).
13. M. Rimskii-Korsakov, “Threat from the
East,” Morskoi sbornik 1 (1907), pp. 61–73.
For the analysis of the propaganda slogan
“Yellow Peril” see my What Is Asia to Us?
Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today
(Boston: Hyman Unwin, 1990).
14. M. A. Petrov, Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi
voine na more [The preparedness of Russia
for world war at sea] (Leningrad: Gosvoen-
izdat, 1926), p. 96.
15. Vickers had offered to build the first Russian
dreadnought in twenty months, which must
have offended Russian national pride. See
Spasskii, vol. 3, p. 131ff.
16. Cuniberti designed the first Italian dread-
nought, Dante Alighieri, in 1907, which had
its four triple-gun turrets on the centerline.
Westwood, p. 66.
17. Admiral Gorshkov’s negative verdict on the
supposed low quality and “slavish imitation
of foreigners in the types of ships, often im-
perfect and obsolete” does not seem fair, es-
pecially as he praises on the same page A. N.
Krylov, I. G. Bubnov, and others, as “greatest
Russian shipbuilders.” Cf. Sergei G. Gorshkov,
The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 91.
18. Westwood (p. 78) calls it “ the Dreadnought
among destroyers.”
19. Ibid., pp. 78–89.
20. The results of the census are neatly summed
up and discussed in terms of global impact
by one of Russia’s leading scientists, D.
Mendeleev, in his masterpiece K poznaniyu
Rossii [Toward understanding Russia] (St.
Petersburg, 1907).
21. As shown by Podsoblyaev (pp. 37–70), using
extensively both the contemporary press and
now accessible naval records for the period of
1905–18. See also Westwood. See also con-
temporary reprints of the selected pre-1914
discussion in Voenno-morskaia ideia Rossii:
Dukhovnoe nasledie imperatorskogo flota [The
Russian naval idea: The intellectual heritage
of the imperial fleet], ed. A. E. Savinkin et al.
(Moscow: Russkii put, 1999). The Navy Gen-
eral Staff (known as “Genmor”) was founded
in 1906 as part of the postwar reforms.
22. Westwood, p. 8.
23. Its influential journal carried the title More i
ego zhizn [The sea and its life]. Ibid., pp. 8,
10, 46.
24. Ibid., pp. 14–20; and Spasskii, vol. 3, pp. 144–
72, passim.
H A U N E R 1 1 7
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:53 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
121
Naval War College: Full Spring 2004 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
25. “Sobolev 2” [pseud.], “Soedinie flota” [Bring-
ing the fleet together], Morskoi sbornik 7
(1914), pp. 207–12.
26. Podsoblyaev, p. 52.
27. Weyers Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten 1914
(Munich: J. F. Lehmann Verlag, 1914), pp.
515–17; Nauticus 1914: Jahrbuch für Deutsch-
lands Seeinteressen (Berlin: E. S. Mittler
Verlag, 1914), p. 534; René Greger, The Rus-
sian Fleet 1914–1917 (London: Allen, 1973),
p. 9.
28. Spasskii, vol. 3, p. 527.
29. The “dawn” metaphor is especially apt in that
by coincidence, the Bolshevik coup known as
the October Revolution began with a salvo
from the cruiser Aurora—named for the
Greek goddess of dawn.
30. J. Meister Greger, Soviet Warships of the Sec-
ond World War (London: Macdonald and
Jane’s: 1977), pp. 15–19; Siegfreid Breyer,
Grosskampfschiffe 1905–1970 (Munich: Ber-
nard and Graefe, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 119.
31. Mikhail S. Monakov, “Sudby doktrin i teorii”
series in Morskoi sbornik, nos. 11–12 (1990),
nos. 3–4 (1991), no. 3 (1992), nos. 3–5 (1994).
“Gervais” is the familiar Western rendering,
properly Zhervé (Æåðâå).
32. For Zof, see Morskoi sbornik 5 (1925), p. 16;
for Ludri, Morskoi sbornik 10 (1927), p. 26.
33. M. A. Petrov, writing in Morskoi sbornik 9
(1923), p. 48.
34. Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to
the Soviet Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1991), p. 429.
35. Compiled from Boris V. Drashpil and Chris-
tian de Saint Hubert, “Main Shipyards, Engine
Builders and Manufacturers of Guns and Ar-
mour Plate in the Saint Petersburg Area up to
1917,” Warship International 4 (1985), pp.
333–61; Polmar, Guide, pp. 413–28; Spasskii,
vol. 4.
36. Compiled from René Greger, “Sowjetischer
Schlachtschiffbau” [Soviet Battleship Con-
struction], Marine-Rundschau 71 (1974), pp.
461–79; S. Breyer, “Sowjetischer Schlacht-
schiffbau,” Marine-Rundschau 72 (1975), pp.
141–63; Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S.
Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet
Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes
1935–1953 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 74f.
37. Breyer (1975), pp. 161–64; Rohwer and
Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, pp.
88–89.
38. Foreign Relations of the United States: The So-
viet Union 1933–1939 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), pp.
457–91, 670–707, 869–903; J. E. Davies, Mis-
sion to Moscow (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1941), p. 208; and Thomas
Maddux, American Relations with the Soviet
Union 1933–1941 (Tallahassee: Univ. Presses
of Florida, 1980), pp. 86–88, 96–98.
39. A. Pokorná, “Czechoslovak-Soviet Arma-
ments Cooperation in the Second Half of the
1930s,” Historie a vojenství (Prague), no. 5
(1982), pp. 56–77 (in Czech).
40. The subhead on page 103 is the English for
the title of M. Monakov, “Zachem Stalin
stroil okeanskii flot?” Morskoi sbornik 12
(1998), pp. 74–79.
41. Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going
Fleet, p. 42.
42. David R. Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The
Militarization of the Soviet Union 1926–1933
(Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2000),
p. 214.
43. Monakov, “Zachem Stalin stroil okeanskii
flot?”
44. For patriotism, see Erwin Oberländer,
Sowjetpatriotismus und Geschichte: Eine
Dokumentation (Cologne: Verlag
Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967).
45. I. V. Kasatanov, ed., Tri veka Rossiiskogo Flota
1696–1996 [Three centuries of the Russian
fleet] (St. Petersburg: Logos, 1996), vol. 2, pp.
339–40.
46. The Russian phrase is bolshoi Morskoi i
okeanskii flot (Pravda, 24 December 1935).
47. Jürgen Rohwer, War at Sea 1939–1945
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996),
p. 9
48. Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going
Fleet, p. 62.
49. Kasatonov, p. 337.
50. Pravda, 29 November 1936, p. 3. It was also
Orlov’s swan song—he would vanish the next
year in the purges.
51. Monakov, “Zachem Stalin stroil okeanskii
flot?” p. 76; Breyer, “Sowjetischer
1 1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:53 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
122
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss2/1
Schlachtschiffbau”; and A. M. Petrov et al.,
Oruzhie Rossiiskogo Flota [Weapons of the
Russian fleet] (St. Petersburg: Sudostroienie,
1996).
52. Kasatonov, p. 349.
53. V. N. Krasnov, “Linkory tipa ‘Sovetskii
Soyuz’” [Soviet Union–class battleships],
Morskoi sbornik 6 (1990), p. 63.
54. Kasatonov, pp. 337–39; see also Kuznetsov’s
testimony in A. S. Kiselev, ed., Admiral
Kuznetsov (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 2000),
pp. 105, 255–56; V. N. Krasnov, “Stalin-
shchina v VMF i korablestroenii [The Stalin era
in the navy and shipbuilding], Sudostroenie 7
(1990), pp. 64–69.
55. Kasatonov, p. 339; R. V. Herrick, Soviet Naval
Strategy: 50 Years of Theory and Practice
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1968),
pp. 38–45.
56. Kasatonov, p. 343.
57. Ibid., p. 340. Summed up in Admiral
Kuznetsov’s personal notes and published in
the posthumous Admiral Kuznetsov, pp. 100–
106. The STO (Sovet Truda i Oborony, the
Council of Labor and Defense), within the
Sovet Narodnykh Kommissarov (Council of
People’s Commissars), was established be-
tween 1922 and 1937 as nominally the highest
decision-making body responsible for
defense.
58. Rohwer and Monakov, “The Soviet Ocean-
Going Fleet, 1935–1956,” International History
Review 18, no. 4 (November 1996), p. 830;
Kasatonov (p. 345) has different figures for
destroyers and submarines.
59. Kasatonov, p. 350; Rohwer and Monakov,
“The Soviet Ocean-Going Fleet, 1935–1956,”
p. 856.
60. Kasatonov, p. 341; Rohwer and Monakov,
Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, p. 97.
61. N. G. Kuznetsov, Nakanune [On the Eve]
(Moscow: Voienizdat, 1969), p. 282.
62. Kasatonov, p. 342.
63. Ibid., p. 349.
64. N. G. Kuznetsov, Na dalekom meridiane [At
the distant meridian] (Moscow: Nauka,
1988), and Nakanune, pp. 115–84.
65. Willard C. Frank, “Naval Operations in the
Spanish Civil War 1936–1939,” Naval War
College Review 37 (1984), pp. 24–55, esp. p. 39.
66. Ibid., pp. 39–40.
67. See ibid., p. 44, and Franco Bargoni,
L’impegno navale italiano durante la Guerra
civile spagnola 1936–1939 [The involvement
of the Italian navy in the Spanish Civil War]
(Rome: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare,
1992).
68. Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going
Fleet, pp. 65–66.
69. British Embassy Moscow to Foreign Office,
Annual Report for 1937, The National Archives
(TNA): Public Records Office (PRO)/Foreign
Office files: FO 371/23699/N 2166.
70. L. Ivanov, Morskoe sopernichestvo imperial-
isticheskikh derzhav (Moscow: Sotsekiiz,
1936), and an article by the same author on
the Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement of 1937,
in Morskoi sbornik 9 (1937), pp. 114–25.
71. See British Embassy Moscow to FO: dis-
patches of 17 January, 4 February, 8 July, 12
September, and 12 November 1938, TNA:
PRO/FO 371/22820 and 22296, and FO 371/
23699 (Alliances and Treaties).
72. This would directly apply to the Chapaev-
class cruisers built in the new shipyard at
Komsomolsk.
73. According to article 7 of the agreement, each
government was expected to furnish particu-
lars of warships under construction within
one month of the treaty’s coming into force,
which the Soviets obviously ignored.
74. Admiralty to FO, 10 January 1939, TNA:
PRO/FO 371/22820/A235/235/45.
75. See in the lead article in Pravda and Izvestiya
of 17 January 1938: “The mighty socialist in-
dustrial potential is capable of fulfilling any
and every order of the People’s Navy Com-
missariat. . . . The mighty specialized ship-
yards (Komsomolsk, Murmansk, Arkhangel,
Vladivostok . . . ) that are being rapidly com-
pleted at the present time will launch ships of
all categories. . . . The vital interests of our
mighty Soviet land demand that we should
possess a powerful fleet capable not only of
defending itself but, in case of need, of taking
the offensive and destroying the enemy in his
own territorial waters.”
H A U N E R 1 1 9
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:53 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
123
Naval War College: Full Spring 2004 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
76. In Lord Chilton’s dispatch to FO, 17 January
1938 (TNA: PRO/FO 371/22296/N 360 and
N465).
77. Pravda, 3 July 1938.
78. Naval Attaché to Admiralty, Dispatch no. 7 of
8 July 1938 (TNA: PRO/FO 371/22296/N).
79. For Commander Yevseev, Krasnoj flot of 16
August 1938. The Ludri School was named
after M. I. Ludri, who died in the Gulag; see
The Times (London) of 31 August 1938,
which lists some of the most prominent vic-
tims of the Navy. He perished together with
Professors Gervais and Petrov, among others.
80. The Voroshilov Naval Staff College was the
former Imperial Nikolaev Naval Academy in
St. Petersburg—the highest educational insti-
tution for naval officers. The purge of the
professors of the naval academy was one of
the widest in the ranks of the Soviet armed
forces; it led to the destruction of practically
the entire faculty, under the pretext that they
had taught the wrong doctrines. The Naval
Academy did not recover until the 1960s. See
memoirs by Kuznetsov and others. According
to The Times of 31 August 1938, the following
naval officers perished in the purges: Admiral
Orlov, commander in chief (C-in-C) of the
navy; Admiral Zhivkov, C-in-C Baltic Fleet;
Admiral Ludry, head of the Naval Academy;
Admiral Ivanov; Admiral Viktorov, Orlov’s
successor; Admiral Muklevich, head of naval
construction; Admiral Kozhanov, C-in-C
Black Sea Fleet; Admiral Kireev, C-in-C Pa-
cific Fleet; Admiral Dishenov, C-in-C North-
ern Fleet; and Admiral Kadatsky, C-in-C of
the Far Eastern Amur Flotilla. Among the few
survivors from the former tsarist navy were
Admiral Galler, the chief of naval staff, and
his first deputy, Admiral Isakov (who traveled
in 1938–39 to the United States on a shop-
ping trip—without success).
81. See in particular D. C. Watt, “The Initiation
of the Negotiations Leading to the Nazi-Soviet
Pact: A Historical Problem,” in Essays in
Honour of E. H. Carr, ed. Chimen Abramsky
and Beryl J. Williams (London: Macmillan,
1974), pp. 152–70.
82. One of the first works dealing with the naval
aspects of Russo-German relations was
Gerhard Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet
Union 1939–1941 (Leiden, Neth.: E. J. Brill,
1954).
83. L A. Bezymensky, “Sovetsko-Germanskie
Dogovory 1939g.: Novye dokumenty i starye
problemy” [The Soviet-German pact of 1939:
New documents and old problems], Novaia i
noveishaia istoriia [New and newer history] 3
(1998), pp. 3–26.
84. Schwendemann, p. 102; Rohwer and
Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, p. 113.
85. Rohwer and Monakov, “The Soviet Ocean-
Going Fleet, 1935–1956,” p. 861, and Stalin’s
Ocean-Going Fleet, pp. 110–43.
86. For the best update see Teddy Uldricks’s re-
view article “The Icebreaker Controversy: Did
Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?” Slavic Review
58, no. 3 (1999), pp. 626–43.
87. From the Kuznetsov Family Archives, origi-
nal; published posthumously in Admiral
Kuznetsov, ed. A. S. Kiselev (Moscow: Mos-
gorarkhiv, 2000), p. 105.
88. Leningradskaya Pravda, 23 March 1960. The
scrapping applied to a dozen Sverdlov-class
cruisers under construction.
89. Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Chal-
lenge for the 1970s (New York: Crane, Russak,
1974).
1 2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:53 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
124
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss2/1
SPACE WEI QI
The Launch of Shenzhou V
Joan Johnson-Freese
Wei Qi is the favorite Chinese board game—chess with more than twohundred pieces rather than sixteen, allowing for significantly increased
strategic complexity. When Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei lifted off into space
from China’s Jiuquan launch site just after 9 AM on 15 October 2003, returning
twenty-one hours later after sixteen orbits around the earth, China made a signifi-
cant geostrategic Wei Qi move. China views long-term geostrategic politics as
having about the same number of possible permutations as a Wei Qi board, and it
is posturing accordingly. The Shenzhou V launch was part of that posturing.
Perched atop a Long March (CZ-2F) launcher, the
Shenzhou V spacecraft took China’s first taikonaut on
a trip thoroughly rehearsed during four unmanned
precursor missions.1 Within China, a publicity cam-
paign was carefully crafted to bring interest and na-
tional pride to a peak at the time of the event.
Worldwide, media attention was considerable.
Prelaunch speculation about the implications of the
Chinese manned space program ranged from dub-
bing it a stunt to speculation about a new space race,
to angst over its potential military significance.
Postlaunch, China has reveled in its success inter-
nally and accepted accolades from world leaders.
What comes next, however, remains uncertain. Al-
though the People’s Liberation Army Daily proclaimed
on launch day, “The whole world will remember the
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Chinese name Yang Liwei,” that has not proven to be the case in the United
States, at least not initially.2 Indeed Yang’s flight was almost a nonevent for
Americans, among whom it was unable to compete for public attention with
other priorities, from the war in Iraq to the baseball playoffs. Clearly, however,
external players, especially the United States, will significantly influence the fu-
ture path of China’s space program. This is especially true given the anticipated
plans to reinvigorate the U.S. manned space exploration program. What the
United States plans to do is important, but in the context of geostrategic politics
how is even more important. While a space race is not a foregone conclusion, it is
a possibility.
In this game of Wei Qi, the next move goes to the United States, which has
three basic options. It can do nothing, which equates to sending congratulations
and then continuing a policy that has excluded China from cooperative space ef-
forts. This option would likely result in China’s setting its own course in space
and working with countries other than the United States. Alternatively, the
United States can throw down the gauntlet and commence with a new manned
space race, announcing unilateral plans and forcing China into a pace it likely
cannot afford. Or the United States can initiate an incremental program of space
cooperation among China, itself, and other international partners. This option
has the potential to reinvigorate the American manned space program and
shape the future direction of China’s space efforts. It is important to remember
too that while Wei Qi involves two players, and while this discussion focuses on
the United States and China, there are other players simultaneously involved, inter-
acting with both countries as well. This complication both expands and influences
the options of the United States and China, and it means that Washington’s next
move will be significant on the larger geostrategic gameboard.
THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
How Washington wants U.S.-China relations to evolve is far from clear. After the
Cold War, the United States began looking around for the “next enemy”to prepare
for—the security community judiciously and appropriately planning for the fu-
ture. As the only country of sufficient size and resources to become potentially a
peer competitor, and the largest remaining communist country, China suc-
ceeded the Soviet Union almost by default. With China pursuing an ambitious
space program built utilizing dual-use technologies, and space being an area
considered by the United States as critical to its own strategic future, competi-
tion in space quickly emerged as an area of possible, indeed likely, contention.
Since 9/11, U.S.-China relations have warmed somewhat, with the United
States seeking Chinese cooperation regarding the global war on terrorism. Also,
China seems to still have some influence over North Korea and has been helpful
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to the United States on that issue. Even in the usually contentious area of
China-Taiwan-U.S. relations, on 10 December 2003 President George W. Bush
welcomed Premier Wen Jiabao to Washington, calling him a “partner” in diplo-
macy and in a statement warning Taiwan against changing its relationship with
mainland China.3 Since space activity has always been somewhat of a barometer
of larger U.S.-China relations, the current period is one of both particular un-
certainty and opportunity.
The Chinese, while advocating a treaty to ban space weapons, have also pur-
sued antisatellite technology.4 Kinetic-energy weapons, jammers, parasite satel-
lites that can surreptitiously attach themselves to other satellites, and
high-powered ground-based lasers are all on the Chinese menu of options being
pursued. The Chinese are also interested in navigation satellites, which can en-
hance missile targeting capabilities.5
China has recently partnered with the European Union (EU) on the Galileo
navigation satellite system being developed by the EU as an alternative to the
American Global Positioning System (GPS).6 China has committed approxi-
mately $259 million in hard currency to this project, a system that is worrisome for
Washington even without Chinese involvement because of its potential to interfere
technically with GPS. Signing on to Galileo early gives China a stakeholder posi-
tion, and it will be working with EU countries on both technical and manufac-
turing aspects of the program.7 Clearly, China is taking a two-track approach to
space matters: discouraging international activity in space weapons while ac-
tively pursuing countermeasures and options of their own. The latter has been
the focus of respective U.S.-China space posturing.
CHINESE PAYOFFS FROM SPACE
China faces Herculean challenges on a daily basis keeping its population em-
ployed, fed, housed, and subsequently stable.8 Why, then, would its leaders spend
severely limited government resources on a manned space program? There are
many reasons, in addition to which Chinese program supporters had the benefit
of being able to learn from the American and Russian experiences. China has read
the playbooks from both countries on how to maximize program benefits and
strategic opportunities. Additionally, in terms of the technology used, China did
not reinvent the wheel but instead chose to build on proven Russian designs.
Project 921, as this, the second Chinese attempt at a manned space program,
is called, was initiated and championed by former Chinese president, and still
head of the military, Jiang Zemin.9 It was undertaken in 1992 because the time
was ripe: China was on an economic upswing and more technologically ad-
ept than during its first attempt in the 1970s;10 China desired advanced space
technology for both domestic telecommunications and the military; and the
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program created a positive focal point for national pride to counter negative
1989 Tiananmen Square images.
China has not, however, sent a man into space because Jiang Zemin is a space
visionary, yearning to explore the heavens as an expression of humankind’s es-
sential nature. Jiang is a pragmatist, a skilled politician and a technocrat who as-
cended to power by maneuvering his way through the Byzantine maze of China’s
power structure. His support for the manned program—publicly evidenced by
his visit to Johnson Space Center in October 2002, his presence at the March
2003 launch of the Shenzhou III unmanned precursor, and ultimately more im-
portantly, through sustained government funding—has been a calculated risk.
Domestic pride and international prestige, economic development (including
skilled jobs and expanded science and engineering educational programs), and
dual-use technology development are all proven reasons for pursuing manned
space programs. Jiang understood that if space successes are spectacular, so too
are space failures. Not only were national goals on the line but his own position
relative to his successor as president, Hu Jintao. Failure would be devastating.
As it turned out, success may have had personal implications as well—one of
the few surprises of the carefully choreographed launch was the absence of Jiang
Zemin. Although he had been scheduled to speak to the taikonaut during the
launch and offer congratulations afterward, he was conspicuously missing from
the launch site and media events. While a disaster would have certainly reflected
poorly on Jiang, apparently being poised to accept credit, even by inference, pre-
sented issues as well for him. It was Hu Jintao at the launch site who spoke to
Yang before the launch, Hu on the phone during the flight, and Hu there to pro-
claim the mission a complete success afterward. Twice on CCTV (China Central
Television) news on the evening of the flight Hu spoke, saying that he was repre-
senting Jiang. People’s Daily reported that “in a phone call to [General] Li Jinai,
chief commander of China’s space program, Jiang said, ‘I am very happy and ex-
cited to hear that our country’s first manned space flight has turned out to be a
complete success.’”11 CCTV also showed footage of the Chinese defense minis-
ter, General Cao Gangchuan, talking to Yang in orbit. Cao too said he was repre-
senting Jiang. But it was clearly Hu that dominated the news that Wednesday
night, with CCTV airing long portions of his two speeches on the space launch.12
Jiang’s absence at the pre- and postlaunch events possibly indicated ambiguity
about how the Chinese leadership wants the launch perceived. Since Jiang’s sole
remaining formal post is that of chairman of the Communist Central Military
Commission, a visible role for him might have sent too loud a message about mili-
tary involvement. Although the Chinese want the United States to view the Chi-
nese military capabilities with respect, they do not want it to view this launch as a
threat that requires a response. But since both People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
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Generals Cao and Li were in attendance, perhaps Jiang’s absence primarily indi-
cates Jiang’s further distancing from power, pari passu with Hu’s rise.13
Pride and Prestige
The 1957 launch of Sputnik was a huge psychological boost for both the Soviet
people and the Soviet government during the Cold War, and conversely a huge
blow to both the people and the government of the United States. Pride, and a
consequent “rallying-around” in the Soviet Union after Sputnik (as experienced
as well in the United States after the Apollo moon landing), also translated into
credibility and hence governmental legitimacy. Credibility and legitimacy are im-
portant considerations in Beijing. One Chinese official stated of the Shenzhou V
launch, “This is not America where money comes from the taxpayers. This is
money of the Communist Party—they would do with it what they decide. It is
great they are investing in something that makes us proud.”14 Beijing’s interest in
manned spaceflight for reasons of domestic pride and international prestige par-
allels its interest in bringing the Olympics to Beijing in 2008. Indeed, Yang carried
an Olympic flag with him into orbit, unfurling it ceremoniously upon his return.15
Six centuries ago a Ming dynasty inventor, Wan Hu, is said to have strapped
rockets onto his chair and ordered his assistants to light them. When the smoke
cleared, Hu and the chair were, not surprisingly, gone. Yang Liwei has now joined
Wan Hu as a space hero. A statue of Yang is already planned in his home province,
Liaoning, a rust-belt region ripe for the revitalization Yang is intended to inspire.
The Shenzhou V capsule will be displayed at the Millennium Monument in Beijing,
where crowds estimated in the thousands celebrated at the time of the launch.
Most celebrations appeared largely choreographed, as opposed to the many
celebrations that spontaneously erupted when Beijing was named the 2008 Olym-
pic host city. The space mission was both an event meant to be filmed and shown
to the world, and one directed by and supported from the top levels of govern-
ment. Having planned celebrations at the Millennium Monument rather than in
Tiananmen Square also deflected comparisons with or reference to other times in
Tiananmen that were neither celebratory nor reflective of national pride and unity.
The diminutive (and now promoted) Colonel Yang’s biography reads like
“the right stuff ”—thirty-eight, college-educated, fighter pilot, selfless wife,
adoring son. He is described as having been a bright youth and a bit of a mischief
maker. In postlaunch interviews he is personable, connecting well with average peo-
ple. His political credentials must also be assumed impeccable, as he is both the new
poster boy for the Chinese leadership and the role model for China’s youth.
Launching a man into orbit is a technical feat not achieved by any of the other
regional space contenders, including Japan and India, and it carries with it
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significant leadership cachet. Officials from around the world, and particularly
the region, sent congratulatory telegrams to President Hu Jintao. In India, how-
ever, space officials downplayed the technical aspects of China’s launch, confi-
dently asserting that India could do the same if it chose to, which they said it did
not. Economics and need (what can a manned mission achieve that an un-
manned mission cannot?) were cited as reasons for that choice.16 However, In-
dian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee congratulated China on its success and
publicly encouraged Indian scientists to work toward a manned lunar mission.
“Those who wonder what could be achieved by such space missions simply want
the status quo to continue,” he proclaimed prior to the launch.17 It is unclear to
or about whom he was speaking—the rest of the world, his own scientific com-
munity, or perhaps both. Just two days after China’s taikonaut launch, India
launched into orbit its most sophisticated remote sensing satellite to date. The
lack of consequent fanfare certainly validated Beijing’s manned spaceflight ap-
proach for maximum prestige value.
Initial Japanese responses to the launch varied. Some space officials discounted
the technical significance of the event while nonetheless congratulating China.
One Japanese official spoke directly in geostrategic terms. “Japan is likely to be the
one to take the severest blow from the Chinese success. A country capable of
launching any time will have a large influence in terms of diplomacy at the United
Nations and military affairs. Moves to buy products from a country succeeding in
manned space flight may occur.”18 Space Activities Commission member Hiroki
Matsuo candidly stated that “discussions on manned space flight have long been
simmering in Japan,” and he further implied that the launch would likely trigger a
reconsideration of Japanese goals for space development. One woman on the
street was quoted in Japanese media coverage as saying, “It’s unbelievable. Japan
lost in this field.”19 While Japan’s “losing” to China through Yang’s launch was
more perception than reality, China’s success juxtaposed against power failures on
both the Japanese environmental satellite Midori-2 and its first Mars probe,
Nozomi, as well as the November launch failure of two spy satellites, has already
resulted in calls for a reexamination of the Japanese program.20
Clearly, China has established at least the perception of being the regional
technology leader, and other countries will feel some necessity to respond. Japan
and India are both technically capable of manned programs if they can muster
and sustain the political will, but that political will is often elusive in democra-
cies. Safety considerations increase the cost of a manned-rated spacecraft by a
factor of about ten. Furthermore, public opinion polls have consistently shown
that while people like the idea of manned spaceflight, they do not highly priori-
tize it compared to other concerns of government, such as schools, roads, health
care, and defense. Space is seen as relatively expendable.
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Internationally, China has joined the United States and Russia in an exclusive
club of countries capable of manned spaceflight. It has regained what it consid-
ers its rightful place among the world’s technology leaders, a place that China
claims on the basis of a long historical legacy as the country responsible for gun-
powder and fireworks. But prestige alone is insufficient for justifying the expen-
ditures inherent in a manned space program. Pragmatic domestic returns are
necessary as well.
Development
Among his other tasks as a hero, Yang is expected to stir China’s youth to pursue
educational programs in science, engineering, and technical careers, to give
them hope of someday being involved with the space program. In both the
United States and Japan, the “best and the brightest” university students are
known to join companies based on recruiters’ hype about involvement in space
programs. Though the graduates may spend their careers making washing ma-
chines, pride in association with space efforts seems relevant in both education
and career choices.
Education is important to China because a space program generally, and a
manned program specifically, fits in with Beijing’s plans for economic develop-
ment. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Europe joined the space race because it
believed that space equaled technology, technology equaled industrialization,
and industrialization equaled economic growth. China’s 2000 space white paper
expresses much the same view.
The Chinese government attaches great importance to the significant role of space
activities in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country with science and
education and that of sustainable development, as well as in economic construction,
national security, science & technology development and social progress. The devel-
opment of space activities is encouraged and supported by the government as an in-
tegral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy.21
Education is a prerequisite for building an industrial base, and development
in China requires jobs, skilled jobs. When it began Project 921 China wanted to
develop a cadre of trained engineers and scientists, and it has come a long way in
that regard. China is proud of the fact that 80 percent of the workforce involved
in that project is under forty years old, many under thirty.22
The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the or-
ganization primarily responsible for executing the manned program, employs
over 150,000 people and has 130 subordinate organizations. The size of the Chi-
nese space enterprise is not unusual. In the United States during Apollo, there
was also the expectation that the nation would not only send a man to the moon
and safely return him but do it while employing people in all fifty states.
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Although China does not have congressional pork-barrel politics to contend
with, it does have a populace of over 1.3 billion to keep employed. While many of
the large Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) are being privatized, a slow
approach is being taken, in order to balance economic efficiency with the need
to keep people working. Indeed, during a 1997 visit by the author to the Xichang
launch site, an employee mentioned that several people shared his job, impeding
his effectiveness. In some instances, that is the price paid for employment stabil-
ity and providing on-the-job experience. The more numerous the experienced
Chinese workers in skilled-labor jobs, the better the chance that the government
will be able to attract global industries and achieve economic development. Em-
ployment, attracting industry, and selling high-tech products and services, in-
cluding within the aerospace field, are all Chinese priorities. Postlaunch
comments from Yan Xuetong, a political scientist at Tsinghua University, reflect
those priorities: “Now,” he said, “people will realize that we don’t only make
clothes and shoes.”
Military Implications through Dual-Use Technology
Clear technological gains are inherent in a space program, many with spillover
advantages to the military. China is acutely aware of the military superiority of
the United States. Accordingly, like David facing Goliath, China focuses on
asymmetrical approaches for dealing with the United States, should it have to,
over issues like Taiwan. Many of those approaches include using space capabili-
ties as force multipliers, which, understandably, causes concern for the U.S. mili-
tary. China has concerns with space as well.
Militarily, China watched the United States establish space dominance in the
first Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. “We are so
dominant in space that I pity a country that would come up against us,” said Ma-
jor General Franklin Blaisdell, director of space operations for the Air Force,
eight days before IRAQI FREEDOM began.23 Indeed, the United States has made it
clear it is seeking not just space superiority but “full spectrum” space
dominance.
Politically, China has observed the rise in Washington of the “Blue Team” as a
major influence on the U.S. government’s China policy. The Blue Team began in
the late 1990s as a group of congressional staffers, think-tank analysts, and aca-
demics who vocally and voraciously viewed China as the next enemy. Many of its
members, Washington outsiders during the Clinton years, have become insiders
with the Bush administration.
In 2001, two events occurred that were critical from the Chinese perspective.
First, the United States issued the Space Commission Report, developed by a
group chaired by Donald Rumsfeld before he became secretary of defense. What
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caught the attention of the Chinese was the report’s statement that space would
inevitably become a battleground for which the United States would be remiss
not to prepare, the unspoken assumption being that preparation meant the de-
velopment of space weapons.24 Second, the United States that year held its
first-ever space war game, called SCHRIEVER I.25 In that well-publicized game,
American forces were pitted against an opponent threatening a small island
neighbor of about the size and location of Taiwan. It did not take the Chinese long
to conclude that they in turn would be remiss not to prepare for the inevitability
of U.S. development of space weapons, of which they might be the target. A Hong
Kong news service quoted a Chinese official that same year as saying, “For coun-
tries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks
and planes, attacking an American space system may be an irresistible and most
tempting choice.”26 Both China and the United States see space assets as so valu-
able to their national security equation that any advance in the capabilities of one
country is viewed by the other as not just a threat but as a setback.
Recent U.S. attention to the concept of “negation” has only increased Chinese
concerns. Negation refers to actively denying the use of space for intelligence
purposes to any other nation at any time. Because it bolsters even further the
idea of U.S. space dominance, it is not just the Chinese who are upset by this con-
cept but allies as well.27
So the question becomes, what has the Chinese military gained as a result of
its manned space efforts? One set of benefits is relatively indirect. In a 21 Octo-
ber 2003 article in People’s Daily, Zhang Qingwei, deputy commander of China’s
manned space project and president of CASC, gave specific information about
both the rocket and the capsule.28 He said that China had achieved break-
throughs in thirteen key technologies, including reentry lift control of manned
spacecraft, emergency rescue, soft landing, malfunction diagnosis, module sep-
aration, and heat prevention. Earlier Chinese publications have cited additional
areas of technical advancement, including computers, space materials, manu-
facturing technology, electronic equipment, systems integration, and testing.
Spacecraft navigation, propulsion, and life support were specifically cited for
potential application to dual-use civil/military projects.29 Moreover, the Chinese
military will benefit from experience in areas such as on-orbit maneuvering,
mission management, launch-on-demand, miniaturization, and computational
analysis. Experience extends not just to building hardware but program man-
agement and integration as well.
For the Shenzhou program, China took a workhorse Russian Soyuz design to
make its own. Both spacecraft have a service module housing the propulsion sys-
tem, a command module, and an orbital module with a docking ring. Both
Shenzhou and the Soyuz TM are capable of carrying three taikonauts/cosmonauts.
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The Shenzhou orbital module, however, has a second set of solar panels, en-
abling it to remain in orbit independently for prolonged periods. The Russians
worked closely with the Chinese, who, having no manned spaceflight experi-
ence, bought selected Russian systems, including life support (notably the pres-
surized suit worn by the taikonauts) and upgrades. However, the price was often
too high, and in some cases China built its own technology in order to under-
stand better the fundamentals involved.
Shenzhou, then, bears an uncanny resemblance to the Soyuz spacecraft;
nonetheless, differences are apparent. A chart (see table 1) published with Zhang
Qingwei’s interview with People’s Daily provides comparisons. In that interview
Zhang also suggested that Shenzhou has more in common with second-generation
spacecraft produced by both the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the
Gemini or Soviet Voskhod spacecraft, than the first-generation Mercury (or, it
could be added, Vostok). Another figure (reproduced as table 2) in People’s Daily
corroborates that view, which has been independently cited in the West as well.30
Direct military benefits for
the Chinese from expanded
space capabilities include up-
grades to their Jiquan launch
site and to their entire tracking
system.31 Further, and notwith-
standing that both the U.S. and
the Soviet militaries have been
unable to identify important
advantages of a man in space
over unmanned systems, the
Chinese seem determined to ex-
plore that premise for them-
selves, likely through the use of the orbital module at some later date.32 The
Shenzhou III precursor mission in March 2002 left its orbital module aloft,
where it remained for six months. It is believed to have carried sophisticated
electronic equipment; the Chinese stated that the equipment was an Earth-science
radiometer; others believe that the module carried a significant electronic
intelligence-collection payload.33 Shenzhou V also left its orbital module aloft,
unmanned, likely again carrying militarily relevant equipment. At some point,
the Chinese may leave a taikonaut in orbit for a period of time. Clearly, they are
intent on getting the maximum return from their investment and will explore all
potential uses of the Shenzhou hardware.
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Project Soyuz TM Shenzhou
Launch mass (T) 7 7.8
Maximum cabin
diameter (m)
2.2 2.5
Reentry mode Semi-ballistic Lifting
Precision of landing site Circle with a radius
smaller than 30 km
Theoretical deviation
15 km ±9 km
Reentry overload peak (g) 3–4 3.24
TABLE 1
COMPARISON BETWEEN “SOYUZ TM” AND “SHENZHOU”
Source: “Advantages of ‘Shenzhou’ Spacecraft, ‘Long-March’ Carrier Rocket,” People’s Daily, 21
October 2003.
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POSTLAUNCH OBSERVATIONS
Together, all of these factors make manned space a high-yield program for the
Chinese. The Chinese realize that seeking parity with the United States in space
technology is unreal-
istic. They are, how-
ever, determined not
to allow the technology
gap to grow any fur-
ther; Program 921 is
part of that effort. In
the short term, the re-
turns they have reaped
have clearly met their
expectations (the only
disappointment being
that Yang was unable to
see the Great Wall from
space). It is the longer term for which experts and pundits both inside and outside
China are now making “best guesses.”
A clue regarding what the Chinese would like from the United States in re-
sponse to their taikonaut launch is the docking ring on the Shenzhou orbital
module. That ring technically enables the Shenzhou to dock with either the
space shuttle or the International Space Station (ISS). The ISS has been a partic-
ular thorn in the side of the Chinese. According to the NASA website, “The ISS
continues the largest scientific cooperative program in history, drawing on the
resources and scientific expertise of 16 nations.” While inability to provide a
meaningful contribution might previously have been enough to justify China’s
exclusion from that collaboration, it did not stop American cooperation with
other, often developing, countries where political benefits were considered sub-
stantial. Shenzhou V has now demonstrated China’s ability to contribute to
manned spaceflight programs. The only remaining “glitch” is politics.
The U.S. Reaction
While the rest of the world immediately heaped praise on China after the launch,
the United States was more circumspect. Bill Nelson (a Democrat from Florida,
and in 1986 a space shuttle astronaut) offered congratulations “on behalf of the
Senate” during the flight: “My hope is that China will become a partner in our
ongoing international efforts, such as the International Space Station, to make
technological advances and to help solve mysteries of outer space.”34 NASA Ad-
ministrator Sean O’Keefe also sent his congratulations to China that day, calling
J O H N S O N - F R E E S E 1 3 1
Project Mercury Vostok Shenzhou
Launch mass (T) Around 1.4 Around 4.7 7.8
Maximum cabin
diameter (m)
1.8 2.3 2.5
Reentry mode Ballistic Ballistic Lifting
Power Storage
battery
Storage battery Solar cell array
Structure
Cabin, brak-
ing module
Reentry module,
instrument module
Attached section, orbital
module, reentry module,
propelling module
TABLE 2
FIRST U.S., CHINESE, AND SOVIET SPACECRAFT:
MAIN TECHNOLOGICAL INDEXES
Source: “Advantages of ‘Shenzhou’ Spacecraft, ‘Long-March’ Carrier Rocket,” People’s Daily, 21 October 2003.
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the event “an important achievement in the history of human exploration.” He
went on to say, “The Chinese people have a long and distinguished history of ex-
ploration” and that “NASA wishes China a continued safe human space flight
program.” Chinese-American astronaut Edward Lu wished Yang Liwei well, in
Chinese, from the ISS.
However, not everyone reacted either as quickly or enthusiastically. Reticence
about congratulating the Chinese on space achievements is linked to anticipated
issues associated with potentially lifting the current ban on launching American
satellites on Chinese rockets. The ban was imposed subsequent to the Cox Com-
mittee Report of May 1999 (issued by the House Select Committee on U.S. Na-
tional Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic
of China) on purported Chinese acquisition of American technology in a num-
ber of sensitive areas, including nuclear weapons, high-performance computers,
and missile and space systems. Congressman Christopher Cox’s committee had
focused in part on accident reports on a series of Chinese launch failures involv-
ing U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s.35 The aftereffects of that report continue to
fuel American reluctance to engage in cooperative space activities with China.
As for President Bush, in remarks to the press on 19 October 2003 at the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Thailand, he announced, “I
congratulated China on its recent space launch.” President Bush had spoken to
President Hu at a meeting that day in which he focused on fair trade, the global
war on terrorism, and North Korea.36 The letter of congratulations delivered to
President Hu reads:
On behalf of the American people, I congratulate you and the Chinese people on the
successful completion of China’s first human space mission. I was pleased to learn
that Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei returned safely to earth. This mission was an his-
toric triumph for the Chinese people and a milestone in the continued exploration of
space. The United States of America warmly welcomes the People’s Republic of
China’s achievement in becoming only the third country to launch an astronaut into
space, and wishes you continued success in this endeavor.37
It is interesting to compare President Bush’s polite and generic congratula-
tions of 19 October to the effusive and specific telegram sent by Russian Presi-
dent Putin the day after the launch.38
Please accept our most sincere congratulations in connection with the historic event
in China’s life—the first spaceflight of a Chinese cosmonaut. This is a worthy and
weighty outcome of the efforts that the people of China have been making for many
years, and of your country’s successful advancement along the road of comprehen-
sive development and transformation of your country into a modern state of world-
wide dimension. We are confident that China’s full-fledged membership of the
family of space powers will serve the cause of securing peace, security and stability on
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Earth, development of science and technology, and progress of planet Earth’s civili-
zation. Russian-Chinese space cooperation is an important trend in bilateral rela-
tions. It is making progress, it has good prospects for the future and, undoubtedly, it
will bear more fruit for the benefit of our nations. Please pass our congratulations
and good wishes to all those who contributed to the project to build a manned space-
craft and, of course, to the first Chinese cosmonaut.39
Putin here calls China a modern state and a full-fledged member of the interna-
tional space community, and seeks extended bilateral space cooperation. The
United States, in contrast, is ambivalent about congratulating a communist gov-
ernment and welcoming China to the international space family.
The pictures presented to the world on 15 October 2003 were of a smiling
Yang Liwei and the Shenzhou V capsule successfully returning from orbit. The
images were not only peaceful but contrasted starkly with the U.S. situation at
the time—the shuttle still grounded, leaving the United States reliant on the
Russians to ferry crews and supplies to the International Space Station, and the
American space community still waiting for the high-level space directive prom-
ised when the Columbia investigation concluded.
Not since President John F. Kennedy and the Apollo program has the United
States had a real space vision or NASA a clearly defined mission. Presidential
tapes released in 2001 evidenced to a surprised American public what the space
policy community had long known—that even Kennedy was not an inspired vi-
sionary regarding space but a pragmatist using space as a Cold War tool capable
of yielding returns in multiple areas. Without a justifying reason, usually tied to
foreign policy or strategic posturing, manned spaceflight is an orphan. The
Clinton administration utilized manned space as a way to build bridges with
Russia after the Cold War and to keep large numbers of Soviet rocket/missile en-
gineers employed and out of the international job market. Hence, the American
and Russian manned space programs were merged.
So, did the Shenzhou V launch catapult the Chinese past the United States in
space? No. In terms of technology and potential, the United States holds unquali-
fied first place. Indeed the U.S. military space assets and capabilities are far ahead
of everyone else’s. A May 2003 report from the Council on Foreign Relations
stated that China is at least two decades behind the United States in military tech-
nology and ability.40 A U.S. military report issued in July 2003 predicted that it will
be 2010–20 before the Chinese manned program is likely even to begin to contrib-
ute to improved military space systems.41 Constrained economic resources signifi-
cantly limit Chinese activities in space, manned or otherwise.
Perceptions of a U.S. decline in space capabilities are usually based on two
premises: that the United States no longer has the capability to reach the moon
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and is now limited to low-Earth orbit, and that the Chinese have independently
achieved success with their manned space program. True, the United States no
longer has the capability for a manned moon mission. That is because the Amer-
ican public—without a strategic vision, pragmatic or otherwise—has not seen it
as a priority, and elected politicians understand that. Generally speaking, one of
the strengths of democracy is that the people get what they ask for, and in the
United States that has not included manned spaceflight. The independent Chi-
nese success is attributable to a conservative, incremental program, with the
benefit of starting farther up the learning curve than the United States and Rus-
sia before it, and of sustained top-level political and economic support.
Working alone was in part a matter of choice, and in part the result of China’s
early exclusion from cooperative American outreach programs for historical
reasons ranging from Mao’s outrageous statements on the viability of nuclear
war to the Cultural Revolution, human rights, and Tiananmen Square. That ex-
clusion has been perpetuated by a combination of factors, including the overall
status of U.S.-China political relations; the penchant of the Chinese for secrecy
and their disinclination for reciprocal information sharing; the fact that the
Chinese program was a completely military enterprise until 1998; and residual
issues and attitudes from the Cox Committee Report. Further, until recently
there was a strong feeling that China did not have much to offer in terms of ei-
ther money or space technology.
The bottom line is that American space capabilities have not declined but that
the United States has chosen to put its money and efforts elsewhere. In areas re-
lated to the military, U.S. capabilities have significantly increased. In other areas,
the nation has simply changed direction—which can be considered good or bad,
depending on perspective.
Shenzhou VI
Immediately following the triumphant return of Yang Liwei, the Chinese an-
nounced that a Shenzhou VI launch, carrying three taikonauts, would likely follow
“within a year or two.”Although the interim is longer than some people, including
this author, anticipated, it is really not surprising. More than anything else, eco-
nomics will drive the Chinese timetable. There are, however, other factors as well.
Domestically, the Chinese want time for celebration. Yang Liwei is a hero, and
a hero needs to be seen and made known. A special trip to Hong Kong was ar-
ranged for him, to do more “rallying” there. Before dimming his status by pro-
moting a successor, the Chinese government wants to take full advantage of the
hero worship and credit by association.
Externally, this period also provides China time to trawl for new partnerships
of all types. Europe will likely be a main target. On 14 October 2003, the day
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before the launch, China published a strategic policy paper stating that the Eu-
ropean Union is the world’s rising superpower, poised to overtake both the
United States and Japan as the biggest trade and investment force in China.42 For
their part, Europe is likely to welcome the Chinese. On launch day, the director-
general of the European Space Agency (ESA) sent the warmest possible congrat-
ulations to China, declaring that the “mission could open a new era of wider
cooperation in the world’s space community.”43 On a broader basis, closer ties
with China benefit countries like France and Germany not only for the potential
lucrative market they offer but as a potential combined strategic counterweight
to American power, which is seen in Europe since Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as
increasingly unilateral.44
Finally, China is in no hurry. The fifteenth of October 2003 is a significant mile-
stone in an already long and eventful history—and although the Chinese have no
election cycles to consider, politicians are always anxious to rest on their laurels.
Secrecy versus Publicity
Commentaries before and after the launch of Shenzhou V described China as
having taken a “clandestine approach” to space.45 That impression has been re-
flected elsewhere as well. Indeed it is because of the obfuscation that has been the
Chinese pattern, modeled after their former Soviet mentors, that this author’s
own 1998 book on the Chinese space program is subtitled “A Mystery within a
Maze.”46 But for many who have followed the program over time, quite contrary
characterizations come to mind about this launch—such as, “amazingly open.”
For months prior, China was uncharacteristically and refreshingly open with
information. Websites were opened, glossy images were released and mass-
distributed, and press releases abounded.
The reason for China’s uncharacteristic approach is simple—you cannot get
publicity without publicity, and you cannot sell products without advertising.
To be seen as a country capable of potentially both selling space hardware and
producing assorted high-tech goods for the world, China must change its image.
This event was expected to go a long way in that regard. After the commercial
launch failures in the 1990s involving launchers from the same Long March fam-
ily that carried the Shenzhou V aloft, China very much wanted and needed to re-
establish the Long March reputation for reliability, and Yang’s launch certainly
provided a highly visible opportunity.
When the Chinese first announced they would broadcast the launch live on
CCTV and then backpedaled “on the advice of space experts,”Chinese Internet chat
rooms buzzed with complaints, which were reported in the People’s Liberation Army
Daily newspaper.47 Chinese citizens wanted to watch the launch broadcast live, and
they let those feelings be known. Such open discontent greatly differs from what
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would have been possible in China ten years ago and appears to represent a crack in
the government stranglehold on information technology and expressions of public
opinion. The decision not to go with a live broadcast was, however, not surprising.
The inherent technical risks of space flight are substantial, and the subsequent
risks to the Chinese leadership outweighed the payoff of a live broadcast. Once
Yang—whose selection was not finalized until sixteen hours prior to liftoff and
whose identity was not known until launch—was off the ground, coverage picked
up almost immediately. If China broadcasts live and allows foreign reporters at
Jiquan for the next event, that will be an indication of Chinese confidence in its
technology and its people.
Image Issues
The launch followed on the heels of a critical plenary session of the Communist
Party Central Committee in Beijing. At that meeting a wide-ranging economic
reform package designed to ease China into a full market economy was en-
dorsed; it was seen as the beginning of Hu’s personal stamp on the government,
and of his consolidation of power. The high-tech nature of the program fits
closely with the new image Hu wants to promote of China as a modern, “wired”
country, and it fits in as well with China’s new, urban image of itself.
Sound bites on the “socialist market economy” are provided to the urban
population that has moved rapidly from waving little red books in Tiananmen
Square to logging-on in Internet cafes. The Chinese “get” globalization—for six
months in 2001, the best-selling book in China was How to Get Your Child into
Harvard.48 The launch of Yang Liwei very much kept with this new image and di-
rectly linked it to the Communist Party. The message—that China is good, pow-
erful, and modern—was consistently conveyed throughout the launch.
Internationally and regionally the spillover was considerable, perhaps even
more than China had hoped for.
During his flight Yang displayed miniature flags of both China and the United
Nations. The latter was clearly a political message. The United Nations has long
advocated exploration of space “for the good of all mankind,” so in this way
China was reaching out to developing countries in particular. It also symboli-
cally acknowledged the role of the UN in global affairs, at a time when the
United States was perceived as ignoring wishes of the UN in Iraq.
One point that clearly posed a dilemma for Beijing was how much to play up
the military significance of the flight. The peaceful nature of the program’s pur-
poses was consistently stressed. Nonetheless, Hu Jintao at one point called Yang
Liwei a “warrior,” and several officials and media reports chose to juxtapose
Yang’s flight with the Chinese development of the atomic bomb, missiles, and sat-
ellites. Indeed, Chinese officials proudly pointed out that Yang’s launch had
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occurred thirty-nine years to the day after China exploded its first atomic bomb.49
Further, high-level PLA officers were visible throughout the mission, and it was
General Li Jinai who officially ordered then Lieutenant Colonel Yang to depart.
China is also walking an image tightrope with respect to economics. While
wanting to be seen as the regional technology leader, China reaps pragmatic ad-
vantages from being considered a developing country. The ambiguity became
apparent when a Japanese foreign ministry official raised postlaunch questions
about why Japan was providing developmental assistance to a country with such
advanced technological capability.50
At the Bangkok APEC meeting three days after the launch, President Hu gra-
ciously accepted warm congratulations on Yang’s flight, an achievement that
played into China’s shifting regional image. China’s reputation was changing
from that of regional bully to potential leader. One prominent Thai business-
man was quoted in the New York Times as saying, “The perception is that China
is trying to do its best to please, assist, [and] accommodate its neighbors while
the U.S. is perceived as a country involved more and more on its own foreign
policy agenda, and strong-arming everyone onto that agenda.”51 The Chinese
appear increasingly interested in balancing perceptions of unilateral strength
with those of multilateral cooperation.
Technology Achievements versus Scientific Leaps
The Chinese success in launching and bringing back a taikonaut does not repre-
sent a quantum leap in science. Textbooks have taught the basics of rocket sci-
ence for fifty-plus years. What the Chinese have demonstrated is a maturing of
their own rocket engineering skills. Rocket engineering is basically a matter of
close attention to thousands of minute details required to make an ultracomplex
system work the first time and every time. More rockets today fail from human
error than faulty designs. The Chinese recognize both the inherent dangers of
spaceflight and the fact that “a tiniest mistake might lead to total failure.”52 The
success of the Chinese in rocket engineering is an achievement, even a break-
through, for them, but that success does not equate to ability to leapfrog past
American capabilities.
The Chinese are acutely aware of their dependence on others for certain sci-
entific “core techniques.” A postlaunch article in People’s Daily pointed out that
China is considered “with Brazil and India, in the ‘marginal countries in science’
which ranks at the fourth layer among the ‘core countries in science,’ ‘powerful
countries in science’ and ‘under-developed in science.’”53 Obviously that is not
where it wants to be, and they are relying heavily on space to push China up the
science learning curve, as it has done for other countries.
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Docking is expected to be China’s next major area of space activity. China
needs to perfect orbital docking technologies and procedures (like space walks)
needed to place a space laboratory in orbit. That space lab is step two in China’s
announced three-step manned program, the third being an orbiting space sta-
tion. The Chinese have stated that they are anticipating a smaller space station
than Mir or ISS; they will likely build incrementally on orbital modules capable
of independent spaceflight.
Manned missions to both the moon and Mars, though ambitiously laid out,
are still officially spoken of in terms of “international” missions. On 29 Novem-
ber 2003 Luan Enjie, director of the Chinese National Aerospace Bureau, pre-
dicted, “By 2020, we will achieve visiting the moon”; commentators noted as
important his use of a verb specifically connoting a human act.54 However, noth-
ing has been unambiguously announced or put in writing. Perhaps to inspire
others, mention is sometimes also made of mining helium-3 as an energy re-
source.55 China will be careful, however, not to overcommit early, not to state
goals it will be unable to meet, and thereby set itself up for high-profile failure.
Problems and indeed catastrophic failure must be anticipated by Beijing.
They, like Washington and Moscow, have little choice but to try to prepare their
public for such events and convince them in advance that when they occur, the
appropriate response will be to identify the problem, fix it, and move on.
Space on the Cheap
Prelaunch estimates had placed expenditures by the Chinese at between $1.4
and $2.2 million. Those numbers, however, are relatively meaningless, for
several reasons. First, there are issues of currency conversion and the low
“cost” figures for manufacturing and wages characteristic of an at least partly
command economy. Additionally, the Chinese space research and develop-
ment sector is generally unified with that of the military, and military expendi-
tures are underestimated. Expenditures on manned spaceflight are therefore
difficult to isolate and probably undervalued. After the Shenzhou V launch, Xie
Mingbao, chief engineer for the manned space program, put the total program
cost at eighteen billion yuan, or $3.15 billion. Of that, he said, only one billion
yuan had been for nonreusable equipment.56 It is unclear, however, if his fig-
ures include such expenditures as those required for the tremendous
prelaunch construction and expansion at Base 20, the East Wind launch site at
Jiquan.57 “Creative” accounting, problematic enough in U.S. space programs
like the shuttle, seems even more likely in China, rendering the accuracy and
comparative value of official numbers dubious.
Still, one of the few questions that the Chinese launch immediately provoked
in the United States was why the Americans cannot “do space” on a keep-it-simple,
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keep-it-cheap basis like the Chinese. The question raises the very real issue of
balancing the desire to develop more technology beyond current capabilities—a
reusable spaceplane, for example—with the need to work more cost-efficiently—
using, say, simple, man-rated capsules.58
WHAT LIES AHEAD?
Justifiably, China is encouraged by its success, and it will continue its manned-
space efforts, for all the positive reasons already discussed. China also hopes for
changes in its favor on the geostrategic Wei Qi board, now that it has joined the
exclusive “club of three.” In interviews between the author and China Radio and
Chinese print media, general questions about the U.S. attitude toward Yang
Liwei’s flight quickly led to specific ones about how the launch might influence
the administration, Congress, and the Pentagon in their dealings with China on
issues like cooperation and export controls. Understanding the resistance to
change in such perceptions, China has hedged its bets by continuing to remind
the United States of its increasing technical capabilities in the military realm. In
a 23 October 2003 People’s Liberation Army Daily article entitled “Space Is the
Commanding Point for the Information Battlefield,” “information warfare” and
“space supremacy” were cited as the key components of China’s battlefield “su-
premacy theory.” Cognizant that it is unable to match American capabilities,
China continues to focus on countering the ability of a potential adversary—
such as the United States—to employ fully its space assets. Clearly, the next move
goes to the United States.
At the time of the Shenzhou V launch the United States had yet to decide what
role, if any, manned space played in its own geostrategic plans. With regard to
military space, however, the United States is neither undecided nor ambiguous
in its goal—full-spectrum dominance. While that ambition offers the United
States substantial strategic advantages, it also creates risks by impelling others to
counter those advantages. China is considered the country with the highest po-
tential desire and capability to counter U.S. space advantages. Because space is
considered so critical to the futures of both countries, each considers it a
zero-sum game, triggering an action-reaction cycle that threatens to escalate
into an arms race of technology and countermeasure development.
While the United States can technologically mitigate some of the perceived
risks from Chinese activities, others are better abated by political and diplomatic
measures, or by proactive “shaping” to channel them into directions favorable to
U.S. interests. For example, restricting Chinese access to Galileo navigation
codes is out of the technical reach of the United States. Currently, however,
Washington is not attempting to shape Chinese space activities through cooper-
ation. While other countries, especially European countries, are trying to coax
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China into further opening the door to meaningful information sharing and co-
operation in areas of mutual interest, the United States has remained
intransigent.
Apparently, since rumors of consideration of a reinvigorated U.S. manned
space effort began within two months of the successful Chinese launch, Wash-
ington realized that “doing nothing” was not an option. If the United States ig-
nored the Chinese launch, China would simply seek out and likely find other
countries more favorably disposed to working with it. That would leave the
United States in the seeming position of having been “caught,” if not overtaken,
by the Chinese in a manned space race driven by public perceptions, as well as
the very real likelihood of more unwanted partnerships, of the Galileo variety,
between China and third nations or groups, with the United States increasingly
the odd man out. Although the American public was apathetic about Yang
Liwei’s flight, the fickle nature of the public meant that could change. If the Chi-
nese continued with manned space activity and the United States continued on
an ambivalent path, the latter would eventually have to decide if it were comfort-
able with an overall first place in space but gold medals for China in manned
space exploration and development. China’s technology would not have out-
paced that of the United States, but its sustained political commitment would
have. With the status quo not being an option, the relevance of how the United
States would reinvigorate its program becomes critical. Simply announcing in-
tent says little, as the devil is always in the details.
The United States can declare a space race, unilaterally developing a
long-awaited manned program to return to the moon or a manned Mars mis-
sion, or some combination of the two. However, it is unlikely that the ISS
partners would support a program developed without their input; in fact,
their post–Shenzhou V congratulatory messages, especially those of Russia and
Europe, suggest that they would support no program that excluded the Chinese.
Further, the continuing financial and technical problems of the still-incomplete
ISS make it unlikely that its sponsors will be anxious to commit themselves, even
if invited, to an expanded manned program. ISS is struggling. Debate followed
the 20 October 2003 arrival of the fresh crew at the station when it was disclosed
that some NASA staff felt the station unsafe, because air, water, and radiation
monitors, medical devices, and some other systems were ailing or broken. NASA
management itself declared the overall station safe, at least temporarily. Clearly,
however, ISS needs immediate attention and possibly additional funding.
The benefits to the United States of a competitive approach are the same
kinds it enjoyed earlier with Apollo—prestige, technology development, and
jobs in aerospace. At the risk of losing face and allowing the technology gap to
grow, China would be pushed to put more money into its manned program and
1 4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:29:56 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
144
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss2/1
at a faster rate than it would otherwise have, thereby diverting it from military
programs. It would be the equivalent of forcing the Soviet Union to spend
money to counter Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) technology. There
are three drawbacks to this approach: Can the United States afford this kind of a
program and maintain the requisite political will to fund it through completion?
Is this really the best long-term strategy for long-term U.S.-China relations?
Does, finally, the United States want to reinforce the view that it prefers
unilateralism to multilateralism?
It can be argued that the United States does not really need to stay the course
and bring a new space race to a conclusion; the Star Wars program was never
completed but still significantly impacted the Soviet Union. But to start with
anything less than full commitment sets up the program for failure. U.S. history
is replete with visions and programs set forth from podiums and later forgotten.
Further, programs are funded in support of policies. Historically, programs sup-
porting policies primarily addressing political competition stand on tenuous
ground. Apollo was such a program; when the policy of political competition
with the Soviets changed, the reason for the program vanished, and its funding
became precarious. Indeed, the last planned Apollo missions were canceled,
even though prior missions had been astounding technical successes. From the
Apollo and post-Apollo programs to Star Wars, the national aerospace plane to,
unfortunately, the International Space Station, success has often been defined in
terms other than program completion or potential for developmental
follow-on.
Chinese officials often state that they will take an approach to space designed
for long-term development and infrastructure, rather than one based on the
Apollo model, which they characterize as visiting the moon and then abandon-
ing the effort. Any new manned space program undertaken by the United States
ought to be part of a continuing plan for development, not one with primarily
short-term political goals. That being the case, the desire and ability to carry the
economic burden alone must be considered. With a rising deficit, eighty-seven
billion dollars as the first rebuilding bill in Iraq, an economy still in recovery, and
the ongoing costs of the war on terrorism, that the American people would be
willing to pay the entire bill for a manned space exploration program—no mat-
ter how much they conceptually liked it—is doubtful. As pointed out, manned
space has been consistently viewed by the public as a good thing to do but low on
the list of funding priorities.
Although wrapping a manned space program within a larger strategic vision
is important and useful, political competition as a basis for that vision offers
short-term motivation rather than long-term staying power, unless a race with
China is in the best interests of the United States. But if spending the Soviets into
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bankruptcy unquestionably played a role in the fall of communism in the USSR,
the subsequent years of near state failure in Russia were in the interest of no one,
nor would it be to repeat the experience in China. If China as an economically
developing state is threatening to the United States, a China near implosion
would likely be even more threatening. Finally, a competitive approach would
unnecessarily and undesirably feed into the pervasive perception of the United
States pursuing a course of imperial unilateralism.
The other alternative focuses on cooperation as the strategic vision, and the
how option. It is imperative that policy makers consider what has brought the
United States success in shaping programs, and what has (most often uninten-
tionally) pushed countries into directions later regretted—such as the develop-
ment of the European Ariane rocket after the United States declined to launch
two European experimental communications technology satellites in order to
avoid competition with the U.S. communications satellite industry. The United
States has a long and productive tradition of international cooperation in space.
Especially in the areas of space science and remote sensing, the United States has
historically viewed space as an opportunity to build bridges with countries while
simultaneously co-opting them into working on areas of its choice rather than
areas not to its liking. Cooperation is clearly the better option with China too—
starting slow, perhaps in space science projects or environmental monitoring,
but leading toward a larger role for the Chinese in a renewed strategic vision for
manned exploration and development, as long as reciprocity and transparency
are maintained.
Specifically, a U.S. proposal for a multilateral review and expansion of
manned space exploration, from ISS to perhaps a lunar and even Mars mission,
on an incremental and inclusive basis, would allow the United States to revitalize
its manned space program and space leadership and to influence the future di-
rection of the Chinese space program as well. This option would both counter
the prevailing view of a unilateralist American geostrategic approach and allow
for a paced, infrastructure development–focused approach without taking on
unrealistic budget burdens. While there is the risk that international politics will
intrude over time, it is counterbalanced by the vested interest in system stability
such a program would give participants.
There would be resistance. Speaking at a meeting of the Space Frontier Con-
ference in Los Angeles a few days before the Shenzhou V launch, for example,
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, a California Republican, called the mission a
“disgrace,” citing China’s poor human rights record and charges that China’s
space program and military applications had benefited from sensitive technolo-
gies supplied by American companies. Isolating China, however, reinforces a
Chinese stance counterproductive to U.S. interests, as a world without China is
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simply not possible for the United States. American and Chinese interests fre-
quently overlap—on North Korea and the global war on terror, for example, not
to mention economics. While the U.S.-China trade deficit looms large in bilat-
eral relations, even that represents engagement between the two countries that
cannot be ignored and is indeed likely to expand. Further, other countries are
clearly interested in working with China on space, regardless of the American
stance. Therefore, the United States can either be involved and retain some mea-
sure of control through leadership, or watch from the sidelines.
The United States has an opportunity to step in, much as it did with Russia af-
ter the fall of the Soviet Union, and use space cooperation to its advantage.
Bringing China incrementally into the larger international family of space-faring
nations, to include eventually International Space Station participation and po-
tentially even more, would not force the ISS partners to choose between working
with China or the United States. Cooperation would tend to generate support
for an international lunar or Mars mission, and it would establish the United
States as the multinational mission leader. The United States should craft a new
directive for the American space program, one based on the inclusion of other
countries. An inclusive vision will give the nation an opportunity to assume the
mantle of leadership in a mission that could inspire the world. On the larger,
geostrategic Wei Qi board, cooperation is the best position for the United States
and the future.
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THE SUBMARINE, 1776–1918
Frank Uhlig, Jr.
When, on 11 April 1900, the U.S. Navy bought the Holland, named for itsdesigner, that little submarine joined a fleet consisting of two armored
cruisers, six monitors, seven first and second-class battleships, and seventeen
each of protected cruisers, gunboats, and torpedo boats. At sixty-four tons the
Holland was not the smallest vessel then possessed by
the Navy, but at fifty-four feet it was the shortest.
Though many of the ships in the not-very-old and
not-very-large U.S. fleet of 1900 would last for years
afterward (the Holland would not be among them), all
would be obsolete when the “Great War” broke out
only fourteen years later. So would all those ships still
being built in 1900, and all those yet only concepts—
and not only in the U.S. Navy but in all navies. Tech-
nology was moving swiftly.
Among those types of warship that made up the
American fleet at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, the submarine alone would survive until the be-
ginning of the twenty-first century. In what size,
shape, or any other particular the submarine will
make it into the second half of this century, we cannot
know, but we can be confident that survive it will.
The submarine would prove itself to be a revolu-
tionary instrument of naval war. But the submarine
was not the only such instrument of war to appear at
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that time. Within less than five years two other instruments of similar import to
those concerned with the struggle for mastery of the sea would make their ap-
pearance. In 1899 the Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi demonstrated, first to
the British and then to the U.S. Navy, the practicality of wireless radio communi-
cations both between ships at sea and between ships and shore. No one needed
to tell the navies the value of this. In the U.S. Navy alone, by the end of 1904 there
were fifty-nine radio sets in use afloat and ashore. During the Russo-Japanese
War, which began that year, both sides used radio; in addition, the Russians en-
gaged in communications intelligence.1
Meanwhile, in December 1903 two Ohio bicycle manufacturers, Wilbur and
Orville Wright, were to show the world that manned, powered, controlled flight
in a craft heavier than air was another practical thing. The first use of such a
practical thing in war took place in Libya in 1911 during an Italian war against
the Ottoman Empire. The first naval use was by the Americans at Vera Cruz,
Mexico, in April 1914.2
Both electrical communications over a distance and manned flight had had
long histories before Marconi and the Wright Brothers demonstrated their
achievements. It was in 1844 that Samuel F. B. Morse began to communicate via
telegraph between Washington and Baltimore. By then men had been flying—in
balloons—for years. The first
manned flight, by the Montgolfier
brothers, over Paris, took place in
1783. Manned flight it was, but it
was barely controlled by those on
board, for they were lifted by hot
air and driven by the wind. Submarines also underwent a long history of devel-
opment before John Holland could demonstrate to the U.S. Navy that he had a
reliable warship, able at its captain’s command to move, steer, shoot, submerge,
and surface.
For more than a century before the Holland’s time, inventors, not often with
naval help, had been trying to develop a practical submarine. One of the earliest
such was David Bushnell of Connecticut, who in 1776, before there was a United
States, built a balloon-shaped undersea craft, the Turtle, which was driven by a
hand-cranked propeller. The craft’s one-man volunteer crew, Sergeant Ezra Lee,
attacked HMS Eagle, a sixty-four-gun ship of the line then at anchor in New
York Harbor. The weapon was a time bomb that Lee was to screw into the ship’s
bottom. Unfortunately for both Bushnell and Lee, the latter found it impossible
to fasten his weapon to the Eagle’s bottom. Both the Eagle and the Turtle sur-
vived their brief encounter unharmed.
U H L I G 1 4 7
Germany edged toward ordering its submarine
captains to torpedo without warning any ship,
regardless of flag or nature, that came within
their sight.
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Eighty-eight years later, in 1864, eight Southern volunteers, commanded by a
Confederate army officer, all of whom were trying hard to put an end to the
United States, used another hand-cranked undersea craft, the cigar-shaped
Hunley, to attack the wooden screw sloop USS Housatonic, anchored on block-
ade duty off Charleston, South Carolina. Their weapon was a spar torpedo, a
ninety-pound charge at the end of a long pole jutting forward from the Hunley’s
bow. Unlike Lee, not only did they sink their intended victim but they sank with
it, perishing to a man.
By the end of the nineteenth century several countries, including Spain and
France, had built some marginally successful submarines. The designers’ chief
advances had been to abandon reliance on propulsion by quickly exhausted men
in favor of machine-driven propellers, and to replace time bombs and spar tor-
pedoes with the newly developed “fish” torpedo. This weapon was developed by
Robert Whitehead, an English inventor working in Trieste, the main seaport of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After being expelled from a tube the torpedo
would swim under its own power toward its intended victim, which, upon being
struck, presumably would sink.
In the nineteenth century both commercial vessels and warships left sail be-
hind as soon as possible, replacing it with coal-fired boilers and reciprocating
engines. The first machine-powered submarines were among those steamships.
But steam, with its need for air intakes and smokestacks, among other character-
istics, was useful for submarines only when they were surfaced. Though it could
deliver not much speed and less endurance, the newly developed electric storage
battery was the only practical means of propelling the submarine when
submerged.
Half a century and more would pass before anyone would develop a better so-
lution to the problem of submerged propulsion, but for surface work the gaso-
line engine, another late-nineteenth-century invention, had clear advantages
over steam, for it needed neither boiler nor smokestack, and its fuel supply could
be kept in tanks. It was gasoline that propelled the Holland and many another of
the early-twentieth-century submarines. Gasoline carried with it mortal dan-
gers, for its vapors were both poisonous and subject to sudden explosions. Still,
it permitted the submarine to dive much more swiftly than the steam engine did,
thus potentially saving the crew in wartime from death by gunfire or ramming.3
Probably John Holland’s biggest step ahead of other submarine designers was
that he provided his craft with diving planes so that, for the first time, a subma-
rine’s officers and men had positive control over their craft’s vertical move-
ments. It was this quality that put Holland’s boat and its new owner, the U.S.
Navy, in the van of submarine development. As a British submarine officer, Vice
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Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, was to write in 1967, America was “the true home of
the submarine.”4
Nearly a century before the Holland’s arrival on the scene, Sir John Jervis, Lord
St. Vincent and First Lord of the Admiralty, opposed in 1804 the support given by
the prime minister, William Pitt the Younger, to a proposal by an American inven-
tor, Robert Fulton, to build a submarine for Britain to use in its seemingly endless
war against the French Revolution and then Napoleon. Pitt, he said, “was the
greatest fool that ever existed to encourage a mode of war which those who com-
manded the sea did not want, and which, if successful, would deprive them of it.”5
St. Vincent’s view prevailed over that of the prime minister. Robert Fulton was
out of luck. But St. Vincent, already recognized as a superb combat commander
and commander in chief, showed himself in this moment—though not in this
moment alone—a fine strategic thinker. He also showed himself a man with a
clear sense of the potential course of a nascent technology. Britain’s decision to do
nothing to encourage the development of the submarine was sound policy, and,
with some wavering in the 1880s, it remained in effect for ninety-six years.
By 1900 the time to replace that policy had come. In 1898 Britain, the world’s
greatest naval power, and France, the world’s second such power, had nearly
gone to war after a lapse of nearly a century, this time over clashing colonial am-
bitions in Africa. French naval maneuvers that year had shown that despite their
many imperfections, submarines might indeed deprive Britain of its command
of the seas, at least off the enemy’s coast. Thus, in order to learn all it could about
submarines, in 1900 the Admiralty ordered five for its own fleet—113-tonners, to
be almost identical to the seven A-class boats (SS 2 through SS 8) John Holland
had designed for the U.S. Navy.6
Political changes in the first fourteen years of the twentieth century were as
radical as those in technology. Though many individuals were involved, their
chief instigator was the German emperor Wilhelm II. Largely owing to that un-
suitable ruler’s words and actions, and those of the men he chose to hold high of-
fice under him, Germany, once Britain’s friend, had become not only its rival for
commercial and naval supremacy at sea but its potential enemy ashore. As a con-
sequence, Britain began to extend the hand of friendship to its old foe, France,
the revenge-seeking enemy of Germany. It even accepted France’s alliance with
imperial Russia, a loathed tyranny that for long had been Britain’s opponent in
an often obscure struggle for influence in Central Asia. But France and Russia,
the second and third naval powers in 1900, had by 1914 fallen to fifth and seventh
place respectively. The Germans had risen to second place, the Americans to third,
and the Japanese to fourth. Italy and Austria-Hungary were sixth and eighth.
France’s need above all for a strong army was the main reason its navy had
fallen so badly; the Russian navy had fallen because in war against Japan (1904–
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1905) it had been beaten soundly. In any case, neither France nor Russia was
likely to have kept its place in the face of the ambitious German (and, for a few
years, the American) building program. Still, the world’s second and third navies
together would not quite have matched the British numerically, for in modern,
battle-worthy ships—that is, in general, those built after the commissioning of
HMS Dreadnought in 1906—by 1914 the German fleet was about 60 percent as
large as the British, and the American fleet about half the size of the German.7
By 1914 all those navies had submarines, and none more than the British. Ac-
cording to Paul G. Halpern’s A Naval History of World War I, Britain had seventy-
three. Its allies, France and Russia, had fifty-five and twenty-two respectively.
Germany had twenty-eight.8 The distant, and neutral, United States had thirty.
The newest submarines in all navies (except the French, where some of the latest
boats were still surface steamers) were driven when on the surface by the com-
plex but comparatively safe internal combustion engine invented by the German
engineer Rudolph Diesel, for whom the engine was named. British manufactur-
ers seemed able to produce a diesel equal to the German originals. Other coun-
tries did less well. American manufacturers were to produce disappointment
after disappointment until just before the Second World War. When it worked,
the diesel provided submarines with enormous endurance at sea. For submerged
propulsion, the electric battery, which provided power for only the briefest time
before it needed recharging, was still the only way to go. Whatever their power
plants, in 1914 the main weapon of almost all submarines was the torpedo,
though some submarines carried mines instead. Most of the new submarines also
carried a small deck gun, three inches or so in caliber, but soon to grow.
Originally, British submarines had been intended to replace controlled mines
for the defense of harbors and to protect the coast from prowlers and invaders.
In war they were to prove unsuccessful in those roles, but by then they had gone
well beyond them. Now the submarines were to advance several hundred miles
from their bases and ambush German warships in waters the Germans thought
of as their own. They did these things and, despite often-ineffective torpedoes
and poorly designed mines, did them well. They did them in the North Sea, in
the Baltic (where no other British warships could go), and they did them in the
Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara during the otherwise unsuccessful Allied at-
tack on the Turkish Straits in 1915. German submarines, or “U-boats,” were ac-
tive in the same way against the British fleet, with similar results. Throughout
the war submarines on both sides were to sink many more large warships than
surface warships managed to sink; unlike those sunk by surface warships, how-
ever, all the submarines’ victims among large ships were obsolete pre-
dreadnoughts and armored cruisers.9
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In a third task, that of serving as distant scouts for the fleet, the submarines of
both fleets were to fail repeatedly. That failure stemmed mainly from their low
speed compared to the rest of the fleet and from the necessity to submerge when
in the presence, or anticipated presence, of enemy fighting ships. They could
neither transmit nor receive radio signals while in that state; they had to surface
first and then rig cumbersome aerials before they could use their radios (and
then unrig them before diving). The result was that for any combined operation
they had to sail long before the rest of the fleet and, as soon as they entered hos-
tile waters, dive or be ready to dive, thus falling effectively out of touch with their
commander in chief.10
The big thing German submariners learned was that they need not focus on
the powerful British Grand Fleet, a fleet of many types of fighting ship centered
on an all-new battle line of dreadnought battleships. Though that fleet existed
mainly to ensure Britain’s ability to snuff out German overseas trade—about
which the German submarines could do nothing—and to ensure Britain’s abil-
ity to protect Allied and other friendly shipping from German raiders, it soon
proved itself ineffective against, even fearful of, German submarines.11
Shipping was almost exclusively owned privately and manned by civilians. It
included everything afloat that was not part of the fighting fleet—passenger lin-
ers (some of them, eventually almost all of them, converted during the war into
troop transports), cargo ships, oil tankers, colliers, and the rest. Those were the
ships that moved Allied armies across both broad oceans and the narrow seas,
that kept those armies (and the fighting fleets too) supplied and resupplied; that,
inbound, carried the raw materials from which factories fashioned arms and
ammunition and, even more important, the food that every Briton, soldier,
sailor, and civilian alike, ate; and
that, outbound, carried the mined
and manufactured goods that did
so much to pay for the essential
imports and the other costs of
war. In contrast to Britain, France was able to feed its own people, but in other
respects it shared Britain’s dependence on imports from abroad.
However, we should not underestimate the influence of the Grand Fleet. First,
under its protection, except in the unreachable Baltic, Britain’s blockading
cruisers ended all of Germany’s enormous seaborne international trade. During
the first year or so of this blockade the cruisers captured more merchant ships
from the Germans than the British lost to the U-boats. Those captured ships
went into British employment, with the result that despite early U-boat suc-
cesses, the size of the British merchant marine actually increased in the first year
of the war. Moreover, the cruisers detained over seven hundred neutral
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merchant ships filled with cargoes bound for Germany. The British took those
cargoes for their own use.12 Second, the Grand Fleet provided the cover behind
which the small warships assigned to protect British shipping could do their
work. Without the distant presence of that fleet, those small warships would
likely soon have perished under the guns of German cruisers.
By the middle of 1915 the British windfall of captured German ships and
seized cargoes had come to an end. But the blockade of Germany did not end;
neither did the cover under which the antisubmarine forces worked.
Effectively for the first two years of the war Britain itself was under no block-
ade. Self-satisfied, the Admiralty cut back severely the construction of new mer-
chant ships in favor of new warships and delayed endlessly the repair of existing
merchant ships in favor of repairs to warships. In so doing, the Admiralty squan-
dered the work of its blockading cruisers. It did so for it had not anticipated the
disaster at sea about to befall Britain and its allies.13
Meanwhile, the U-boats came to cruise independently in the approaches to
British and French ports, the places all Allied merchant ships had to sail from and
return to; others trespassed even closer and stealthily laid mines in the fairways. To
employ a useful term only recently created, from the beginning the U-boat cap-
tains had information dominance over their victims, for the latter knew nothing
of any U-boat’s whereabouts until a submarine’s skipper chose to make his pres-
ence known by means of a challenge, a shell, or a torpedo. The submarine captain
would likely attack with his deck gun, or board and sink his victim with a bomb
placed deep inside. If a merchantman were armed, he would submerge and attack
it with a torpedo. The U-boats’ numbers were small at first—only thirty in Febru-
ary 1915 but fifty-two in March 1916, and more were on the way.14
The British responded to what before long would become an assault on their
very existence by building dozens, then scores, eventually hundreds, of mine-
sweepers, sloops (that day’s equivalent of a modern frigate), and destroyers.
Their purposes were to open the channels and keep them open, and to patrol the
seaward approaches to the ports (out to four or five hundred miles) in order to
find and sink the U-boats before the latter could find and sink the merchant
ships. But men in small ships with no sensors except their eyes, hunting for other
small ships that wished not to be found except on their own terms, could not of-
ten succeed. The U-boats had information dominance over them too. They were
small ships—few of the U-boats in that war displaced as much as a thousand
tons surfaced; the best of their opponents, the war-built sloops and destroyers,
were not much bigger than that.
Haltingly—eagerly on the part of the kaiser’s admirals and generals, reluctantly
on the part of his politicians and statesmen—Germany edged toward ordering its
submarine captains to torpedo without warning any ship, regardless of flag or
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nature, that came within their sight. That is, they were to engage in “unrestricted
submarine warfare.” When unsought consequences developed, chiefly in the form
of anger expressed by the American government, Germany edged back.15
After two years of intense, seemingly unending warfare on two enormous
fronts that were across the Continent from each other (one in Russia, the other
in France) and of the ever-worsening effects of the British blockade, against
which they were helpless, by the summer of 1916 the major figures in the German
government, civilians included, could see no hope of victory except by means of
an unrestricted submarine assault against British, other Allied, and neutral ship-
ping. (The neutrals were included because they carried about 30 percent of Brit-
ain’s imports.) In October, with ninety-six submarines, the German government
moved forward again. In February 1917 they went all the way.16
Appalled by the destruction of many civilian lives in sunken passenger
ships—notably the Cunard liner Lusitania, attacked in May 1915 with a loss of
1,200 lives, 128 of them U.S. citizens—the Americans had already made clear
their opposition to any unrestricted submarine attacks. But the Germans were
desperate, and they believed that even if the Americans entered the war, they
could not be effective enough soon enough to save the Allies. The Americans de-
clared war on 6 April 1917.
Perhaps because they believed in the maxim that “the best defense is a good
offense” (strategic and operational thought in those days seems not often to have
risen above the level of appealing maxims), the Royal Navy preferred patrolling
(hunting) for U-boats, which they saw as being on the offensive, over gathering
merchant ships into convoys escorted by sloops and destroyers, which they in-
terpreted as being on the defensive. Undeterred by the patrols, the U-boats kept
on sinking ships. By the spring of 1917 one merchant ship in four that cleared a
British port would fail to return;17 the Germans calculated that the end of the war
at sea was nigh. Gloomily, the British reached the same conclusion.18 When that
end came, the Allied position on the eastern front (disintegrating), on the western
front (shaky), everywhere, would collapse. The war would end in German victory.
In the nick of time the British and their new associates, the Americans,
adopted the escorted convoy. The most authoritative comment on this is Grand
Admiral Karl Doenitz’s succinct observation in his memoirs that “the German
submarine campaign was wrecked by the introduction of the convoy system.”19
In another passage Doenitz tells us that when the convoys went into effect
the oceans at once became bare and empty; for long periods at a time the U-boats,
operating individually, would see nothing at all; and then suddenly up would loom a
huge concourse of ships, thirty or fifty or more of them, surrounded by a strong es-
cort of warships of all types. The solitary U-boat, which most probably had sighted
the convoy purely by chance, would then attack, thrusting again and again and
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persisting, if the commander had strong nerves, for perhaps several days and nights,
until the physical exhaustion of both commander and crew called a halt. The lone
U-boat might well sink one or two of the ships, or even several; but that was but a
poor percentage of the whole. The convoy would steam on. In most cases no other
German U-boat would catch sight of it, and it would reach Britain, bringing a rich
cargo of foodstuffs and raw materials safely to port.20
In October 1918 Doenitz himself, commanding the five-hundred-ton UB-68
in the Mediterranean, lost his submarine while he was attempting to attack a
convoy, and he spent the last bit of the war in a British prison camp. Later he
would put to good use both his experience and that of the U-boats in general
when opposed by convoys.
The convoy system had not deprived the submarines of their information
dominance. It had just made that dominance nearly irrelevant, for it had re-
duced the number of potential targets from many single ships to a few groups of
ships; if the submarine’s captain, “by chance,” as Doenitz says, found such a
group, he found it accompanied by an armed escort bent on frustrating, and if
possible destroying, him. Because of the escorts he had to avoid closing on the
surface. Compared to most merchantmen a submarine’s speed on the surface
was high; submerged, its speed was low. Therefore, unless from the first moment
the U-boat was ahead of the convoy, it was not likely ever to get into a firing posi-
tion. Even if the escorts never knew that a submarine had been nearby, they still
would have frustrated its attack.
Admiral Hezlet gives us an example of this effect, from May 1918:
Eight U-boats were on patrol in the south-western approaches to the British Isles, de-
ployed to intercept convoys. In operations that lasted about a fortnight, thirty-six
convoys passed through the area, but the U-boats made contact with only five of
them. All five were attacked and three merchant ships were sunk. Two independent
ships were also sunk in this area. In a similar period a year before against unescorted
shipping, this number of U-boats would probably have sunk a hundred ships or more.
The convoy escorts, Admiral Hezlet adds, sank none of the U-boats.21
The first American contribution to the war was with destroyers, of which on 9
April 1917 the U.S. Navy had sixty-eight—some in the Pacific, some on the Asi-
atic station, but most in the Atlantic. Six arrived at the British naval base at
Queenstown, Ireland, early in May 1917. Early in July half the entire force was in
European waters, and more would follow.22 Their task was to take part in the
protection of shipping. They were particularly called on to escort the transports
with which the United States advanced its army three thousand miles across the
Atlantic to France. This the destroyers did without losing a single transport to
U-boat attack on the outbound voyage. (They did lose three largely empty
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transports on the return voyage.) Many of those transports were former Ger-
man passenger liners interned by their owners in American harbors in order to
avoid capture by blockading British cruisers.
Eventually there were two million American soldiers in Europe. They never
became as skilled as were the experienced French, British, and German soldiers,
but through their weight of numbers and their vigor they helped defeat the
Germans on the western front. The defeat in France, and other military failures
in Italy, the Balkans, and southwestern Asia, combined with the “total demoral-
ization of an underfed nation” caused by the blockade, led to revolution in the
German, Hapsburg, and Ottoman empires, the flight of old rulers to exile, and a
call from Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg for an armistice.23 So ended the
war, on 11 November 1918.
That “total demoralization of an underfed nation” was among the objectives
the desperate Germans had hoped their U-boats would achieve against Britain.
The U-boats came close, but then, as we have seen, their effort was “wrecked by
the convoy system.”
In fact, the “convoy system”was the naval share of a great civil-naval effort begin-
ning in Britain in 1917 aimed at overcoming the U-boats. Civilian leaders drove the
Admiralty to repair damaged and worn-out merchant ships and to build new ones;
they also centralized and made orderly the hitherto helter-skelter scheduling of
ships’ sailings, made ports and railways more efficient, and established a system of
food rationing throughout the kingdom, so that despite the U-boats, everyone had
enough—just enough—to eat.24 Theirs was a great achievement.
Still, with only a few thousand officers and men (about a thousand to start with,
five thousand lost, and thirteen thousand serving at the end), manning from begin-
ning to end only about 350 small ships (of which half had been lost by war’s end in
November 1918), the Imperial German Navy’s U-boat arm had nearly overcome
an alliance that eventually included almost the entire world outside of Germany
and its principal allies, the decrepit Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.25
That was an impressive performance by a very small number of people at a
time when navies measured their manpower in the hundreds of thousands and
armies measured theirs in the millions. In four years that small number of offi-
cers and men sank five thousand ships. No submarine campaign since then has
matched that number. The average size of that vast, unfortunate armada of
sunken ships was 2,400 gross tons—not large, but collectively they came to
twelve million gross registered tons, and that is a lot.26 The most successful sub-
marine commander in any navy, any war, was Lother von Arnauld de la Periere,
who, in the Mediterranean with his 685-ton U-35, sank more than 435,000 gross
tons of shipping—put another way, 194 ships. Many of those ships went down as
a result of fire from Arnauld’s single 4.1-inch gun.27 Clearly, in reaching those
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numbers Arnauld had no convoy escorts with which to contend. Also, plainly,
most of his victims were small ships engaged in the coastal and short-sea trades.
Nowadays a single tanker, or perhaps two together, might measure 435,000 tons.
There was still another impressive performance: This simple, practical in-
strument of war, employed directly upon shipping—the object around which
naval war revolves—achieved its effect in the most brutal fashion. Because all
too often they dared do it no other way, submarines torpedoed merchant ships,
including passenger liners, without warning. Then, because they had no way of
rescuing those who had survived the blast, they left them to the mercy of chance.
Chance is not often merciful.
It was the brutality associated with the sinking of ships by submarines that
was a primary cause, perhaps the primary cause, of the U.S. declaration of war
on Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1917. Without the participation of the
Americans, probably there would have been no allied victory—at best, after the
Royal Navy’s defeat of the U-boats, a standoff on the western front followed by a
negotiated peace motivated by ex-
haustion on both sides as well as,
in Germany’s case, the urgent
need to end the blockade. So, do-
ing it the only way they could, the
submarines nearly brought victory to their side. But by doing it the only way
they could, they brought their own side down to defeat. For them it was a situa-
tion without solution.28
What about the other two revolutionary instruments that revealed them-
selves at about the same time as the submarine, the wireless radio and the
heavier-than-air craft? By the summer of 1914 both had managed to show them-
selves as practical instruments of war. It was not until the autumn of that year
that the submarine managed to show that it too was a practical instrument of
war. In the “Great War,” radio communications and one of its offspring, com-
munications intelligence, were to play major roles in the deployment of forces
strategically, operationally, and tactically, especially for the Allies, but not so ef-
fectively as the Allies might have hoped in their struggle against the U-boats, for
the latter were always better informed about their enemies than their enemies
were about them. The submarine’s impact on the war, then, was greater than that
of radio and its derivatives. As for aircraft, though in the war of 1914–18 they
were built and used by the hundreds of thousands, they had little influence on
the course of events, either afloat or ashore.29 Both radio (and its derivatives)
and the aircraft, however, would have enormous impact on events yet to come—
in this writer’s view, even greater than that of the submarine.
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COMMENTARY
THE NAVAL HISTORICAL COLLECTION: RECENT ACQUISITIONS
Evelyn M. Cherpak
The Naval War College Library’s naval historical collection, located in Mahan
Hall, is the depository for college archives, manuscript collections, and oral his-
tories that document the history of the institution, naval warfare, and the pres-
ence of the U.S. Navy in Narragansett Bay. During the past year, several
historically significant manuscript collections and single items have been ac-
quired. One such collection relates to the career of the college’s founder and first
president, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce. It consists of his warrant to master
dated 15 September 1855 and his commission to lieutenant dated 16 September
1855, both signed by President Franklin Pierce and Secretary of the Navy James
C. Dobbin; his commission to commodore dated 25 November 1881, signed by
President Chester A. Arthur and Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt; and a
certificate appointing Luce as U.S. Commissioner General to the Columbian
Historical Exposition in Madrid, Spain, in 1892, with signatures of President
Benjamin Harrison and Secretary of State James Blaine. Letters of appointment
to master and lieutenant, a letter from the U.S. Naval Academy Board of Exam-
iners in 1849 indicating that Luce passed his exams,
and a three-page holograph history of his ship and
shore assignments dating from 1849 to 1865, written
by Luce himself and dated 14 July 1866, complete the
acquisition. These items fill a gap in the College’s
holdings on its founder and are important for institu-
tional history.
Papers of enlisted men are rare finds; hence, the
William H. Sellers Collection, which documents his
naval career as a chief yeoman from 1887 to 1922, is
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especially valuable. Sellers was born in Bridgeport, Connecticut, enlisted in the
Navy at age sixteen, and saw action during the Spanish-American War at the bat-
tle of Santiago Bay in USS Gloucester, J. P. Morgan’s former yacht Corsair. He re-
ceived a West Indies medal for rescuing Spanish admiral Pascual Cervera from
the sea. During World War I, Sellers was in charge of the Red Cross Bank at the
U.S. Naval Training Station, Newport, Rhode Island. After his retirement from
the Navy, he served as a clerk in the Supply Department at the U.S. Naval Tor-
pedo Station in Newport for eighteen years. He retired from the Torpedo Station
in 1940 and died in 1942.
His papers include official naval and personal correspondence dating from
1902 to 1936; rare editions of books, including a 1913 edition of the Bluejacket’s
Manual, a 1902 edition of the Petty Officer’s Drill Book, and the 1899 log of USS
Gloucester; pamphlets, including The History of the U.S. Naval Training Station,
Newport, Rhode Island, published in 1915; and a history of Victoria, Australia,
and its metropolis dated 1908. There are also various editions of the Newport Re-
cruit, World War II editions of the Newport Daily News, and the Newport Herald
from 1945, as well as photographs of USS Hartford, USS Gloucester, and sailors at
the Newport Naval Training Station in 1918. Miscellaneous items are a Crossing
the Line Certificate and the script of the ceremony, a blueprint of the battle of San-
tiago Bay, and a 1912 photo of the wreck of the USS Maine, artillery shells (one
from the Maine), a mariner’s telescope, and a pair of binoculars. His books are lo-
cated in the library’s rare book collection, while the artifacts are in the Naval War
College Museum collection. The Sellers papers contain unique materials that shed
light on the naval career of an enlisted man in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries. The collection was presented to the Naval War College Foundation
by Mrs. Catherine Kelley-Watson and Mrs. Mary C. McNally.
The manuscripts of Admiral Sir James Hawkins Whitshed, Royal Navy, were
recently presented to the Naval War College Foundation by Captain Lawrence A.
Kurtz, U.S. Navy (Ret.). They consist of documents, books, and records from the
American Revolution through the Napoleonic Wars to 1849. The collection
houses correspondence Whitshed both sent and received while squadron com-
mander in the Mediterranean, 1799–1802; letters received when he was naval
adviser to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, from 1803 to 1804; letters sent and
received when he was captain of HMS Formidable, and a letterbook dated 1808–
09; and order books containing the admiral’s orders given and received while he
was commanding officer of HMS Rose and HMS Temeraire, dated 1784–86 and
1799–1801, respectively, and when he was commander in chief of Royal Navy
ships off the coast of Ireland, from 1807 to 1809. The latter contains information
about American sailors who were held by Royal Navy ships under Whitshed’s
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command. There are several signal books, copies of track charts, and the admi-
ral’s flag-rank commissions; instructions for the conduct of ships of war; gen-
eral instructions and notes for courts-martial; and sailing instructions for the
east coast of North America. There is also an unpublished biography of
Whitshed entitled Admiral of the Wooden Navy, prepared by Captain Kurtz. A log
from the HMS Thetis and HMS St. Vincent that belonged to the admiral’s grand-
son and namesake, and several copies of the Dublin Chronicle containing articles
covering the American Revolution complete the holdings.
This is a remarkable collection of a flag officer of the Royal Navy during the
latter part of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, when Great
Britain possessed the most formidable navy in the world.
Researchers interested in visiting the Naval Historical Collection should con-
tact the curator, Dr. Evelyn M. Cherpak, at (401) 841-2435, fax (401) 841-7790,
or cherpake@nwc.navy.mil for an appointment. The collection is open Monday
through Friday, 0800 to 1630, except for federal holidays.
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REVIEW ESSAY
THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PRUDENCE
Vickie B. Sullivan
Lord, Carnes. The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know
Now. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2003. 304pp. $26
In introducing his treatise to its princely addressee, Niccolò Machiavelli de-
scribes its contents as deriving both from his “long experience with modern
things” (he had served the Florentine republic as an advisor and diplomat) and
“a continuous reading of ancient ones” (he is the author of an extensive com-
mentary on Roman history, Discourses on Livy, and The Prince). What
Machiavelli says of himself in The Prince, originally published in the sixteenth
century, can justly be applied to Carnes Lord, author of an immensely astute
modern guidebook to executive power. Like Machiavelli, Lord has extensive ex-
perience with modern affairs, having served in two presidential administrations,
first as an adviser to the National Security Council under President Ronald Reagan
and then as an assistant to the vice president for na-
tional security affairs under President George H. W.
Bush. He also possesses a rare knowledge of political
philosophy—both ancient and modern. Holding doc-
torates in both the classics and political science, Lord
is an eminent translator of, and a commentator on, the
political work of Aristotle. He brings his vast knowl-
edge and extensive experience to bear on this book.
The echoes of Machiavelli’s classic far surpass that of
its evocative title. Like The Prince, this work consists of
twenty-six chapters; it is relatively short, the better to be
digested by busy princes, and it occasionally refers to
Vickie B. Sullivan is an associate professor and chair of
the Department of Political Science at Tufts Univer-
sity. She received her doctorate from the University of
Chicago. Dr. Sullivan is the author of Machiavelli,
Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republican-
ism in England (2004), and Machiavelli’s Three
Romes: Religion, Human Liberty, and Politics Re-
formed (1996). She is the editor of The Comedy and
Tragedy of Machiavelli: Essays on the Literary Works
(2000) and the coeditor of Shakespeare’s Political Pag-
eant: Essays in Politics and Literature (1996). Her ar-
ticles have appeared in The American Political Science
Review, History of Political Thought, and Polity.
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potential readers as “princes.” Moreover, in educating today’s leaders, Lord makes
liberal use of such Machiavellian maxims as “all states need good arms and good
laws”and that “elites”are “more dangerous to the well being of political leaders than
are the people at large.”
Lord’s appeal to Machiavelli is justified, as he explains, because the Florentine
played the pivotal role in defining our modern conception of executive power.
Machiavelli declared the necessity of a strong ruler not only when states are
founded but also at times of danger, an ever-present threat in the chaotic world
of international politics. The English philosopher John Locke helped to make
Machiavelli’s powerful executive compatible with a mixed constitutional gov-
ernment by balancing it with the legislative powers of Parliament. Even within a
liberal government, with its circumscribed ability to act, Locke retains a power-
ful executive by endowing it with “prerogative,” the ability to act without law—
even against the law—when the public good demands it. This Machiavellian
executive, transformed but still recognizable in its contact with the thought of
Locke, comes to full republican fruition in the explication provided by Alexander
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. Hamilton justifies the need for an energetic
executive by showing that a powerful, single leader is needed even in a republic to
act decisively not only in foreign affairs but also in domestic ones when strong
leadership is needed to manage “national elites and popular passions in the inter-
ests of the long-term health and safety of the regime.”
In this way, Lord illustrates the tensions at play within contemporary liberal
constitutional democracy. Whereas democracy at its most extreme posits the
untrammeled will of the majority as sovereign, liberal constitutionalism main-
tains the necessity to control and circumscribe political action. Moreover, exec-
utive power, able to act quickly and decisively, is often at odds with both
democracy and liberal constitutionalism and is sometimes able to override the
mechanisms of both. Nevertheless, the prince of a liberal republic is, at other
times, at their command. In homage to the work of Harvey C. Mansfield of Har-
vard University, Lord calls these rather paradoxical facts the “ambivalence of ex-
ecutive power,” explaining that because the American presidency is formally
subordinated “to the people and the legislative power, it is seen fundamentally as
an instrument of others or as not fully responsible for its actions and therefore
can disarm to a degree the resentments of those adversely affected by them.” The
executive can sometimes find strength even in this weakness.
Despite these theoretical resources available to the executive, Lord examines
the current challenges to effective leadership and shows how they might be
turned into instruments for effective and beneficial rule. Among the challenges
and potential instruments that Lord analyzes are state bureaucracy, legislation,
education and culture, economics, diplomacy, the military, intelligence,
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communication, and strategy. It is in this part of the book that Lord’s judgment,
a result of his own experiences in political life, is brought to bear in an especially
fascinating manner. For instance, his treatment of intelligence generally, and his
criticisms of the CIA particularly, give the reader the sense that Lord knows of
what he speaks. He wishes to see, for example, intelligence agencies concern
themselves less with general information and more with secrets that are “opera-
tionally useful to leaders.”
Although Lord can be said to be something of a Machiavellian in showing the
continuing need, even in a modern liberal republic, for a single powerful leader,
ultimately it is neither a Machiavellian understanding nor even a modern sensi-
bility that informs Lord’s approach to politics—either its practice or its goals.
Machiavelli, of course, is famous for his definition of a virtù that is able to act
against conventional morality informed by classical philosophical or Christian
traditions. Aiming too high, intoned Machiavelli, can result in one’s “ruin”
rather than one’s “preservation.” As a result, Machiavelli maintains that “it is
necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to
be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity” (The Prince, p. 61).
Indeed, Lord acknowledges in perhaps the most Machiavellian of his chapters,
“Modern Founders,” that “it is not necessary to go to the end of [the] road
with” Machiavelli in supporting the use of “unscrupulous thugs” to achieve the
greatest political results.
This particular parting of the ways with Machiavelli reveals a more fundamental
departure that plants Lord even more firmly with the classics against the moderns
and the contemporary approach to politics. He uses the term “statecraft”to describe
the type of educated, thoughtful leadership he envisions. What guides the statesman
is prudence, very much akin to Aristotle’s phronesis—the ability of a leader of out-
standing moral character to evaluate practical situations and make wise deci-
sions: “Perhaps the fundamental lesson of all this is that at the end of the day there
is no substitute for prudence in political leaders. Inseparable from prudence in the
sense we have been using that term are both substantive understanding of the
principles of statecraft and good moral character.” By advocating prudence as the
fundamental characteristic of leaders, Lord eschews social science, modeled on
modern natural science, that seeks to formulate universal and precise theories to
explain political phenomena. Instead, he advocates an approach to political science
that is “practically useful rather than scientifically exact.”
Lord uses recent history, particularly the deeds of great leaders, and philoso-
phy to inform his reader’s judgment. Reading Lord’s The Modern Prince is an
important step in an education that fosters political prudence.
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IN MY VIEW
NO GUN RI
Madame:
Stephen F. Davis, Jr.’s review of No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War
Incident [Naval War College Review, Autumn 2003, pp. 177–78] gives undue
credit to a clumsy pastiche of factual errors, baseless speculation, and contrived
theories masquerading as military history. Clearly, author Robert Bateman seeks
only to defend the 7th Cavalry Regiment (with which he served in peacetime) by
discrediting the Associated Press report on U.S.-inflicted deaths of Korean civil-
ians in July 1950.
Speaking not for AP but as a secondary participant in the project, I share my
colleagues’ exasperation with the persistent and willful distortions of their work
on No Gun Ri by a clutch of self-interested critics, who mainly recycle each oth-
ers’ opinions about a story that few of them seem ever to have actually read.
While Bateman did that much, he remains deplorably ill informed about basic
journalism. His absurd claim that AP published its story knowing the informa-
tion was “inconsistent or incorrect,” and reviewer Davis’s suggestion of a “free
press run amok,” represent an affront to all AP staffers, for whom professional
integrity is no less important than it is for military people.
AP is not a supermarket tabloid; it’s a global organization responsible to
thousands of newspaper members and other subscribers. It doesn’t take sides,
conduct crusades, or gratuitously smear institutions such as the U.S. military.
The arduous two-year No Gun Ri project is fully described in The Bridge at No
Gun Ri, a 2001 book by the same reporting team, and its basic findings were af-
firmed by the Army inspector general’s report in January 2001.
While Davis calls it “interesting” that Bateman made no effort to contact
Korean survivors or witnesses, “appalling” might be a better word for purported
“historical research” that totally ignores the victims of a mass killing. Bateman’s
“translation problems” excuse is beyond lame, but it pales beside his unsup-
ported, and truly repugnant, allegation that Korean peasants who suffered
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grievously in war spent the next fifty years creating “tainted testimony” and de-
manding compensation out of sheer greed.
Had reviewer Davis thoroughly compared Bateman’s book with the AP stories
it tries to debunk, he would have found, as we did, more than a hundred fac-
tual mistakes, irrelevancies, significant omissions, misquotations, and other
failings—in sum, a sloppy mishmash that wouldn’t get past any marginally
competent copy editor. Limited space permits only a few examples.
First, to support his contentions, Bateman shamelessly invents people—
South Korean “guerillas” (sometimes “guerrillas”), a GI “platoon,” an “excitable”
officer who “garbled” a phone message (he may have meant “excited,” but either
way he could not know this). Wannabe “war hero” Edward Daily was never AP’s
“main witness” but an incidental figure deep in the story and was elevated to No
Gun Ri poster-boy by others—two major newspapers that showcased his melo-
dramatic words on page 1 and a TV network that flew him to Korea for an inter-
view. (Daily had managed for years to dupe other 7th Cavalry veterans, including
Bateman, about his Korea exploits before the media ever heard of him.)
Bateman’s claims that two other ex-GIs lied about being at No Gun Ri are
groundless. One man’s medical records show he remained on duty despite a mi-
nor wound, and in the other case, Bateman misread a morning-report entry of
“eff ” (effective date) as “off.”
Bateman conjures up imaginary “armed men” hiding among refugees and
attributes the finding of two weapons—a Japanese rifle and a Soviet-type sub-
machine gun—to a “nearby platoon” of GIs making a “sweep of the refugees” to
create what he strangely calls “some of the only documentary evidence” of an en-
emy presence at No Gun Ri. In fact, neither Korean survivors nor U.S. unit rec-
ords confirmed any local guerrillas (or “northern infiltrators”) at No Gun Ri.
As for the weapons, the sketchy report does not say who found them, when,
where (“nearby” with respect to . . . what?), or even whether they were in firing
condition. Amazingly for a historian, Bateman makes no attempt to corroborate
these details or the actual existence of his mystery “platoon” but leaves readers to
puzzle over the rest of his “documentary evidence.”
Bateman all but ignores AP’s discovery in U.S. archives of numerous high-
level orders to stop civilian movements at all costs in the war’s early months, and
he never mentions the key fact that a 7th Cavalry regimental log that would es-
tablish whether such orders were received at No Gun Ri is inexplicably missing
from government archives.
While AP never said how many died at No Gun Ri but cited various U.S. and
Korean estimates ranging from under a hundred to four hundred, Bateman uses
tortured reasoning—but no evidence—to settle on “around 25,” including “at
least two guerrillas,” although none were identified.
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Rather than accept that similar memories might simply reflect shared experi-
ence at No Gun Ri, Bateman advances another unsubstantiated theory of Korean
survivors “contaminating” each other’s minds with recollections either false or a
“montage” of other, unrelated events. Nor, apparently, does it occur to him that
former soldiers might conveniently forget or even lie about an incident that con-
ceivably could return to haunt them legally after fifty years.
Some of Bateman’s assertions are outrageous, as when he says AP “inflated
the amount of research” it did. The AP team used computer-assisted reporting
techniques, and a staff researcher spent months filing Freedom of Information
requests, exploring official archives, and tracking down sources in several states.
Some assertions are fantasy, as when he transforms a battalion commander’s re-
port of “a vehicle, possibly a tank,” into “a section of tanks [that] blasted through”
his position. Some are just silly, as when he chides AP for claiming to have inter-
viewed “more than 24 generals”—actually a college reporter’s mistake.
Finally, questioning deaths at No Gun Ri by saying that aerial photos didn’t
show bodies or graves, he ignores villagers’ statements that bodies collected out-
side the railroad tunnel were stacked inside, covered with dirt, and buried later.
Nor does he mention annual memorials in local villages, something he could
have witnessed if he had ever gone there.
RICHARD PYLE
Associated Press, New York
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BOOK REVIEWS
ACTIONS MATTER—WORDS ARE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE
Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Brookings
Institution Press, 2003. 200pp. $22.95
Three years of George W. Bush’s presi-
dency have dramatically altered the
world’s geopolitical stage. Following the
tragic events of 9/11, American military
power was used to topple the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s re-
gime in Iraq. At the same time, the
United States has irked some of its long-
standing allies through its use of force,
blunt political statements, and rejection
of international agreements such as the
ABM Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol (on
global warming), and the International
Criminal Court.
Discerning a coherent foreign policy
framework guiding these actions has
been difficult. The most authoritative
source has been the national security
strategy of 20 September 2002, and
most of the president’s advisers have
published articles in the leading foreign
policy journals and newspapers. These
writings, however, present contrasting
views, leaving some with the impression
of a president who is attempting to bal-
ance several disparate policies.
Enter America Unbound by Ivo Daalder
and James Lindsay. Exhaustively docu-
mented, with 477 footnotes squeezed
into two hundred pages, this book, by
two Clinton administration National
Security Council staffers, is a readable,
balanced, and concise work that ex-
plains the present administration’s the-
ory behind the practice. These two
authors, who know as much about how
foreign policy is translated into action
as anyone, have accomplished an em-
pirical analysis of the actions and state-
ments of President Bush and his
advisers, discovering and articulating
the worldviews behind their decisions.
Along the way they also debunk some
commonly held beliefs.
Daalder and Lindsay deliberately focus
their analysis on President Bush. They
claim that rather than his being manip-
ulated by his advisers, Bush is the key
decision maker when it comes to for-
eign policy, basing his actions on his
deep personal convictions and a coher-
ent worldview that:
• An America unconstrained
(unbound) by alliances, traditions,
and friendships is safer
• American power should be used for
America’s, and hence the world’s,
benefit
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• No strategic peer competitor should
be allowed
• America is best safeguarded by
preemptive strikes against
threatening states.
Using statements made by Bush while a
presidential candidate, the authors
show that his worldview has not only
been consistent since he was appointed
to the office but was reinforced by 9/11.
The events of that day provided Bush
with the means to execute his revolu-
tionary foreign policy.
Daalder and Lindsay show that Bush is
guided by a few corollaries. One is that
states matter—the best way to attack
terrorism, and terrorist groups, is to at-
tack the states that harbor them. An-
other is that actions matter—what one
says is of little consequence. A third is
that if the United States leads, others
will follow.
We are introduced to new labels, or
more precisely, to people referred to as
“neocons,” whom the authors describe
as democratic imperialists. This group,
which includes presidential advisers
Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and
William Kristol, argues that the United
States should use its overwhelming
force to remake the world in its own
image, embracing nation building and
the spread of democracy.
Alternatively, Daalder and Lindsay label
George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald
Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice as “as-
sertive nationalists,” who also believe
that the United States should use its
overwhelming power to rid the world of
all the bad people, although they do not
support attempts to remake the world
in America’s image. Both groups, how-
ever, share a deep skepticism of
Wilsonian international law and the
institutions and treaties by which it was
propagated. This has enforced an alli-
ance between them that encourages the
use of American military power, though
the groups remain divided on their ulti-
mate objectives.
Unbound America is, ultimately, a criti-
cism of President Bush’s policies, his
foreign policy unilateralism in particu-
lar. The last chapter asserts that “the
fundamental premise of the Bush revo-
lution, that America’s security rested on
an America unbound, was profoundly
mistaken.” The authors base their case
not so much on growing anti-American
sentiment throughout the world as on
the position that the complex foreign
policy goals now confronting America
cannot be solved with a “go it alone”
policy.
Daalder and Lindsay’s assertion comes
early in the “revolution.” Saddam
Hussein is in U.S. custody; Afghanistan
is adopting a constitution; Libya’s
Mohammar Qaddafi is agreeing to give
up his weapons of mass destruction
programs; Iran is agreeing with Euro-
pean diplomats to a nuclear nonprolif-
eration treaty protocol; Saudi Arabia
has announced its first-ever elections;
dialogue is being renewed among Syria,
Israel, and the PLO; and finally, China
has engaged itself to help solve the issue
of North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro-
gram. It remains to be seen whether
President Bush will be proven correct in
his belief that strong-armed leadership
will result in a strong following and
make the world safer.
DAVID MARQUET
Captain, U.S. Navy
Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
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Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Jr.
The Iraq War: A Military History. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press (Belknap), 2003.
312pp. $25
The pairing of Professor Williamson
Murray and retired Army major general
Robert Scales, Jr., is a potent and un-
usual combination of combat experi-
ence and superb scholarship. The Iraq
War captures both the strategic under-
pinnings of the war and the operational
designs that led to the stunning success
of the initial military campaign of Op-
eration IRAQI FREEDOM. The end prod-
uct is an extremely rare occurrence—an
insightful overview and assessment of
the second Gulf war produced while the
guns were still warm.
That this duo joined forces to produce
such a superlative history is not unex-
pected. Murray’s reputation as a mili-
tary historian of the first rank was
recently confirmed in his highly ac-
claimed A War to Be Won (Harvard
Univ. Press, 2000), an operational-level
perspective of the Second World War
coauthored with Allan Millett. Murray’s
credentials also include his role as the
principal author of the Gulf War Air
Power Survey, a history of air opera-
tions in Operation DESERT STORM. His
partner in this current effort is a model
soldier-scholar, combining a thirty-year
military career as an Army artilleryman
with solid credentials, including a Ph.D.
in history from Duke University, a tour
as Commandant of the Army War Col-
lege, and several previous books on fire-
power and future conflict. He was also
the project director and principal au-
thor of the U.S. Army’s official history
of the first Gulf war. The critical themes
of his previous book, Yellow Smoke: The
Future of Land Warfare for America’s
Military (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003),
on the future of land power in the
twenty-first century, are suffused
throughout The Iraq War and help put
the last conflict into a larger historical
setting.
This book is a pleasure to read, com-
bining lucid prose and mastery of both
history and operational detail to permit
the reader to grasp clearly the dynamics
of the race to Baghdad. Unlike the ini-
tial reporting of the fighting by embed-
ded journalists, these analysts are not
limited to a narrow “soda straw” view-
point of the war. They put the war in its
proper strategic and historical context,
and the conduct of the fighting in its
proper place with the evolving changes
in the conduct of war. The crisp text is
artfully edited, and it is amplified by
several dozen photographs and a set of
high-quality color maps. The latter are
all-too-rare additions to history texts
and further distinguish this book from
pretenders.
The concluding chapter provides criti-
cal insights on the political and military
implications of this war. This chapter
alone is worth the price of the book;
one can only hope that it will be widely
distributed among the halls of Congress
as well as in the educational centers of
the U.S. armed forces. This evidence of
the enduring nature of war, with its im-
mutable fundamentals, will not surprise
realists, combat veterans, or military
historians. Nonetheless, it should be re-
quired reading for enthusiasts of the
putative “dot.com” economy and their
irrational exuberance for information
technology. As Murray and Scales
stress, despite overwhelming technolog-
ical superiority, commanders “had to
make decisions of life and death under
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split-second pressures and an unprece-
dented barrage of information that was
often ambiguous, uncertain, contradic-
tory, or quite often wrong.” The au-
thors acknowledge a number of
changing characteristics in war, includ-
ing the emphasis on speed, precision,
simultaneity, and the need for modular
force structure, interdependence be-
tween service units, and jointness at
lower levels. Yet they also stress that
true knowledge was rare. No matter
how sophisticated the intelligence col-
lection, a real picture was rarely formed
until a human being laid eyes on the
target. Finally, the authors adroitly
connect the growing complexity of to-
day’s battlefield with the need for
high-quality leaders who have been im-
mersed in an intensive training and ed-
ucation regimen. The adaptability of
U.S. commanders made up for strategic
and intelligence inadequacies. It was
this mental agility that permitted the
creative, quick thinking that was so evi-
dent as American forces transitioned
from deliberate planning at Central
Command to reacting to real but un-
foreseen circumstances on the ground.
This final chapter overlooks a critical
shortfall in U.S. strategic readiness. The
U.S. military must become adept at
“multidimensional operations” to com-
bat insurgencies and prop up failed
states. Murray and Scales admit that the
United States could have been better
prepared for the transition to stability
operations, and they admit that its mili-
tary is inclined to “avoid the messy
business that lies beyond clear-cut, de-
cisive military operations.” The U.S.
military excels at combined arms—the
combination of infantry, armor, and
artillery to enable fire and maneuver.
It is not as good at combined means—
employing other instruments of na-
tional power, including the full panoply
of the interagency community toward a
desired end state. The American way of
war is unsurpassed at the fighting as-
pects of war, but this does not necessar-
ily translate to winning the peace. This
shortfall was manifested by the failure
of both the Bush administration and
the military to prepare fully for its oc-
cupation of Iraq and the continuing
need to conduct the sort of nation-
building activities that are occupying
the U.S. armed forces in Asia. The Pen-
tagon is now examining innovative or-
ganizational and doctrinal changes to
address the problem. However, the so-
lution lies beyond that five-sided struc-
ture and must include a maladroit
national security architecture that has
resisted substantive post–Cold War
realignment.
This is a remarkably impressive work,
especially since it was produced so close
to the fighting. Undoubtedly, a more
comprehensive assessment of the war
will eventually be produced, probably
years from now when distance, objec-
tivity, and primary source material are
available. For the foreseeable future,
however, The Iraq War will be the de-
finitive history of this complex and
multifaceted campaign.
F. G. HOFFMAN
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
Quantico, Virginia
Art, Robert J., and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. The
United States and Coercive Diplomacy. Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2003.
442pp. $19.95
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The threat of force is an instrument of
statecraft—an instrument that U.S.
presidents have not been afraid to use.
When successfully employed, the threat
of force can deter an adversary from
embarking upon an unwelcome course
of action or coerce an adversary to
cease undesirable activities. Scholars
and practitioners both acknowledge
that of these two means of force, coer-
cion is by far the more difficult to
execute.
The United States and Coercive Diplo-
macy attempts to increase our under-
standing of coercive diplomacy by
building upon works of other scholars
of international relations, in particular
Alexander George, the noted scholar of
international relations. The appearance
of this book is especially timely, since
the 1990s witnessed numerous attempts
on the part of the White House to em-
ploy coercive diplomacy—a trend that
has continued to the present day. Given
such potentially contentious issues as
the North Korean and Iranian nuclear
programs, Chinese-Taiwanese relations,
and the global war on terror, it appears
that coercive diplomacy has a high
probability of continued use.
The editors take a straightforward ap-
proach to their subject. A brief intro-
duction by Robert Art defines the term
“coercive diplomacy,” discusses its use
by national leaders, and describes the
structure of the book. In the following
seven chapters, contributing authors
present seven case studies that have in-
volved U.S. efforts to employ coercive
diplomacy. Each study seeks to deter-
mine whether coercive diplomacy was
successful and why success or failure
resulted. These studies are followed by
a concluding chapter in which Art re-
views the contributors’ findings and
provides his own comparisons. He then
offers general conclusions regarding co-
ercive diplomacy and several recom-
mendations that national leaders
should consider.
Taken in its entirety, The United States
and Coercive Diplomacy is a worthy
book, deserving attention from those in
both academia and government. The
writing is articulate, the chapters well
organized, and the conclusions reason-
able. More importantly, this book be-
longs to the all-too-small family of
books that contribute to, as Alexander
George once wrote, “bridging the gap”
between academicians and national
leaders, between theory and practice.
That said, there are some drawbacks to
this work. Structurally, it would have
benefited if the contributors had fol-
lowed a common format when present-
ing and analyzing their various cases.
Also, the definition of the term “coer-
cive diplomacy” lacks precision, as Art
readily admits. However, it is clear that
coercive diplomacy employs a threat of
force, and sometimes the use of force,
to get a target (the recipient of the coer-
cive threat) to do something that the
coercer wants but that the target does
not. The editors make a point of distin-
guishing between coercive efforts, which
do not involve the threat of force, and
coercive diplomacy, which does. While
the inclusion of the threat of force
clearly marks a coercive threshold, a
deeper discussion of coercive efforts
would have been of significant interest
to those who may have to use coercion
as part of statecraft. Even more prob-
lematic is the question of the degree of
force required to distinguish coercive
diplomacy from war. Robert Art notes
that the line is not easily drawn or dis-
tinct; the discussion and case studies
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reinforce that observation. Presumably
the distinction is an important one, and
potentially there are different cautions
and prescriptions to be followed for the
different strategies.
The cases examined in the book are well
chosen and have been studied at the
Naval War College. They examine the
efforts made by the Clinton administra-
tion to use coercive diplomacy in So-
malia, Bosnia/Kosovo, and Haiti; in the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation;
to coerce the North Koreans into aban-
doning their nuclear weapons program;
and several attempts to use coercive di-
plomacy against Saddam Hussein from
1990 to 1998. The final study discusses
the use of coercive diplomacy in the
U.S. response to terrorism. Interest-
ingly, and perhaps inadvertently, the
cases are presented in ascending order
of quality.
The Somalia case, written by Nora
Bensahel, concludes that providing se-
curity for humanitarian relief efforts
was a success for U.S. coercive diplo-
macy. As Art points out, there can be a
fine line between compellance and de-
terrence. Bensahel’s study would seem
to make a stronger case for a successful
deterrent strategy being initially em-
ployed, not a coercive one. However,
there can be no doubt that this turned
into an attempt to use coercive diplo-
macy as a tool in the nation-building
efforts that subsequently followed, and
that it failed.
Both the Somalia and Bosnia/Kosovo
discussions suffer from brevity. Of
course, a certain degree of editing is in-
evitable for these complex and lengthy
cases, but too much has been left out,
most notably a detailed discussion of
the impact of the Croatian ground
offensive that occurred in conjunction
with the NATO air campaign in 1995. It
could also be argued that the Kosovo
campaign was an exercise in coercive
diplomacy from beginning to end and
never truly transitioned into a “war.”
The meticulous selection of targets,
some of which were chosen more for
psychological than purely military im-
pact; the extremely limiting rules of en-
gagement employed by NATO; and the
eventual introduction of the threat of a
ground campaign make Kosovo appear
to be a case of “tightening the screw”
vice a failure of coercive diplomacy. Of
course, both conclusions are debatable.
Robert Pastor was privileged to be pres-
ent at the last-minute, face-to-face ne-
gotiations between General Raul Cedras
(the leader of the Haitian coup), Jimmy
Carter, Colin Powell, and Sam Nunn.
Pastor’s account is spellbinding, but it
can be argued that he overstates the im-
portance of these negotiations in his
presentation of the Haitian case. Art
again deflects much of the criticism as-
sociated with this observation when he
admits that the Haitian case is not easy
to categorize. Is it a case of successful
coercive diplomacy at the last minute,
or one of the shortest and least sangui-
nary combats on record, given that
Cedras did not capitulate until after re-
ceiving positive confirmation that an
invasion force was en route?
Jon B. Alterman’s discussion of Iraq,
like that of Somalia and Bosnia/Kosovo,
covers much temporal ground in rela-
tively few pages. Among the more sig-
nificant questions addressed is whether
the Tomahawk missile attacks con-
ducted against Iraq in response to the
discovery of a plot to assassinate former
president Bush were truly an example
of coercive diplomacy. It seems at least
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equally likely that the attacks had noth-
ing to do with coercion and were sim-
ply a form of reprisal.
Three of the final four cases, written by
William Drennan (Korea), Robert S.
Ross (China-Taiwan), and Martha
Crenshaw (war on terror), are very
good. Both Drennan’s and Crenshaw’s
work deserve special mention. Drennan
advances the argument that it was
North Korea, not the United States,
that successfully employed coercive di-
plomacy in the Korean nuclear crisis,
and he offers compelling justification
for his conclusion. Crenshaw takes on
the extremely topical and thorny issue
of whether coercive diplomacy has even
a remote chance of success when em-
ployed against extremely dedicated
nonstate actors. The well laid out con-
clusion is that it is not possible to use
coercive diplomacy directly against
such actors but it is possible to use co-
ercive diplomacy against state actors
that may also be involved.
In many ways Art’s final chapter is the
capstone piece of the book—as it
should be. One of his major conclu-
sions is that efforts to use coercive di-
plomacy fail two out of every three
times. To his credit, he takes care to
temper this finding with caution. For
example, he admits that leaders may
embrace a strategy of coercive diplo-
macy to convince a domestic audience
that “everything has been tried” to gain
support for war, rather than any effort
to truly change the target’s behavior.
Thus some historical examples of
“failures” of coercive diplomacy may
have been initiated with no expecta-
tion of international success. He also
tangentially touches another potential
category of “failure” that should have
been explored in greater depth and
might skew the percentage of failures
attributed to coercive diplomacy. One
of Art’s prescriptions for policy makers
is that coercive diplomacy should never
be attempted unless one is willing to go
to war if the effort fails. Sound advice,
but even a state that has already decided
to go to war should perceive a long-
shot attempt at coercive diplomacy not
as a policy failure per se but merely as
an option with a chance, however small,
of a large payoff with potentially no cost.
Art distills the findings of this book into
six guidelines for practitioners who
wish to employ coercive diplomacy.
Four of these were initially postulated
by Alexander George; their wisdom is
reconfirmed by the research in this
work. Two additional guidelines are de-
scribed as prerequisites for having a
chance at successfully utilizing coercive
diplomacy. “Demonstrative denial” is a
form of coercive diplomacy that works
better than “limited punishment.” The
other type of coercive diplomacy has al-
ready been mentioned. These guidelines
are far more than just a reiteration of
“common sense” or “good diplomatic
practices,” but true aids and cautions to
decision makers and should not be
taken lightly.
The United States Institute for Peace
should be commended for backing this
project, which deserves an audience
both inside academia and inside the
Beltway.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
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Macgregor, Douglas A. Transformation under Fire:
Revolutionizing How America Fights. Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 320pp. $34.95
This book provides an exceptional look
at a complex subject—bringing the U.S.
Army into the twenty-first century.
Building on the themes presented in his
book Breaking the Phalanx: A New De-
sign for Landpower in the 21st Century
(Praeger, 1997), Macgregor again calls
for the Army to leave behind, once and
for all, its “garrison” mentality and fully
embrace a joint expeditionary mindset.
He sees an army whose transformation
has bogged down because it chooses to
focus too narrowly on new technology
whose performance to date has fallen
short of expectations.
The value of this book is the construc-
tive manner in which it describes how
the Army (like all services, for that mat-
ter) should transform from a Cold War
force to one that is capable of meeting
the nation’s requirements in the new
century. Macgregor provides a lucid
and well reasoned argument on what
is wrong with the Army’s current ap-
proach to transformation. He asks sev-
eral simple but demanding questions:
Whom and where do we fight? How
should we fight? Most importantly,
what is the strategic purpose for the
Army in the future?
Macgregor makes clear that transforma-
tion must be more than wholesale re-
placement of current equipment using
new information and nanotechnologies.
Rather, what is needed, he insists, is
greater emphasis on developing fresh
ideas about how to restructure and reor-
ganize the current force. Such change
must be made in conjunction with a
rationally evolved plan that replaces
legacy equipment with tools that will
generate the desired combat effects
needed in the future. In his view, the
Army already has the skills and 90 per-
cent of the technology and platforms it
needs; what is missing is a “joint organi-
zational structure and combat leadership
philosophy” needed to exploit an effects-
based operational framework.
The current global war on terrorism, in
Macgregor’s view, provides the perfect
opportunity to change the Army. Yet
such transformation must not risk los-
ing what is clearly the finest fighting
force in the world today. America’s cur-
rent and future enemies are resourceful
and imaginative and will find ways to
obviate or mitigate current U.S. tactical
and strategic advantages, especially
where equipment and material are con-
cerned. To meet these evolving chal-
lenges, Macgregor repeatedly
admonishes the Army to develop and
articulate a concept for joint maneuver
and land strike that embraces a joint
operational architecture.
Leveraging ideas presented in other fo-
rums, the author recommends that the
nation’s security planners begin devel-
oping military command and control
organizations that are regionally fo-
cused and structured to incorporate
land, air, and sea elements into a joint
architecture integrated with and subor-
dinate to current regional combatant
commanders. To be effective their
forces must be capable of seamlessly
plugging into such regional command
and control arrangements. The Army in
particular, with its indigenous hierarchi-
cal and top-heavy command structure, is
ill suited to do so and must change if it is
to do its part in the joint fight.
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Throughout this work, Macgregor pro-
vides specific and concrete examples of
problems and solutions. He explains,
for instance, how the Army should
align itself in a joint architecture based
on combat maneuver groups composed
of light reconnaissance, airborne as-
sault, aviation combat, and early de-
ploying support. The purpose of such
groups is to integrate lean fighting units
with powerful strike assets that are not
only lethal in combat but have the nec-
essary strategic agility to achieve rapid
decisive results. Lest the reader think
that Macgregor is a proponent of
smaller and lighter forces, he also
makes clear there can be no substitute
for superior firepower in any fight. In
examining the most recent U.S. combat
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq,
Macgregor notes that the real challenge
of the close fight is that “the advantage
of information dominance diminishes
considerably”; “old-fashioned fire-
power delivered in mass” remains
essential.
The conclusion reminds us that the na-
ture of warfare will continue to change
and that the need for transformation
will only grow in importance as our en-
emies adapt to our past successes. The
process of transformation, he points
out, however, is not the sole responsi-
bility or purview of the Army—it re-
quires the best civilian and military
minds. Macgregor’s effort goes a long
way toward furthering that thinking
and is a must read for those who wish
to enter the military transformation
debate.
RONALD RATCLIFF
Naval War College
Karnad, Bharat. Nuclear Weapons and Indian Se-
curity. New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002. 724pp.
Rs795
Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul. India’s Maritime Security.
New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000. 208pp.
$42.64
Analysts and observers interested in
global security issues would do well to
pay closer attention to the always rich
debate in Indian security circles about
that country’s future national policies,
supporting budgets, and force struc-
tures. India is a rising power with a rap-
idly growing economy, an increasing
military budget, and in some key areas,
a newly enhanced national will to trans-
late its potential into broader influence
on the world stage. These two books are
excellent examples of the national de-
bate on how India should use its power
to protect and advance its growing na-
tional interests. Each covers specific
elements of India’s national security—
nuclear weapons and maritime security.
Bharat Karnad is an unabashed advo-
cate of a robust Indian nuclear weapons
structure, doctrine, and policy. Karnad,
a national security policy analyst at an
Indian think tank, the Centre for Policy
Research in New Delhi, was a member
of the First National Security Advisor
Board to the National Security Council
of India. In that capacity, he was a
member of the Nuclear Doctrine
Drafting Group. In the wake of India’s
May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, the
group produced a draft nuclear doc-
trine that was submitted to the National
Security Council in August 1999. (After
significant delay, the essence of the doc-
trine was adopted formally in January
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2003.) The author is squarely and
proudly in the realist school of political
science, basing his arguments and as-
sessments on the proposition that the
world is an anarchic place, that states
are the primary international actors,
and that power—with military power at
its core—is all that matters.
The book is sweeping in scope. Karnad
is prescriptive and uses his interpreta-
tion of history to create a strong case
for his prescribed end state for India
and its nuclear forces. This end state
consists of a nuclear force for India
containing 350–400 nuclear warheads/
weapons, some with megaton yields,
and a set of delivery systems that in-
cludes “sizable numbers” of interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
long-range cruise missiles. Given what
the author assumes will be the ICBM
force’s problems with accuracy, he rec-
ommends a countervalue strategy that
he deems sufficient to deter U.S. inter-
vention in Indian affairs. He also notes
that a force of this size and structure
would be sufficient to achieve notional
parity with China.
While it is easy to focus on the headline-
making conclusions that arise from
Karnad’s tome, a reader would do well
to take the time to read the entire piece
carefully. The first half of the book is a
comprehensive history and analysis of
India’s evolution as a nuclear power. In
this section, the author convincingly
challenges conventional wisdom about
the teachings and actions of India’s re-
vered “father of the nation,” Mahatma
Gandhi. Karnad argues that the nation’s
misinterpretations of Gandhi’s teach-
ings gave rise to a mistaken, and strate-
gically misguided, “moralpolitik” that
limited India’s ability to act decisively
to advance and protect its own national
interests in a Hobbesian world. In fact,
the author seeks to debunk the oft-cited
link between this moralpolitik and
traditional Indian culture and values as
expressed in the texts of ancient India.
The result of this political philosophy,
which championed morality in pursuit
of interests and led to “doctrinaire posi-
tions on the exercise of force” was that
India as a collective lacked the will to
achieve power in the decades following
its independence.
In the second thematic half of the book,
a 250-page chapter 5, Karnad uses more
recent historical examples and analyses
of real and potential great-power sce-
narios to make the case that India must
fashion a set of nuclear doctrines, poli-
cies, and capabilities to advance its re-
gional and global interests. Specifically,
he warns against deterrence by “half-
measures,” noting that India cannot
rely on other powers to protect it. Spe-
cifically, he argues that U.S. and Indian
interests, even currently, are likely to
converge only in the short term and
that India must have the military
wherewithal, specifically in the nuclear
realm, to ensure that it does not be-
come a vassal of Washington.
Roy-Chaudhury’s book also delves into
an element of India’s national security
and the appropriate policy to address it,
but his area of focus is one less fraught
with potential controversy—maritime
security. His recommended course of
action, that India adopt a new maritime
security policy to update and expand
the outdated and inadequate Ocean
Policy Statement of 1982, is also less
alarming. Roy-Chaudhury’s study is a
natural follow-up to his Sea Power and
Indian Security (Brassey’s, 1995), which
was favorably reviewed in the Summer
1996 issue of this journal. While his
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previous book chronicled Indian naval
developments, this work deftly outlines
the maritime dimensions of India’s se-
curity—economic, political, and mili-
tary—and suggests the development of
an overall policy framework to tie them
together.
Roy-Chaudhury is currently a Fellow
for South Asia at the International In-
stitute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London. This book was written while
he was a research fellow at the Institute
for Defense Studies and Analysis
(IDSA), a think tank funded by India’s
Ministry of Defense. While at IDSA,
Roy-Chaudhury specialized in naval
and maritime security affairs, and the
combination of his time in this envi-
ronment and his previous studies
makes him eminently qualified to pro-
duce a volume on such a subject.
The author outlines India’s impressive
economic growth in the last decade
and the international, particularly
maritime, implications of that trend.
In essence, India has become more de-
pendent on trade for its prosperity,
and, in turn, it has become more reliant
on such imported resources as crude
oil, with consumption of petroleum
products rising during the 1990s more
or less at the same rate as India’s gross
domestic product—about 7 percent per
annum. Roy-Chaudhury picks up the
concerns of his first book about the im-
portance of a viable national merchant
fleet in addition to a navy for a coun-
try’s security, noting that India’s rap-
idly growing trade is not being met by a
similar growth in either India’s mer-
chant fleet or port handling capacity.
The author describes a range of interna-
tional economic groupings to which
India became a member in the 1990s
and how those may bolster even further
India’s trade ties.
He goes on to discuss India’s rights and
interests in its exclusive economic zone,
the maritime portions of India’s long-
standing rivalry with Pakistan, and the
rise of such new, nonstate security is-
sues in the Indian Ocean as piracy and
arms and narcotics trafficking. He high-
lights the changing capabilities of four
countries with naval presence in the
Indian Ocean, making the case that
more traditional security issues remain
salient and indeed may grow in their
maritime dimensions. He then essen-
tially picks up from his earlier book and
describes the Indian Navy’s moderniza-
tion over the decade of the 1990s. Here
he notes that despite increasing mari-
time security issues and increased atten-
tion paid to the navy, the recommended
force structure outlined in 1964, consist-
ing of fifty-four principal combatants,
has yet to be reached. Where Karnad
attributes shortfalls in India’s nuclear
forces primarily to a lack of political will,
Roy-Chaudhury makes a more mixed
case for the navy’s shortfall. He notes the
lack of funding over the years, the col-
lapse of India’s primary supplier (the
Soviet Union) in the early 1990s, and
the slow transition of India from a buyer
of combatants to a builder.
Roy-Chaudhury concludes, after a dis-
cussion of naval cooperation, that the
various dimensions of India’s security
that rely on the sea are growing more
important, not less. Therefore, he rec-
ommends that the Indian government
as a whole, not just the navy or the
Ministry of Defense, adopt a national-
level maritime security policy, essentially
an updated and expanded ocean policy
statement. He was brought into the
National Security Council Secretariat to
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implement such a recommendation.
While a draft policy was drawn up in
2001, it has yet to be promulgated,
pending the formation of greater insti-
tutional links among various Indian
ministries with responsibilities in this
area. The Ministry of Defense was
tasked to initiate such an
interministerial coordinating body, but
so far the policy has not been formal-
ized. Even without such a public policy,
India is moving ahead with enhancing
its maritime security in all its spheres.
ANDREW C. WINNER
Naval War College
Smith, Edward A., Jr. Effects Based Operations:
Applying Network-centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,
and War. Washington, D.C.: Department of De-
fense Command and Control Research Program,
2002. 545pp. $20
“Effects-based operations [EBO] are co-
ordinated sets of actions directed at
shaping the behavior of friends, foes,
and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.”
This definition is offered in Edward
Smith’s long, tortuous study, Effects
Based Operations. Substitute the terms
“speeches by the president,” “negotia-
tions by diplomats,” or “economic
sanctions” for “effects-based opera-
tions,” and the emptiness of this defini-
tion becomes all too evident.
The major difficulty with this work,
however, lies in the following passage:
“The very nature of military competi-
tion should make it clear that would-be
foes will attempt to exploit any warfare
niche in which they believe the United
States and its allies cannot successfully
engage. Logically, these would-be foes
will see exploitable niches wherever
network-centric and effects-based oper-
ations are least applicable. Urban and
guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism op-
erations, peacekeeping efforts, and hos-
tage rescues are just a few examples.”
With this statement, Smith has gratu-
itously undermined the importance and
value of effects-based operations (drag-
ging network-centric operations along
in the process), for those “niches” con-
stitute the shortlist of operations U.S.
military forces will be undertaking for
the foreseeable future.
This is a complex and ambitious book,
which progresses from a general dis-
cussion of EBO through chapters that
illustrate the relationship with network-
centric operations, discuss operations
in the cognitive domain, and describe
how complexity factors into the pic-
ture. Toward the end of the book an
operational example is offered before
some general conclusions are reached.
Effects-based operations, we are repeat-
edly reminded, focus on the mind of
man. The “effects-based strategy is con-
ceived and executed as a direct assault
on the opponent’s will and not a by-
product of destroying his capability to
wage war.” Just what the “opponent’s
will” constitutes is not clearly ad-
dressed. Is it the will of the soldiers in
the field, the will of the civilians sup-
porting the effort, or the will of the
leadership? The differences in Opera-
tion IRAQI FREEDOM are noteworthy.
The will of the Iraqi armed forces was
quickly broken, as they threw down
their arms and fled. But was the will of
Saddam, of the brothers Hussein, or of
the Iraqi resistance broken? How can
one confidently determine a change in
will, and how can one be totally sure
that the change is permanent? No
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theory is offered to help the reader un-
derstand how to break the will of
fanatics.
In a long, intricate work there are
bound to be contradictions, but when
they cut to the core of the argument,
they become disconcerting. For exam-
ple, one reads: “In effects-based opera-
tions, therefore, actions and their
effects are not and cannot be isolated.
They are interrelated.” But later the au-
thor writes, “If those disproportionate
effects are to shape behavior in the di-
rection we want, however, we must fig-
ure out first how to trace the path of an
action to a certain effect, and then how
to plan the right actions to set the chain
in motion.”
None of this means that effects-based
operations should not be pursued—
only that Smith does not have it quite
right. Better, one should think carefully
about EBO in terms of objectives. Rear
Admiral Henry Eccles provided in these
pages over twenty years ago the key in-
sight in this regard: “The objectives rep-
resent ‘the effect desired,’ what one is
seeking to achieve by the use of military
force.” Eccles guides one to the recogni-
tion that the selection of objectives pro-
vides the desired effect—hence the basis
for effects-based warfare. Of course,
one can select objectives for which the
effects either are monumentally diffi-
cult to achieve or can never be clearly
determined. To change the will of, say,
Osama Bin Laden falls squarely in this
latter category.
Unfortunately, the publisher of this
book did not do Smith or his readers any
favor by printing the text in a sans-serif
font in a fully justified format. There is
a reason why books and newspapers use
serif fonts—“kerning” of letters and
words makes them significantly easier
to read in small type sizes. The book
also lacks an index, which makes find-
ing items quite a feat, and the footnotes
do not correlate with the text.
Effects Based Operations is presented in
the first person plural. Employment of
the first person plural has two serious
drawbacks—consistency and advocacy.
On some pages “we” takes on at least
three separate meanings—U.S. decision
makers, the author himself, and the au-
thor and his reader. In other places
“we” appears to refer to the U.S. Navy,
and elsewhere to U.S. military forces.
This proves rather confusing for the
reader, who is continually challenged to
discern to whom the author is referring.
Use of the first person, moreover, gives
this book the tang of an in-house, parti-
san staff study rather than a dispassion-
ate analysis.
Finally, the bibliography is thin, omit-
ting such important works as General
David Deptula’s Effects-Based Opera-
tions: Change in the Nature of Warfare
(Aerospace Education Foundation,
2001) and Paul Davis’s Effects-Based
Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge
for the Analytical Community (RAND,
2001).
All in all, this book was a disappoint-
ment, weighed down by its length, its
complexity, and its many flaws.
ROGER W. BARNETT
Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
Voorhees, James. Dialogue Sustained: The Multi-
level Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2002. 470pp. $24.95
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For over thirty years, the Dartmouth
Conference has been a multifaceted
arena for sustained dialogue between
the United States and the Soviet Union
(later the Russian Federation). The con-
ference, structured in plenary meetings
and task forces, enabled the two super-
power adversaries to edge slowly to-
ward greater understanding. It was one
of the earliest efforts to engage the Sovi-
ets outside of official channels, and it
succeeded, although sometimes in Cold
War fits and starts, by bringing together
a consistent group of experts.
In his detailed history of the Dartmouth
Conference, James Voorhees connects
first-person reflections and memories
of the participants with documentation
of Dartmouth planning and reporting.
He also undertakes a thorough review
of the literature and engages two long-
time conference participants, Harold
Saunders and Vitaly Zhurkin, to ana-
lyze the lessons learned.
All three are well placed to reflect upon
the value of the Dartmouth process.
Voorhees is an associate of, and
Saunders is the director of international
affairs at, the Kettering Foundation, the
institution that funded the conference
for many years and served as its intellec-
tual “home.” Zhurkin, director emeritus
of the Institute of Europe in the Russian
Academy of Sciences, began his partici-
pation with the conference in 1971.
The result is a book that brings the
Dartmouth process alive against the
backdrop of key events in the U.S.-
Russian relationship, beginning in the
1950s and extending almost to the pres-
ent day. In that respect, it is good read-
ing for anyone interested in the history
of the Cold War.
This work is also important because it
describes the continuing value of the
process. Yevgeny Primakov, a long-time
participant, expressed this well when he
wrote to Saunders during the book’s
preparation: “The whole history of the
Dartmouth meetings demonstrates the
usefulness of such non-official group[s].
. . .[F]ormal contacts do not exclude
the necessity of non-official exchange of
opinions in particular between those
people who have the capability to re-
port their impressions and conclusions
after such exchanges to the highest state
officials.”
Furthermore, the process has had valu-
able offshoots, such as the Inter-Tajik
Dialogue, which Saunders cochaired
from its inception. The dialogue has
been effective in resolving what seemed
to be an intractable civil war in
Tajikistan. Dartmouth, in short, has
given birth to some productive notions
of conflict resolution, and Voorhees,
Saunders, and Zhurkin describe their
potential well.
The book’s shortcomings are in two
areas. First, its description of government
policy making falls prey to oversimplifi-
cation. Anyone who believes that politi-
cal appointees stick to making policy
and professional bureaucrats stick to
implementing it has never watched the
British television comedy Yes, Prime
Minister, the classic program that
chronicles relations between minister
and mandarin in the British govern-
ment. Its lessons apply equally well in
Washington, and probably also in Mos-
cow. That aside, if the book had ac-
knowledged more of a symbiotic
relationship between political appoint-
ees and bureaucrats in the policy-
making process, it might have granted
an even more influential role to the
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Dartmouth Conference. In other words,
the meetings and briefings that the au-
thor recounts, involving many layers of
the U.S. government, probably provided
multiple points at which Dartmouth in-
sights could enter U.S. policy.
The book’s second problem is rather
scant recognition that Dartmouth was
largely a “closed loop system” on the
Russian side, involving “the same, lim-
ited number of figures whom the Soviet
authorities permitted to have this kind
of access to Americans.” Undoubtedly,
the stalwarts of the cooperation from
the Institute of the USA and Canada
and other institutes had links into the
Soviet policy-making system. Neverthe-
less, the limitations on who could par-
ticipate meant that for many years the
dialogue lacked access to key areas of
expertise, such as arms control, on the
Russian side—a fact that Voorhees
freely acknowledges.
It is also worth considering whether the
benefits of a close and continuing rela-
tionship with a few chosen people were,
in the end, the dialogue’s downfall. In
the 1990s, as more and more Russian
experts from a variety of institutions
became available, they migrated into a
plethora of international security and
policy forums. Because it was full to
capacity, however, the Dartmouth
Conference was not always able to ac-
commodate this “new blood.” One
Russian participant expressed the di-
lemma well: “We have lost our audi-
ence. The government isn’t interested,
and besides our institutes have lost
their influence.”
Despite these problems, the Dartmouth
process clearly played a vital role in de-
veloping communications between the
two superpowers during the Cold War.
As this book makes clear, the
conference’s legacy will abide in the
conflict-resolution techniques to which
it gave life.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER
Senior Associate,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Lipsky, David. Absolutely American: Four Years at
West Point. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.
336pp. $25
Steven Covey advises us to start with
the end in mind, so here it is. If the
reader knows of a young person who
aspires to attend a college-level military
academy, any one of them, give that
person this book to read, cover to cover.
David Lipsky has written an entertain-
ing and sobering book about life as it is
lived at the U.S. Military Academy. He
did so by living in Highland Falls, New
York, for four years and by having un-
precedented daily access to the cadet
students and their mentors. The book
inspires, using a quiet style of observa-
tion that captures the poignancy and
irony of moments without being
judgmental.
Lipsky, a journalist for Rolling Stone
magazine, periodically chronicles mod-
ern college campus life. He admits to
having been reluctant to take on the
West Point assignment, because he had
been brought up not to like the mili-
tary. Jann Wenner, his publisher and
boss, convinced him otherwise.
So, as the author states in the preface,
he learned to road-march, live and nav-
igate in the woods, recognize ranks, and
absorb other basic military knowledge.
Along the way, he experienced an epiph-
any: “Not only was the Army not the
awful thing my father had imagined, it
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was the sort of America he always pic-
tured when he explained . . . his best
hopes for the country. A place where ev-
eryone tried their hardest. A place where
people—or at least most people—looked
out for each other. A place where peo-
ple—intelligent, talented people—said
honestly that money wasn’t what drove
them. A place where people spoke
openly about their feelings and about
trying to make themselves better.”
The author followed a class at West
Point from first (plebe) year through
graduation. Lipsky finds that the stu-
dents there experience elements of cam-
pus life not unlike those on civilian
campuses: sex, cliques, the Internet, al-
cohol, and in a very minor way, drugs.
He also learns to appreciate the acad-
emy’s motto: “Duty, Honor, and Coun-
try.” As one student reflects on the
experience, he states that “becoming a
military officer isn’t just a profession,
it’s a calling.” Lipsky illustrates how life
at West Point is not easy. The tension
and stress between the normal tempta-
tions of modern American life and the
peculiar structures, strictures, and
norms necessary to become a commis-
sioned U.S. Army officer sometimes
prove too much.
However, those who persevere make for
the most interesting stories. We learn
of the “golden boy,” a self-motivated
cadet who finds himself unable to chose
infantry as a branch and anguishes
whether he should “take five and fly”
to live with his true love or follow the
calling. There is the “sad sack,” who,
because he has a terrible time perform-
ing physical tasks, is routinely targeted
by his tactical officers for separation
and yet stubbornly hangs on and
graduates, to the astonishment and
admiration of his peers. There is the
“reluctant leader,” who only wants to
play football but is transformed into a
first-rate tactical leader who leads a
rag-tag orienteering team to a moral
victory.
Not all of Lipsky’s stories are inspira-
tional, however. He also discusses,
without judgment, a very real phenom-
enon in the military—the gap between
teaching high standards and values, and
practicing them. So objective are
Lipsky’s observations that one wonders
if he realizes what he’s reporting. The
most moving story, and a prime exam-
ple of high standards and values, is the
one of a department head—a combat
veteran lieutenant colonel who sets for
cadets exceptionally high standards and
inspires them to achieve those stan-
dards (one cadet preserved the stub of
this officer’s cigar in a plastic bag as an
icon). When one of the colonel’s subor-
dinate officers produces a highly con-
troversial and politically incorrect
report, the colonel takes responsibility
for it, protecting his subordinate from
an investigation that could end his
career. However, for his actions, the
colonel was dismissed from the Army
because he “failed to exhibit the three
Army values: Honor, Respect, and Loy-
alty.” There is true irony.
Still, this is a small affair in the effort to
mold character at West Point. Let the
cynicism and skepticism wait for now.
This work is a testimony to the eternal
hopefulness and idealism of youth.
Read it and remember.
JONATHAN E. CZARNECKI
Associate Professor, Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program
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Massie, Robert K. Castles of Steel: Britain, Ger-
many, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea.
New York: Random House, 2003. 880pp. $35
This work is the sequel to Pulitzer
Prize–winning author Robert Massie’s
Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the
Coming of the Great War (Random
House, 1991). It is a sweeping narrative
of World War I at sea. While it focuses
primarily on the struggle between the
main German and British fleets, it also
examines the German U-boat cam-
paign, other revolutions in undersea
weaponry, the pivotal role of good in-
telligence, and the broad geographic
scope of the war. The book provides a
clear sense of how important the clash
of British and German navies was to the
war’s eventual outcome, and it illus-
trates how Winston Churchill’s dra-
matic description of Admiral John
Jellicoe, commander in chief of the
British Grand Fleet, as “the only com-
mander who could lose the war in an
afternoon” could be an accurate one.
This is also a cautionary tale of failures
and missed opportunities. In the earli-
est stages of the conflict, we see both
sides baffled when their opponent’s ac-
tions do not match prewar assump-
tions. The German naval strategy, for
example, was based on the certainty
that the British would immediately at-
tack the German fleet or institute a
close-in blockade. When this did not
happen, Massie writes, “the premise on
which the Germans had based their
strategy was overturned.” Consequently,
German admirals “discovered that they
did not know what to do.” When the
German fleet, on the other hand, did not
come charging out for a fight, the British
public, expecting another Trafalgar,
became annoyed with the navy’s “un-
willingness” to act. Each side scrambled
to formulate a new strategy. There is a
clear lesson here—flexibility, not plans
set in stone.
The author shows that the most costly
strategic failure, however, was the Ger-
man resumption of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare. By no means is this a
groundbreaking interpretation, but in
these pages the course of action leading
to the decision is made clear. The fail-
ure of the vaunted High Seas Fleet to
carry out its anticipated task of whittling
down the Grand Fleet painted the Ger-
mans into a strategic corner from which
they eventually saw unrestricted subma-
rine warfare as their only alternative.
Despite these explanations of strategy,
Castles of Steel is also a readable and
dramatic work. The narrative rushes
along, with a desperate hunt for the en-
emy in the vast Pacific, with fleets and
squadrons that speed toward each other
without a hint of the other’s presence,
and with battle cruisers that appear out
of the mist to shell unsuspecting coastal
villages and then slip quietly away. Ac-
tion in the North Sea, the book’s pri-
mary theater, culminates in a gripping
four-chapter account of Jutland. Mean-
while, the fog of battle makes command
and control difficult, even with the new
technology of wireless communication.
In the words of British admiral David
Beatty, the war at sea became “a conflict
with the unexpected,” despite the best-
laid plans. The reader can sense the
drama and urgency born of this uncer-
tainty on every page.
Yet while acknowledging the great nar-
rative allure of vast fleets fighting for
control of the seas, some readers might
question the relevance of such a lengthy
analysis. After all, was it not the overall
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experience of the First World War that
marked the passing of the Mahanian
ideal of climactic shoot-outs between
battleships and pointed to new realities
in naval strategy? Almost from the time
the echo of the guns in the North Sea
faded, naval strategy shifted to things
radically different from decisive battles
between capital ships. The strategic
framework of Forward . . . from the Sea
appears to have little in common with
Jutland or Dogger Bank.
Nevertheless, the struggle to adapt to
this shift is part of the experience we see
unfolding in Castles of Steel. Jellicoe
came to realize that his fleet’s primary
purpose “was not destruction of the en-
emy fleet, but command of the sea with
the accompanying ability to maintain
the blockade.” Ultimately, we see a suc-
cessful adjustment on the strategic level
by the British, contrasted with a com-
plete failure of German grand strategy.
Finally, this is clearly a well researched
book. Telling figures on German eco-
nomic imports show precisely the effect
of the British blockade. Information on
the coal consumption of ships could
easily have been left out, but because of
its inclusion, we have a much better un-
derstanding of a ship’s limitations and
abilities. The reader comes to know the
characters involved in the drama, and
we can thereby understand their
choices better. Robert Massie’s careful
attention is evident throughout the
book and contributes to its stature as a
seminal volume in understanding
World War I at sea, as well as the evolu-
tion of seapower and strategy in the
early twentieth century.
DAVID A. SMITH
Department of History,
Baylor University
Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows &
Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare
in the Ancient World. New York: Overlook, 2003.
319pp. $27.95
Adrienne Mayor’s recent effort is a
comprehensive review of the use of bio-
logical and chemical weapons by an-
cient cultures. Mayor is an independent
scholar of the classics and folklore who
lives in Princeton, New Jersey. She has
been published in MHQ: Quarterly
Journal of Military History and various
archeology journals, and she is the au-
thor of The First Fossil Hunters: Paleon-
tology in Greek and Roman Times
(Princeton Univ. Press, 2000); a simi-
larly titled program is scheduled for the
History Channel in July 2004.
This work describes in detail the use of
weapons of mass destruction by the an-
cient cultures of Greece, Rome, China,
India, Islamic regions, and Mongolia.
Mayor presents a much needed update
of the historical use of these weapons. If
modern scientists appear to understand
the nature and effects of chemical and
biological weapons through their exper-
tise in biochemical and molecular sci-
ences and epidemiology, ancient
civilizations created and used similar
weapons by empirical evidence alone.
The (mythical) first use of a biological
weapon in the ancient world was by
Hercules, who dipped his arrows in the
venom of the slain Hydra. Ancient
myths may also reflect the realities of
their time. Descriptions of poisoned
wounds in the Trojan War accurately
depict the effects of snake venom and
other toxins, lending confirmation of
the use of this type of weapon. In AD
198–99, the citizens of Hatra (the
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remains of this city are located south of
Masul, Iraq) successfully defended their
city from a Roman attack by the use of
clay-pot bombs likely filled with scorpi-
ons and other venomous insects gath-
ered from the surrounding desert.
Hannibal catapulted earthenware jars
filled with venomous snakes during a
decisive naval battle against King
Eumenes of Pergamum between 190
and 184 BC.
One of the greatest current concerns in
homeland defense today is the protec-
tion of food and water supplies from
intentional contamination. Mayor pre-
sents evidence that purposeful poisoning
of food and water sources as a military
tactic was once commonplace. The ear-
liest documentation of poisoned drink-
ing water referenced is from Greece in
590 BC, when hellebore was used to poi-
son the water source of the city Kirrha
by the Amphictyonic League, causing
the inhabitants to become “violently
sick to their stomachs and all lay unable
to move. The Amphictyons took the
city without opposition.” Aeneas the
Tactician in 350 BC wrote a siegecraft
manual recommending that military
commanders “make water undrink-
able” by polluting rivers, lakes, springs,
wells, and cisterns. A more recent anal-
ogy is presented with the Iroquois’ use
of animal skins to cause illness in the
water supply of over a thousand French
soldiers during the eighteenth century.
The earliest recorded use of incendiary
weapons was of flammable arrows by
Persia against Athens in 480 BC. Chemi-
cal additives soon followed in order to
enhance burning characteristics against
more sturdy defenses. The use of fire
and incendiary material was an impor-
tant tool during early naval battles.
During Alexander the Great’s siege of
Tyre in 332 BC, the Phoenicians refitted
a large transport ship as a floating
chemical firebomb with sulfur, bitu-
men, pitch, and kindling material. The
Phoenicians ignited the ship just before
it struck a pier on the fortified island;
the pier was destroyed.
Greek fire, an ancient predecessor of
napalm, was a weapons system used to
attack ships during naval engagements.
Pressurized distilled naphtha was
pumped through bronze tubes aimed at
ships. The delivery system was capable
of shooting liquid fire from swiveling
nozzles mounted on small boats. It was
first used to break the Muslim navy’s
siege of Constantinople in AD 673, and
again saved the city from this fleet in AD
718. From the seventh century, the
Byzantines and Arabs formulated varia-
tions on Greek fire, which resembled
napalm, for “it clung to everything it
touched, instantly igniting any organic
material—ship’s hull, oars, rigging,
crew, and their clothing. Nothing was
immune.” A paper published for
Napoleon claims to have rediscovered
the lost recipe for Greek fire, with the
disturbing title “Weapons for the
Burning of Armies.”
A thread throughout Mayor’s history is
unease or taboos associated with bio-
logical and chemical weapons. Victims
of Hercules’ poison arrows included
Chiron, a centaur who taught the medi-
cal arts to humans, and Hercules’ son,
Telephus. Such instruments violated
the “traditional Hindu laws of conduct
for Brahmans and high castes, the
Laws of Manu.” In 1139 the Second
Lateran Council decreed that Greek
fire and similar burning weapons were
“too murderous” to be used in Europe.
A modern chemical weapon tragedy re-
counted by Mayor is the 2 December
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1943 German bombing of the SS John
Harvey, which was docked in Bari, Italy,
secretly holding two thousand M47A1
sulfur mustard (H) bombs. The explo-
sion exposed U.S. personnel and Italian
citizens to chemical weapons, which re-
sulted in hundreds of deaths.
This work imparts seminal information
on the use of biological and chemical
weapons in the ancient world, and as
such it provides an outlook missing
from much current thought about this
era. It is highly recommended.
ZYGMUNT DEMBEK
Lieutenant Colonel, MS, USAR
Author of Biological Weapons Defense (Humana
Press, 2004)
Rubin, Barry, and Judith Colp Rubin. Yasir Arafat:
A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2003. 354pp. $27.50
The Palestinian people would have been
better off as citizens of Israel. That is a
conclusion one can reach after digesting
the political biography of Yasir Arafat
by the veteran Middle Eastern writer-
reporter team of Barry Rubin and
Judith Colp Rubin.
The book is clear on its takeaways. To
understand Arafat, you must under-
stand the “struggle” as well as his rec-
ord of failure. Arafat now holds the
record for creating, and remaining the
leader of, the planet’s longest-running
revolutionary movement, while at the
same time failing to bring the Palestin-
ian struggle to a successful conclusion.
In his adult life, Arafat has spent five
decades as a revolutionary, forty years
as chief of his own group, thirty-plus
years as a leader of an entire people, and
seven years as head of a government.
Despite all the opportunities and re-
sponsibility, Arafat has not brought the
Palestinian people peace, victory, or an
independent state. His failures and his
own vision of the “struggle” have cost
the Palestinians dearly. When, in 2000
at Camp David, he was offered a recog-
nized Palestinian state on generally rea-
sonable terms, he walked away. His
rejection of the offer ignited the current
intifadah.
This fresh dissection of Arafat should
be of great interest to Review readers
looking for insight as to why the United
States has often appeared “eager to give
Arafat another chance” in its own quest
to broker a lasting Middle East peace.
For years, no matter how many times
Arafat proved unreliable, the United
States found reasons to give him an-
other chance. Either he is indispensable
to the peacemaking process, or he is the
lone remaining roadblock. If the United
States is ever to break this maddening
cycle, it must first know Arafat for who
he really is.
The Rubins’ portrait of Arafat may be
the most intimate to date, exposing him
to the reader and asking questions that
beg for answers. How did such a man
become the leader of his people? What
human “tools” does Arafat exploit?
If one reads only a single chapter, make
it “Being Yasir Arafat.” Reading like a
psychological profile from a CIA dos-
sier, this chapter not only details some
of Arafat’s most intimate behavior,
habits, beliefs, and idiosyncrasies but
goes on to connect the dots to provide
the why of his behavior: Why does
Arafat forever wear the traditional Arab
kaffiya head garb, and why is it folded a
certain way? Why does he always sport
the scruffy beard? Why is he always
dressed in a military uniform when he
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is a political leader? Explanations of
these quirks provide colorful insight
into this man’s character.
Violence is a pervasive theme of Arafat’s
life. Despite his professed commitment
to the peace process, Arafat is a demon-
strated man of violence, the Rubins
charge, well connected to global terror-
ism. The Rubins present strong evi-
dence that Arafat not only has a long
history of duplicity in terrorist events
but in many cases personally plotted,
encouraged, and triggered the violence
himself. As early as the mid-1970s, the
Palestinian Liberation Army had a re-
cord of involvement in skyjackings,
bombings, assassinations, and murders.
Arafat learned from experience, despite
what world leaders told him, that vio-
lence paid.
Overall, the Rubins evince abhorrence
of Arafat. It appears there really is little
to like about the man. Among other
traits, in the Rubins’ view, he is petty,
arrogant, megalomaniacal, and disin-
genuous. The Rubins carefully place
evidential anecdotes to support their
portrayal. Typical is Arafat’s purported
response to the question of why he lied
so much—“I would kill for Palestine, so
you don’t want me to lie for Palestine?”
The book keeps his deplorable traits in
plain sight, as a policeman would say,
“where it can’t hurt you.” However
much one would just want him to go
away, his prominent role in contempo-
rary Middle Eastern affairs cannot be
ignored.
This book performs a valuable service
as a primer on the characters, organiza-
tions, and connections in the shadowy
world of Middle Eastern terrorism and
Islamic radicalism. A short but useful
glossary and chronology further help
one make these associations.
This is a pure biography. It is impres-
sively documented with thoughtful
analysis, deliberately focused on Yasir
Arafat. It is not intended as a history of
the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, or Israel. However, for readers
who are already certain about Arafat’s
character, the Rubins’ account may sur-
pass even the most critical assessments.
C. J. KRISINGER
Headquarters, Air Mobility Command
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
Kerrey, Bob. When I Was a Young Man: A Mem-
oir. New York: Harcourt, 2002. 270pp. $26
Bob Kerrey’s absorbing memoir tells
the story of his coming of age in the
Midwest and his loss of innocence in
Vietnam, where he was grievously
wounded. Congressional Medal of
Honor recipient, former governor and
senator from Nebraska, Kerrey opens
and closes his book by describing his
efforts to keep a promise he made to his
dying father—to learn how his father’s
brother died in World War II. He states
that he wanted this work to be about
his father and his uncle but that the
story he ended up telling “is not the
story I intended to tell.”
Kerrey first recounts his vintage child-
hood in Lincoln, Nebraska, and earning
his pharmacology degree at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska. In 1966, knowing he
would likely be drafted, and inspired by
Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny,
Kerrey joined the Navy and entered Of-
ficer Candidate School. Once commis-
sioned, he volunteered for underwater
demolition team training, and after
completion, he was selected for the
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Navy’s new special-mission SEAL (sea,
air, land) combat teams.
After more arduous training in weap-
ons and tactics, Kerrey was soon sent to
Vietnam. He writes, “To say that I
barely had a clue about what I was do-
ing in Vietnam understates the case.”
He led two SEAL missions in Vietnam
in early 1969 that redefined and trans-
formed his life. In the first mission, he
led his six-man squad at night into the
small village of Thanh Phong, where
high-level Vietcong were suspected of
meeting. The resulting firefight, in
which women and children were killed,
caused Kerrey to feel “a sickness in my
heart for what we had done.” He states,
“The young, innocent, man who went
into Vietnam died that night. . . . I had
become someone I did not recognize.”
On his next mission, just over two
weeks later, his right foot was nearly en-
tirely blown off. Kerrey writes, “With
difficulty I pulled myself upright so I
could direct my men.” He tied off his
mangled leg with a tourniquet and in-
jected himself with morphine. His war
had lasted barely two months.
Kerrey had much of his right leg ampu-
tated. He then started the long and
painful process of recovery at the Phila-
delphia Naval Hospital. He chose Phila-
delphia because it was the farthest from
his home and the people he knew. He
wanted to recover alone, and he “did
not want to have to answer questions
about what I had done in the war.”
While there, Kerrey also learned that he
had been submitted for the Medal of
Honor for his last mission. Not feeling
deserving, he was told by friends that
“no one ever does,” and that he must
“accept this award for everyone who
should have been recognized but was
not.” Kerrey’s chronicle of his recovery
with other critically wounded is per-
haps the most poignant and memorable
portion of this eloquent memoir. He
was discharged from the Navy in De-
cember 1969, determined to make the
most of his second chance and “begin
his second life with gratitude.”
Kerrey’s candid and moving story starts
and ends with a quest, but he does not
offer a neat resolution for the anguish
caused by his violence in Vietnam. Al-
though unable to find out enough in-
formation about his uncle’s death in the
Philippines in 1944, he was perhaps
able to keep his promise to his father
after all, by honoring his uncle as a sol-
dier “who should have been recognized
but was not.” Kerrey was also able to
come to terms with his experiences dur-
ing the war. Kerrey’s spare and haunt-
ing story is a meaningful addition to the
literature of war.
WILLIAM CALHOUN
Naval War College
1 9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2004.vp
Monday, March 29, 2004 8:30:04 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
194
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss2/1
FROM THE EDITORS
NEW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS:
STRATEGIC SURPRISE?
Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century, edited
by Jonathan D. Pollack, has just been issued by the Press. Dr. Pollack is director
of the Strategic Research Department in the Naval War College’s Center for Na-
val Warfare Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. The papers
he has collected in this volume were first presented at the Naval War College’s
Asia-Pacific Forum, held here in Newport on 6–7 February 2003. The confer-
ence and book were made possible by the generosity of the Raytheon Corpora-
tion, through the Naval War College Foundation. Strategic Surprise? is available
at $27 ($23 for Foundation members) from the Naval War College Foundation
Museum Store (401-848-8300), or by e-mail at kosterj@nwc.navy.mil.
MEMOIRS OF ADMIRAL H. KENT HEWITT, 1887–1972
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, whose career spanned the first fifty years of the twenti-
eth century, played a leading role in the World War II Allied invasions of North
Africa and southern Europe. He also had a long and close association with the
Naval War College; the College’s Eccles Library is housed in Hewitt Hall, named
in his memory. His memoirs, edited by Dr. Evelyn Cherpak, archivist of the Na-
val War College, have just been issued by the Naval War College Press. Covering
his ancestry, boyhood, early education, Naval Academy experience, and active-
duty years, the memoirs were among the admiral’s papers presented by his
family to the College’s Naval Historical Collection, overseen by Dr. Cherpak,
between 1973 and 1976. The Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, 1887–1972 is
available from the Naval War College Foundation Museum Store.
HISTORY OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Dr. John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History and chair-
man of the College’s Maritime History Department, has generously undertaken
to produce, first, an essay-length history of publishing at the Naval War College
and of the Naval War College Press specifically; and second, a permanent display
of materials on the subject. Watch for the article in future issues, and for the
display when you visit Founders Hall, which houses both our offices and the
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College’s Museum. (The exhibit will be replicated “virtually” on our website,
and a smaller display will appear in the planned Museum annex in Newport’s
historic Fort Adams.)
THE EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN
NAVAL HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to the
researcher who has the greatest need and can make the optimum use of re-
search materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s Archives,
Naval Historical Collection, and Henry E. Eccles Library. A guide to the Col-
lege’s manuscript, archival, and oral history collections may be found on the
Naval War College’s website, www.nwc.navy.mil (click on “Library,” then
“Library Publications,” then “Naval Historical Collection”). Further informa-
tion on the collections and copies of the registers for specific collections are
available on request from the Head, Naval Historical Collection (e-mail
cherpake@nwc.navy.mil).
The recipient will be a Research Fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime
History Department, which will provide administrative support during the re-
search visit. Submit a detailed research proposal that includes statement of need
and plan for optimal use of Naval War College materials, curriculum vitae, at
least one letter of recommendation, and relevant background information to
Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War College Foundation,
686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207, by 1 August 2004. Employees of
the U.S. Naval War College or any agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are
not eligible for consideration; EEO/AA regulations apply.
SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) will hold its
annual conference 24–27 June 2004 at the University of Texas at Austin. The
conference will be attended by approximately three hundred academics and
professionals working in the fields of history and international relations both in
the United States and abroad. The 2004 conference will highlight recent innova-
tions in cultural history, cultural studies, and military history as they pertain to
diplomatic history, under the theme of “Borderlands, Frontiers, Peace, and War.”
For further information contact the conference coordinator, Sara Wilson, at
shafr@mail.la.utexas.edu, or telephone (512) 471-3261.
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NEWPORT PAPERS
Subscribe (free of charge) to our Newport Papers monograph series or obtain
copies of specific titles by contacting the editorial office at (401) 841-2236 or
press@nwc.navy.mil.
1. “Are We Beasts?” Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II “Area Bombing,”
by Christopher C. Harmon
2. Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for
the 1990s, by Gary W. Anderson
3. The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, by Horace B.
Robertson, Jr.
4. Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile
5. Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, by
Gary W. Anderson
6. The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve
of the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer
7. Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German
States, by Mark E. Victorson
8. Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenberg
9. A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and
Spain, by James J. Tritten and Luigi Donolo
10. Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Glenn E. James
11. The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strategy:
Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman
12. What Color Helmet? Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates, by Myron H.
Nordquist
13. Sailing New Seas, by J. Paul Reason, with David G. Freymann
14. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component
Commander, by Charles C. Swicker
15. International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Con-
ventions during International Armed Conflict, by Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen
16. The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet
Submarines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr.
17. The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military
Affairs, by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds
18. Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial
Implications of Network-centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and
Andrew L. Ross
19. The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John B. Hattendorf.
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